Given the complicated nature of this valuation case, we note that valuation issues are inherently imprecise and capable of resolution only by a Solomon-like pronouncement. Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980); Messing v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967). As this case is appealable to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, we have endeavored to follow that court's view of the valuation process.

In prior cases we have cautioned the parties that we may find that the evidence of value presented by one of the parties is "sufficiently more convincing than that of the other party, so that the final result will produce a significant financial defeat for one or the other, rather than a middle-of-the-road compromise which we suspect each of the parties expects the Court to reach." Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980); see also Boltar, L.L.C. v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 326, 333-40 (2011) (rejecting expert opinion that disregards relevant facts affecting valuation or exaggerates value to incredible levels as unreliable and unhelpful to the Court). We also may accept only those portions of expert opinions that we find reliable.

And we may adopt or reject an expert's opinion in whole or in part. Davis v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 530, 538 (1998); see also Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980). Valuation is a question of fact, and the factors considered in determining value should be weighed according to the circumstances in each case.

Under section 1245, all deductions for depreciation are recouped as ordinary income to the extent a taxpayer realizes a corresponding gain on the disposition of his section 1245 property. See e.g., sec. 1245(a); Buffalo Tool Die Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 445 (1980). Like section 1250, section 1245 only applies when a gain is realized.

Johnson v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 469, 477 (1985). Moreover, we may either accept the opinion of the expert in its entirety, Buffalo Tool & Die Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980), or we may rely on any portion of an opinion as we may find it insightful and reliable. Parker v. Commissioner, supra at 562.

HELD, the value of the gift for purposes of a charitable deduction is determined on the basis of before-gift and after-gift valuations of the property subjected to the easement. HELD FURTHER, the approach to valuation cases set forth in Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 451 (1980), is reiterated. Reuben B. Robertson, Arthur K. Mason, and Raymond J. Sherbill, for the petitioners.

9 Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. 10 Estate of Gallo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-363, citing Buffalo Tool and Die Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980). 11 Section 6653(a) provides as follows:SEC.

We are not bound by the opinion of an expert witness, and we may accept or reject expert testimony in the exercise of our sound judgment. Helvering v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 295 (1938); Bank One Corp., 120 T.C. at 332; Estate of Newhouse, 94 T.C. at 217. We may accept the opinion of one expert over that of another, see Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980), and we may select what portions of each expert's opinion, if any, to accept, Parker v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547, 562 (1986). Because valuation involves an approximation, the figure at which we arrive need not be directly traceable to specific testimony if it is within the range of values that may be properly derived from consideration of all the evidence.

Respondent contends that the Court should exercise its authority to reject Mr. Miller's opinion as to the value of the conservation easement in full because he has a history of dishonesty; he plagiarized portions of his report; and the report includes errors of both commission and omission which culminate in a conclusion of value that is incredible. See, e.g., Chiu v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 722 (1985) (rejecting an expert's testimony as incredible when the expert's opinion of value was so exaggerated as to make it unrealistic); Fuchs v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 79, 99 (1984); Dean v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 56, 75 (1984); Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980) (finding that experts may lose their usefulness when they merely become advocates for the position argued by a party). We need not rule on the contention, as we find Mr. Petkovich's analysis to be correct on the merits.

We may accept an expert's opinion in its entirety, or we may be selective as to the portions we find reliable. See Helvering v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 295 (1938); Parker, 86 T.C. at 561-562; Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980). We may also determine FMV on the basis of our own examination of the record evidence.