Buescher v. Lastar

7 Citing cases

  1. People v. Varon

    189 Cal.App.3d 1163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 1 times

    (Cf. Western Coal Mining v. Jones, supra, at p. 822; Buescher v. Lastar (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 73, 75-76 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 124].)

  2. Wagner v. Benson

    101 Cal.App.3d 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 254 times
    Holding that bank did not owe duty of care to plaintiffs, as "inexperienced investors," where bank loaned money to them for "a risky venture"

    The trial court erred in apportioning its award of legal fees between the defense and collection aspects of the Bank's case. The Bank is entitled to the reasonable expenses incurred in the suit, during trial and on appeal ( Buescher v. Lastar (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 73, 76 [ 132 Cal.Rptr. 124]). The reasonable value of the professional services rendered is best determined by the trial court ( Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 44 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303]).

  3. Cakebread v. Berkeley Millwork & Furniture Co.

    Case No. 16-cv-00083-RS (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2017)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that the plaintiff could not state a claim for conversion with respect to a deposit payment, even if the plaintiff maintained a contractual right to repayment after cancellation

    See Miran v. Convergent Outsourcing Inc., No. 16-CV-0692-AJB-(JMA), 2016 WL 7210382, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2016) (declining to consider on summary judgment a legal theory that is not alleged in the complaint). In support of their position, the Cakebreads rely on Buescher v. Lastar, 61 Cal.App.3d 73 (1976). In Buescher, the plaintiff recovered on a demand note the defendant signed despite the expiration of the statute of limitations.

  4. Ridgewood Associates, Inc. v. Trumpower

    NO. CIV.S-06-1376 LKK/GGH (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2007)

    The standard, however, is not rigid, and courts have found that even informal language is sufficient, so long as it identifies the debt. See, e.g., Bronne Shirt Co. v. Matthess, 88 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Buescher v. Lastar, 61 Cal. App. 3d 73 (1976); Hayes v. O'Marr, 81 Cal. App. 210 (1927). Importantly, "[t]he postponement of [payment] to a future time . . . does not make the acknowledgment uncertain. It merely imposes an additional condition and makes it incumbent on the plaintiff to allege and prove its existence before he can sue on the new promise and recover."

  5. Gamble v. Northstore Partnership

    28 P.3d 286 (Alaska 2001)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that "Civil Rule 82 may be overridden" by statute or agreement

    See Amos Flight Operations, Inc. v. Thunderbird Bank, 540 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Ariz. 1975); Buescher v. Lastar, 132 Cal.Rptr. 124, 126 (Cal.App. 1976); Ingle v. Perkins, 510 P.2d 480, 482 (Idaho 1973); Hollinger v. McMichael, 594 P.2d 1120, 1120-21 (Mont. 1979); Edwards v. Mesch, 763 P.2d 1169, 1172 (N.M. 1988); Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980); Puget Sound Mut. Sav. Bank v. Lillions, 314 P.2d 935, 940 (Wash.

  6. Marcus Food Co. v. PLA-art International, Inc.

    No. D052979 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2009)

    Marcus Food could not reasonably believe the letter was an acknowledgment of Cold Storage's liability. Marcus Food's reliance on Buescher v. Lastar (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 73 (Buescher), is misplaced. In Buescher, the plaintiff recovered on a demand note the defendant signed despite the expiration of the statute of limitations.

  7. Zander v. Scott Co. of California

    190 Or. App. 268 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 8 times

    In order for a communication to constitute a valid acknowledgment under section 360, assuming (without deciding) that the section applies to open accounts, the communication must meet four criteria: (1) it must be communicated to the creditor; (2) it must be a direct, distinct, unqualified, and unconditional admission of the debt; (3) it must indicate that the party is liable for the debt and willing to pay it; and (4) it must not contain any intimation of an intent to refuse payment of the debt. Clunin v. First Federal Trust Co., 189 Cal. 248, 250-52, 207 P. 1009, 1010 (1922) (construing original 1872 version of statute; proviso added in 1947 and amended in 1955); see also Searles v. Gonzalez, 191 Cal. 426, 430, 216 P. 1003, 1004 (1923) (acknowledgment must treat "indebtedness as subsisting and one which the debtor is liable and willing to pay") ; Kurokawa v. Blum, 199 Cal App.3d 976, 245 Cal.Rptr. 463, 471 (1988) (acknowledgment must be in writing); Buescher v. Lastar, 61 Cal App.3d 73, 75-76, 132 Cal.Rptr. 124, 125-26 (1976) (acknowledgment must be unequivocal, containing no new terms or conditions). In this case, the letter was not directed to the creditor; rather, it was directed to a third party, albeit a related one. More obviously, the letter does not contain "a direct, distinct, unqualified and unconditional" admission of the debt. It states that Scott has released $200,000, which had previously been "on hold," to M+W. It goes on to say that "the balance of the purchase order funds" will be paid if M+W/M meets certain conditions.