" p. 742. For later decisions dealing with the obligation to indemnify in tort or contract terms, or both, see Moroni v. Intrusion Prepakt, 24 Ill.App.2d 534, 165 N.E.2d 346 (1960); Rovekamp v. Central Const. Co., 45 Ill.App.2d 441, 195 N.E.2d 756 (1964); Parsons v. Kuhne-Simmons Co., 76 Ill.App.2d 121, 221 N.E.2d 168 (1963); Skezas v. Safway Steel Products, 85 Ill.App.2d 295, 229 N.E.2d 781 (1967); Wrobel v. Trapani, 129 Ill.App.2d 306, 264 N.E.2d 240 (1970); Buehler v. Toynan Construction Co., 133 Ill.App.2d 106, 272 N.E.2d 861 (1971), aff'd 52 Ill.App.2d 214, 287 N.E.2d 691 (1972); Gadd v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 5 Ill. App.3d 152, 275 N.E.2d 285 (1971); Gerlach v. Pepper Construction Co., 2 Ill. App.3d 169, 276 N.E.2d 22 (1971); Tiffiny Dec. Co., supra. It should be noted that in each case, the particular court was explaining the theory of a rule, and that the choice between a tort or policy principle and a promise to indemnify did not have the kind of significance present here.
And as the appellate court stated, "The Act is applicable to those persons `having charge of' the work; that is, not only those who exercise direct supervisory control, but also those who under the circumstances of the particular case have assumed responsibility therefor." (272 N.E.2d at 864.) The facts stated in the affidavit submitted by Roeth were not sufficient to entitle it to judgment against either the plaintiff or the other defendants.