Opinion
Civil Action 6:23-cv-3514-JD-KFM
05-03-2024
Matthew Robert Budney, Plaintiff, v. Nurse Julie, Nurse Ashley, Sheriff Reynolds, Captain Lawson, Kim Little, Savannah Wall, Hanna Bishop, Lieutenant Reid, Officer Tollison, Nurse Grant, Nurse Billie, Officer Brown, Sheriff Deputy Payton, Lieutenant Maddox, Lieutenant Miller, Lieutenant Humphries, and John Doe, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) (doc. 65). The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, was a pretrial detainee in the Laurens County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”) at the time of the events alleged in his complaint and amended complaint. He seeks relief in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d)(D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under Section 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
As noted, the plaintiff's allegations in his complaint and amended complaint regard incidents that occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at the Detention Center (docs. 1; 9). The plaintiff is now a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). On November 16, 2023, the undersigned recommended that the district court allow this case to go forward with respect to the plaintiff's medical indifference claim against defendants Nurse Julie, Nurse Ashley, Nurse Grant, Kim Little, Savannah Wall, and Sheriff Reynolds and further recommended that the district court dismiss the remaining claims and defendants (doc. 34). The plaintiff filed his objections to that recommendation on January 11, 2024 (doc. 54).
On January 11, 2024, the plaintiff also filed a motion for an emergency injunction, seeking an order from the court requiring SCDC “to provide followup testing to ensure successful treatment of neuro ocular syphilis” (doc. 53 at 1). On January 12, 2024, the undersigned recommended that the plaintiff's motion for an emergency injunction be denied (doc. 57). On January 18, 2024, the plaintiff filed the instant motion for a TRO, seeking to have certain defendants in this action suspended from providing medical care or working at the Detention Center until an investigation has been completed by the South Carolina licensing authority regarding the actions alleged in the plaintiff's amended complaint (doc. 65). Specifically, the plaintiff seeks to have defendants Nurse Ashley, Nurse Julie, Nurse Grant, and Kim Little suspended from practicing medicine until the investigation is completed and to have defendants Nurse Ashley, Nurse Julie, Kim Little, and Hanna Bishop suspended from working at the Detention Center until the investigation is completed (id.).
The substantive standard for granting either a TRO or a preliminary injunction is the same. See e.g., U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Wolf Run Mining Co., 452 F.3d 275, 281 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because granting a motion for preliminary injunctive relief “requires that a district court, acting on an incomplete record, order a party to act, or refrain from acting, in a certain way[,] [t]he danger of a mistake in this setting is substantial.” Hughes Network Sys., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc'ns Corp., 17 F.3d 691, 693 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is committed to the equitable discretion of the district court. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010).
The standard for granting preliminary injunctive relief is set forth in Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Under Winter, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate:
1) he is likely to succeed on the merits,
2) he will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is not granted,
3) the balance of equities favors him, and
4) the injunction is in the public interest.555 U.S. at 20; see also League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014). Moreover, Winter requires that each preliminary injunction factor “be ‘satisfied as articulated.'” Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), aff'd, The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). Therefore, the plaintiff (the movant herein), bears a heavy burden in seeking a preliminary injunction. Id. at 321.
As an initial matter, to the extent the plaintiff seeks a TRO against defendant Hanna Bishop, as noted above, on November 16, 2023, the undersigned recommended that the district court dismiss certain claims and defendants - including all claims against Hanna Bishop (doc. 34). As such, service upon Hanna Bishop has not been authorized and Hanna Bishop is not currently an active defendant in this case. Additionally, it is unclear what immediate harm the plaintiff asserts as supporting his requirement for a TRO, as his motion does not allege any specific immediate harm (see doc. 65). Indeed, as noted above, the plaintiff is no longer incarcerated in the Detention Center; thus, he has not shown that allowing the above-named defendants to continue working and providing medical care at the Detention Center would cause him any harm (see doc. 31 (updating the plaintiff's address to Kershaw Correctional Institution)). Further, as a pro se litigant, the plaintiff may not seek relief on behalf of other detainees who may still be at the Detention Center because a prisoner cannot file or maintain a lawsuit on behalf of others. See Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1981) (a prisoner cannot act as a “knight-errant” for others); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“it is plain error to permit [an] imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a class action.”). Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the district court deny the plaintiff's motion for a TRO (doc. 65).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).