Opinion
Civil Action 6:23-cv-3514-JD-KFM
02-08-2024
Matthew Robert Budney, Plaintiff, v. Nurse Julie, Nurse Ashley, Sheriff Reynolds, Captain Lawson, Kim Little, Savannah Wall, Hanna Bishop, Lieutenant Reid, Officer Tollison, Nurse Grant, Nurse Billie, Officer Brown, Sheriff Deputy Payton, Lieutenant Maddox, Lieutenant Miller, Lieutenant Humphries, and John Doe, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on the plaintiff's motion for “emergency assistance” (doc. 109). The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, was a pretrial detainee in the Laurens County Detention Center at the time of the events alleged in his complaint and amended complaint. He seeks relief in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d)(D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under Section 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
As noted, the plaintiff's allegations in his complaint and amended complaint regard incidents that occurred while he was a pretrial detainee in the Laurens County Detention Center (docs. 1, 9). The plaintiff is now a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). On November 16, 2023, the undersigned recommended that the district court allow this case to go forward with respect to the plaintiff's medical indifference claim against defendants Nurse Julie, Nurse Ashley, Nurse Grant, Kim Little, Savannah Wall, and Sheriff Reynolds and further recommended that the district court dismiss the remaining claims and defendants (doc. 34). The plaintiff filed his objections to that recommendation on January 11, 2024 (doc. 54).
On February 5, 2024, the plaintiff filed the instant motion requesting “emergency assistance from the court” (doc. 109). The plaintiff states that Spartanburg County has a detainer hold on him for a traffic violation associated with felony charges for which he posted bond. He claims that if he is taken to the “Spartanburg County Jail” it will disrupt certain services he receives through the SCDC. He fears that he will be released in an unfamiliar area without money, clothes, transportation, or his legal documents. The plaintiff claims that the “detainer hold demonstrates malicious prosecution” (id.).
The plaintiff does not specifically state in his motion what he wants the court to do, but it appears that he is requesting that the court order Spartanburg County to dismiss the detainer and/or order the SCDC not to transfer him to Spartanburg County. Thus, the undersigned has construed the plaintiff's motion as seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or preliminary injunction.
The substantive standard for granting either a TRO or a preliminary injunction is the same. See e.g., U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Wolf Run Mining Co., 452 F.3d 275, 281 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because granting a motion for preliminary injunctive relief “requires that a district court, acting on an incomplete record, order a party to act, or refrain from acting, in a certain way[,] [t]he danger of a mistake in this setting is substantial.” Hughes Network Sys., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc'ns Corp., 17 F.3d 691,693 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is committed to the equitable discretion of the district court. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010).
The standard for granting preliminary injunctive relief is set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Under Winter, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate:
1) he is likely to succeed on the merits,
2) he will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is not granted,
3) the balance of equities favors him, and
4) the injunction is in the public interest.555 U.S. at 20; see also League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014). Moreover, Winter requires that each preliminary injunction factor “be ‘satisfied as articulated.' ” Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), aff'd, The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). Therefore, the movant bears a heavy burden in seeking a preliminary injunction. Id. at 321.
Here, the SCDC and Spartanburg County - the entities against whom the plaintiff asks that the court enter the emergency injunction - are not parties to this lawsuit. Generally, a court “may not enter an injunction against a person who has not been made a party to the case before it.” Pew v. Wetzel, C. A. No. 3:12-cv-1984, 2015 WL 10474859, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2015), R&R adopted by 2016 WL 948878 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Wilson v. Givens, C. A. No. 9:21-cv-00523-RMG, 2021 WL 2935241, at *2 (D.S.C. July 13, 2021) (“Plaintiff impermissibly seeks relief against individuals who are not parties to this action.”); Abdullah-Malik v. Bryant, C. A. No. 1:14-cv-109-RBH, 2015 WL 225740, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 16, 2015) (“[T]o the extent [Plaintiff] seeks to enjoin persons who are not parties to this lawsuit, Plaintiff's motion is improper.”).
Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the district court deny the plaintiff's motion (doc. 109).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).