Although the Code does not address itself to that which constitutes a taxpayer's last known address, we have consistently held that the last known address is the taxpayer's last permanent address or legal residence known by the Commissioner or the last known temporary address of a definite duration to which the taxpayer has directed the Commissioner to send all communications. Daniel Lifter, 59 T.C. 818, 820-821; Culver M. Budlong, 58 T.C. 850, 852; Harvey L. McCormick, 55 T.C. 138, 141. See Gregory v. United States, 57 F.Supp. 962, 973 (Ct.Cl.).
Indeed, cases with nearly identical underlying factual circumstances have spawned quite disparate decisions. Compare Welch v. Schweitzer, 106 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1939) with Budlong v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 850 (1972) and compare Estate of McKaig v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 331 (1968) with Kuebler v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. 454 (1979). III.
However, in connection with whether the taxpayer has given the requisite notice of a change in address, we have heretofore taken the position that the filing of a return, which is more recent than, and which bears an address different from that appearing on, the return under examination, does not constitute, for purposes of mailing a notice of deficiency with respect to that return under examination, the necessary notice of an address change. Weinroth v. Commissioner, supra at 436-437; Budlong v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 850, 852-853 (1972). See Borison, ‘The Evolving Due Diligence Requirement of the Service in Determining a Taxpayer's Last Known Address,‘ 41 Tax Law Rev. 111 (1985), for an in-depth discussion of what has previously been considered, by this and other courts, to be: (1) ‘clear and concise notification‘ of a change of address; and, (2) an exercise of due diligence by the Internal Revenue Service in determining a taxpayer's last known address.
We will address these contentions in turn, noting that in these matters, the burden of proof is on the petitioner. Alta Sierra Vista, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; Budlong v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 850 (1972); Walsh v. United States, 507 F.Supp. 808 (D. Minn. 1981); Rule 142(a). I. Oral Communications to Respondent's Representatives -.
We do not interpret the requirement that the taxpayer provide clear and concise notification to the Commissioner of his new address as narrowly as does respondent. It is well established that subsequent returns filed with a new address do not constitute clear and concise notification to respondent of such address. Budlong v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 850 (1972). Although petitioners adduced some evidence that the Internal Revenue Service now employs a computerized system to update its files from the filing of subsequent returns, this evidence was by no means sufficient for us to reconsider our holding in Budlong.
They may pay the tax, file Form 843, Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement, and, if that claim is denied or six months has passed without any determination from the IRS, file a refund suit in the appropriate U.S. District Court or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. See secs. 6532(a), 7422; Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760, 772 (9th Cir. 1962) (noting that a taxpayer's failure to file a petition within 90 days of a notice of deficiency's mailing did not foreclose a potential refund suit); Budlong v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 850, 854 n.2 (1972) (same). Additionally, as described above, the Vaughns can request a collection alternative at any time.
Mr. Ramey is free to pay the amounts at issue, request a refund, and dispute any denial of that request in the appropriate Federal District Court or the Court of Federal Claims. See Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760, 772 (9th Cir. 1962) (noting that taxpayer's failure to file petition within 90 days of deficiency notice's mailing did not foreclose a potential refund suit); Budlong v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 850, 854 n.2 (1972) (same). And of course, if his financial circumstances have changed, Mr. Ramey may continue to negotiate with the Commissioner's collection officers concerning his liabilities for the taxable years 2012 to 2016.
As a general matter, respondent is entitled to treat the address appearing on the return for the year in question as the last known address absent ‘clear and concise notification‘ of a new address. Alta Sierra Vista, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 367, 374 (1974), affd. without published opinion 538 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1976). We have generally held that the filing of a subsequent return with a change of address does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of notice of a change of address. Weinroth v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 430, 436-437 (1980); Budlong v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 850, 852-853 (1972). However, for the purposes of this matter, we follow the holdings of the Ninth Circuit
Although petitioners do not specifically rely upon Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 940 (1971), to the extent the cited decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit conflict with this Court's established precedent, we infer that petitioners desire this Court to apply the rationale of the Court of Appeals. Respondent argues that the statutory notice mailed on April 13, 1981, was mailed to petitioners' ‘last known address‘ in accordance with section 6212(b)(1), because this Court has repeatedly held that the filing of tax returns subsequent to the years in issue showing a different address are not, by themselves, sufficient to notify the Commissioner of the taxpayer's new address, citing Alta Sierra Vista, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 367, 376-377 (1974), affd. without published opinion 538 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1976); Lifter v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 818, 822 (1973); and Budlong v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 850, 852-853 (1972). Further, while the respondent acknowledges that Internal Revenue Service employees did mail correspondence to petitioners at their Carolwood address prior to the mailing of the notice of deficiency, he argues that all of the correspondence mailed to the Carolwood address pertained to tax returns which bore that address. Respondent asserts, however, that with respect to the taxable years before us that he was never put on notice of petitioners' change of address due to the following circumstances: (1) the petitioners signed a Form 872 extending the period of limitations with respect to taxable year 1976 which listed their Faysmith address over a year after they had moved to the Carolwood address; (2) after the Commissioner's employee signed this 872, he mailed it to petitioners at their Faysmith address where they received it; and (3) in January 1981, he mailed another 872 to petitioners at the Faysmith address and it was not returned by either the Postal Service or petitioners.
This record is clear that petitioner Shirley Gray never notified respondent of any change in her address other than by statements contained on later filed returns. This is not sufficient notice of a change in address. Budlong v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 850 (1972). At the time respondent mailed the notice of deficiency, he had some indication that petitioner might not be living at the address shown on her tax return for the year 1975, but he had no information as to where she was in fact living.