A state tax does not offend the Commerce Clause when the tax is: (1) Applied to an activity with a "substantial nexus" with the taxing state; (2) fairly apportioned; (3) nondiscriminatory against interstate commerce; and (4) fairly related to services provided by the state. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra, 430 US at 279; see also Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or. 93, 104-05, 597 P.2d 1232 (1979). This test for determining whether a tax is valid under the Commerce Clause is similar to the test for determining whether a tax is valid under the Due Process Clause.

The statute's reference to an effect on "rights, status or other legal relations" requires a plaintiff seeking declaratory relief to allege "some injury or other impact on a legally recognized interest beyond an abstract interest in the correct application or the validity of a law." Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or. 93, 95, 597 P.2d 1232 (1979). The interest perhaps most often recognized as sufficient for standing under ORS 28.020 is a present or foreseeable financial interest, such as that of a taxpayer, e.g., Lipscomb v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., supra, but many other interests have been recognized as well, including the interests of voters, e.g., Webb v. Clatsop Co. School Dist. 3, 188 Or. 324, 331, 215 P.2d 368 (1950), and of users of a road, e.g., Rendler v. Lincoln Co., 302 Or. 177, 182, 728 P.2d 21 (1986).

Id. at 107. See also deParrie v. State of Oregon, 133 Or. App. 613, 617, 893 P.2d 541 (1995) (the plaintiff's claim held not justiciable because "he [did] not demonstrate any `injury or other impact on a legally recognized interest beyond an abstract interest in the correct application or the validity of a law'" (quoting Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or. 93, 95, 597 P.2d 1232 (1979)). That leaves the question of to whom the practical effects requirement applies.

Insofar as the dismissal was based on standing, however, it is not subject to the same objection. Although defendants nominally raised the standing issue by motions asserting that the complaint failed to state a claim, a plaintiff's standing is germane to whether there is a justiciable controversy. As the court explained in Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or. 93, 597 P.2d 1232 (1979): "A plaintiff suing under ORS chapter 28 must show that he is a person 'whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by' the challenged instrument * * *."

This requires them to show "some injury or other impact on a legally recognized interest * * *." BudgetRent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or. 93, 95, 597 P.2d 1232 (1979). We have held that a potential bidder has a protected economic interest in ensuring that a city complies with statutory bidding requirements and that allegations that alleged violations of those requirements kept it from bidding were sufficient to give it standing to seek a declaratory judgment.

(Emphasis added.) 333 P2d 741 (1958) (plaintiffs had no standing under Declaratory Judgment Act because wrong of which they complained was "public in character"); Gortmaker v. Seaton, 252 Or 440, 443, 450 P2d 547 (1969) (plaintiff lacked standing under Declaratory Judgment Act because a decision would not affect his rights); Cummings Constr. v. School Dist. No. 9, 242 Or 106, 408 P2d 80 (1965) (plaintiffs failed to show entitlement to declaratory judgment relief because they could not prove they had any present legal rights against the defendant); Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or 93, 597 P2d 1232 (1979) (plaintiff had standing under Declaratory Judgment Act because tax would affect its interests in numerous ways). We acknowledge that three recent decisions from this court may have caused some confusion in the application of statutes conferring standing on persons who do not assert a personal interest in the outcome.

In determining whether US West's preemption claim is justiciable, we begin with the terms of the declaratory judgment statute. See Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or. 93, 95, 597 P.2d 1232 (1979) (applying that principle); cf. Leo v. Keisling, 327 Or. 556, 560, 964 P.2d 1023 (1998) (stating that courts should decide cases on subconstitutional grounds before reaching constitutional issues). ORS 28.020 authorizes persons whose "rights, status or other legal relations are affected" to seek a declaratory judgment.

"to an effect on `rights, status or other legal relations' requires a plaintiff seeking declaratory relief to allege `some injury or other impact on a legally recognized interest beyond an abstract interest in the correct application or the validity of a law.'"Eckles v. State of Oregon, 306 Or. 380, 385, 760 P.2d 846 (1988), appeal dismissed, 490 U.S. 1032, 109 S Ct 1928, 104 L Ed 2d 400 (1989) (quoting Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or. 93, 95, 597 P.2d 1232 (1979)). When a taxpayer relies on his or her status as a taxpayer to establish standing under ORS 28.020, the complaint must show a present or foreseeable financial interest; that is, the taxpayer must allege that the challenged government action actually or potentially affects the taxpayer's taxes adversely.

ORS 308.555 states that the goal of the unit valuation method is to ascertain the "fair proportion" of the property of the company in Oregon. We previously have noted that these rather vague directives do little to define the limits of state taxing authority and are essentially a codification of the limits imposed by the due process and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. See Southern Pacific Trans. Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 295 Or. 47, 57 n 11, 64, 664 P.2d 401 (1983); see also Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or. 93, 104-05, 597 P.2d 1232 (1979). The limits imposed by the commerce clause and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment are much alike.

See, Norfolk Western Railway Co. v. Missouri Tax Comm., 390 U.S. 317, 323-25, 88 S Ct 995, 19 L Ed 2d 1201 (1968); Smith v. Columbia County, 216 Or. 662, 686-88, 341 P.2d 540 (1959). However, as we noted in Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or. 93, 104-05, 597 P.2d 1232 (1979): "* * * Insofar as constitutional rules are in the first instance directives to state and local lawmakers, a rule to be `fair' or `just' makes a limited contribution to difficult and controversial debates over tax sources and rates. * * *"