Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-8975.
March 29, 2004
ORDER
AND NOW, this 29th day of March, 2004, upon consideration of defendant Nicole Chappell's motion for entry of final judgment (docket entry # 44) and plaintiff's response thereto, and the Court finding that:
(a) While driving an automobile that he had rented from Budget Rent-A-Car System, Inc.'s predecessor, Joseph Powell, III fell asleep at the wheel, and the vehicle ran into a guardrail and rolled over, see Budget Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Chappell, No. 02-8975, 2004 WL 234686 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2004) (docket entry # 32);
(b) As a result of this accident, Chappell, who was a passenger in the car, suffered serious personal injuries that have left her paraplegic, id.;
(c) After Budget's predecessor initiated a declaratory judgment action, Chappell sought to recover for her injuries by bringing (1) a cross-claim against Powell for his own negligence; (2) a counterclaim against Budget for negligent entrustment of its automobile to Powell; and (3) a counterclaim against Budget as the automobile's owner, see Answer (docket entry # 7);
Chappell predicated this claim on Section 388 of New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law, which makes the owner of an automobile strictly liable to the victims of a driver's negligence.
(d) On February 2, 2004, we granted summary judgment to Budget on Chappell's Section 388 counterclaim because we determined that Pennsylvania law applied to that claim and Pennsylvania does not impose vicarious liability on a car's owner for the driver's negligence, see Budget, 2004 WL 234686, at *8-9;
We also entered summary judgment in favor of Budget on its claims for declaratory judgment. Because resolution of Budget's declaratory judgment claims and Chappell's Section 388 counterlaim all depend on whether Section 388 applies here, we shall refer collectively to these claims as the "Section 388 claim."
(e) Chappell now requests that we direct the entry of final judgment on the Section 388 claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b);
(f) Rule 54(b) permits the court to "direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims . . . upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment";
(g) "[I]n deciding whether there are no just reasons to delay the appeal of individual final judgments in a setting such as this, a district court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved," Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980), and must "clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying its decision to grant 54(b) certification," Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1975);
(h) Among the relevant factors for us to consider are "(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in set-off against the judgment sought to be made final; and (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like," id.;
(i) Chappell's Section 388 claim raises difficult choice-of-law and constitutional questions upon which her unadjudicated negligence and negligent entrustment claims do not depend;
(j) In view of the significant injuries that Chappell sustained and her consequent serious need, no future developments before us are likely to moot her request for review of our decision on the Section 388 claim;
(k) If it hears Chappell's appeal from our decision, the Court of Appeals would not face the choice-of-law issues a second time because its decision would either confirm our understanding of the relevant principles or inform our handling of the as-yet unadjudicated claims;
(l) There are no claims or counterclaims which could result in set-off against our judgment on the Section 388 claim;
(m) Now denying review of the Section 388 claim would require the parties to incur the heavy expenses of litigating the remaining negligence and negligent entrustment claims — solely to preserve Chappell's right to appeal our decision on the Section 388 claim at a later date — even though her counsel does not appear confident that either of those claims could succeed, see Mot. for Final Judgment at 5 ("In the event that an exhaustion of remedies results in a finding of the application of Pennsylvania law with respect to vicarious liability, counsel would strongly recommend to his client, defendant Chappell, that she discontinue with prejudice her remaining counterclaim and crossclaim.");
(n) Budget does not oppose Rule 54(b) certification, see Resp. to Mot. for Final Judgment; and
(o) Thus, there is no just reason for delaying our entry of final judgment on Chappell's Section 388 claim and on Budget's declaratory judgment claims;
Certifying the Section 388 issue also affords an institutional advantage. Unlike a district court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit may seek a definitive ruling from the New York Court of Appeals on the proper interpretation of Section 388. See 3rd Cir. LAR Misc. 110.1 (permitting certification of state law questions to the state's highest court); N.Y. Ct. of App. R. 500.17 (permitting certification from a federal court of appeals, but not a federal district court).
It is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Chappell's motion for entry of final judgment is GRANTED;
2. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), the Clerk shall ENTER final judgment in favor of Budget Rent-A-Car System, Inc. and against Nicole Chappell on the claims in Budget's complaint and on Chappell's Section 388 counterclaim; and
3. The Clerk shall TRANSFER this civil action to our Civil Suspense docket.