The City ignores the 1991 amendments. In support of its motion, the City cites McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990) and Buddingh v. South Chicago Cable, 830 F. Supp. 437 (N.D.Ill. 1993) for the proposition that a plaintiff must allege interference with his abilities to form a contract in order to state a claim under section 1981. Both McKnight and Buddingh draw their interpretation of section 1981 from Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989).
Any controversy is over whether a Section 1981 retaliation plaintiff may allege retaliation for seeking to enforce only the contract rights guaranteed by Section 1981, as this court has held. See Buddingh v. South Chicago Cable, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 437, 441-42 (N.D.Ill. 1993). Contra Wilborn v. Primary Care Specialists, Ltd., 866 F. Supp. 364, 370 n. 1 (N.D.Ill. 1994).
Al-Dabbagh v. Greenpeace, Inc. 873 F. Supp. 1105, 1113 (N.D. Ill. 1994). Although the basic concept remains the same, the application of the alter ego doctrine in the workers compensation context differs from its application in the corporate law arena. See Buddingh v. South Chicago Cable, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 437, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1993) We recognize that ownership in the corporation is a necessary factor to finding an alter ego in the corporate context for the purpose of piercing the corporate veil.
Both Mr. Miloczki and Mr. Kuhtreiber qualify, at least at the motion to dismiss stage, as potential alter egos of Pollmann. See, e.g., Buddingh v. South Chicago Cable, Inc., 830 F.Supp. 437, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Adams v. City of Chicago, 865 F.Supp 445 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (allegation that individuals were managerial employees was sufficient to allege they were alter egos of corporation); Graves v. Man Group USA, Inc., 479 F.Supp.2d 850, 854 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (allegation that individuals were supervisors and one a human resources representative was sufficient to allege they were alter egos of corporation); Watkins v. Woodlawn Cmty. Dev. Corp., 2006 WL 218163, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (allegation that individual was property manager and plaintiff's supervisor was sufficient to allege he was alter ego of corporation); and Alberts, 1995 WL 476654 at *5 (allegation that individual was zone manager with authority over plaintiff was sufficient to allege he was alter ego of corporation). Accordingly, this Court finds that Creighton's IIED claim is not preempted by the IWCA.
This court wholly agrees with the foregoing reasoning and similarly finds retaliatory conduct actionable under section 1981. We are aware that in Buddingh v. South Chicago Cable, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 437 (N.D.Ill. 1993), the court held that a claim of retaliatory discharge resulting from the plaintiff's filing of a race discrimination complaint with the EEOC failed to state a claim under section 1981. The Buddingh court found that "plaintiff does not allege that defendants retaliated against her for any attempt to enforce contract rights, even as that term is broadly defined under the Civil Rights Act of 1991."
The court nonetheless concludes that under Illinois law, where the employer is a fictitious person, i.e., corporate entity, and its authorities and powers are necessarily delegated to supervisors to conduct the corporate business, the supervisors act as alter egos of the corporate entity. See Buddingh v. South Chicago Cable, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 437, 443 (N.D.Ill. 1993). Under the liberal construction rule, Whitehead has not alleged that AMI expressly commanded or authorized Durk to harass Whitehead, but she has alleged enough facts to establish that Durk was acting as an alter ego of AMI. According to the complaint, Durk possessed supervisory and managerial authorities over Whitehead.
In such a situation, when the alleged acts of sexual harassment and discrimination are alleged to have been ongoing and continuous into the period following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, then plaintiff is entitled to a trial by jury as to those claims, whether they occurred prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 or thereafter. See Buddingh v. South Chicago Cable, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 437, 440 (N.D.Ill. 1993). Furthermore, plaintiff is also entitled to punitive damages with respect to said claims.