Buckley v. Valeo

12 Citing cases

  1. Gifford v. Congress

    452 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Cal. 1978)   Cited 8 times

    II, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 496. For additional description of the legislative history of § 437h, see Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 138-41 (D.D.C.), remanded en banc, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 168, 519 F.2d 817, on remand 401 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court) en banc decision on certified questions, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 519 F.2d 821 (1975), aff'd in part 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). The true meaning of the qualifier, "serious," is open to debate.

  2. Buckley v. Valeo

    519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975)   Cited 98 times
    Detailing how "[t]he material available to the court looks both ways"

    These provisions are loosely termed the "public financing provisions." Parallel proceedings with respect to Subtitle H and constitutional questions pertaining thereto are presently pending before a three-judge district court of this Circuit, Buckley v. Valeo, D.C., 387 F. Supp. 135. That court heard oral argument jointly with this court sitting en banc.

  3. Mott v. Federal Election Com'n

    494 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1980)   Cited 10 times
    Upholding $5000 contribution

    The first court to be presented with a section 437h request observed that the case should be expedited "provided only that a substantial constitutional question is raised by a complaint and that complaint is filed by a party having standing to lodge it." Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D.D.C.) remanded, 519 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc). In remanding the Court of Appeals did not disturb the district court's express finding that "the plaintiffs raise substantial constitutional questions."

  4. Wagner v. Fed. Election Comm'n

    717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013)   Cited 21 times

    See Bread PAC, 455 U.S. at 583, 102 S.Ct. 1235 (it is “obvious fact that Congress wanted a broad class of questions to be speedily resolved”); CalMed, 453 U.S. at 188, 101 S.Ct. 2712 (Congress enacted section 437h as “method for obtaining expedited review of constitutional challenges to the [FECA].”); Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 591 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir.1979) (noting “apparent Congressional intent to provide expedited review to attack ‘any provision’ of” FECA); Buckley, 519 F.2d at 819 (noting “intention of Congress for expedition in appellate disposition”); Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F.Supp. 135, 138 (D.D.C.1975) (“The very essence of [ section 437h] ... is speedy judicial review.”). The legislative history confirms this understanding.

  5. Federal Election Commission v. Lance

    635 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981)   Cited 23 times
    Disallowing overbreadth challenge to various prohibitions within a single section, 2 U.S.C. § 441b, that were not applicable to the plaintiff, and concluding that plaintiff "ha[d] standing to challenge section 441b only as it prohibits [the two activities applicable to the plaintiff]"

    The Ninth Circuit interpreted the legislative history as follows: The legislative history of section 437h is succinctly set out in the district court's opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 139-41 (D.D.C. 1975), certified to en banc court, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (en banc), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). [Section 437h] originated as an amendment offered by Senator Buckley to expedite authoritative Supreme Court determination of the Act's constitutionality. The en banc requirement apparently was deemed to be an expediting mechanism due to a misconception that an en banc hearing was a matter of right following a hearing by a panel of three appellate judges; to require an initial en banc hearing was thus thought to eliminate a merely "preliminary" three-judge hearing. . . . . That proposition is, of course, inaccurate: en banc hearings are discretionary.

  6. Bread Political Action Com. v. Fed. Elec. Com'n

    591 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1979)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that the en banc review provision applies only to actions "brought expressly to challenge the [FECA] on constitutional grounds," but that the provision may be invoked by plaintiffs other than those of the three named types

    Since at least some of the plaintiffs have the requisite standing, and since the ultimate decision as to the standing of others may have to await further exploration, in the interests of time, this Court defers to the Court of Appeals on that issue.Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 142 n. 14 (D.D.C. 1975). The court of appeals, however, expressed no similar reservations about the standing of the organizational plaintiffs and remanded the case to the district court for the taking of necessary evidence and certification of resulting constitutional questions, without dismissing any of the named plaintiffs.

  7. Libertarian Nat'l Comm., Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n

    930 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D.D.C. 2013)   Cited 10 times
    Certifying the proposed constitutional question before making "findings of fact, limited to those facts potentially relevant to the question certified"

    Before Buckley reached the Supreme Court, District Judge Howard Corcoran of this court transmitted the entire case to the en banc Court of Appeals. Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F.Supp. 135 (D.D.C.1975). The Court of Appeals remanded the case to Judge Corcoran to (1) “[i]dentify constitutional issues in the complaint,” (2) take evidence, (3) make findings of fact, and “[c]ertify to [the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals] constitutional questions arising from steps 1, 2, and 3.”

  8. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

    Civ. No. 02-582 (CKK, KLH, RJL), Civ. No. 02-581 (CKK, KLH, RJL), Civ. No. 02-633 (CKK, KLH, RJL), Civ. No. 02-751 (CKK, KLH, RJL), Civ. No. 02-753 (CKK, KLH, RJL), Civ. No. 02-754 (CKK, KLH, RJL), Civ. No. 02-781 (CKK, KLH, RJL), Civ. No. 02-874 (CKK, KLH, RJL), Civ. No. 02-875 (CKK, KLH, RJL), Civ. No. 02-877 (CKK, KLH, RJL), Civ. No. 02-881 (CKK, KLH, RJL), (D.D.C. May. 2, 2003)

    hich provides for judicial review "by a 3-judge court convened pursuant to section 2284 of title 28, United States Code," BCRA § 403(a)(1); FECA § 310 note; 2 U.S.C. § 437h note, FECA's judicial review provision provided — and still provides — that the Federal Election Commission, any national political party committee or any eligible voter "may institute such actions in the appropriate district court of the United States . . . as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of [FECA]" and that such court "immediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality of [FECA] to the United States court of appeals for the circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc," 2 U.S.C. § 437h. Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437h, and noting a comment of the provision's sponsor that "it is in the interest of everyone" to have "serious question[s] as to the constitutionality of this legislation . . . determined by the Supreme Court at the earliest possible time," Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 139 (D.D.C. 1975) (quoting 120 CONG. REC. S5707 (daily ed. April 10, 1974) (statement of Sen. Buckley)), remanded by Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the district court in Buckley certified 28 such questions to the en banc D.C. Circuit, see Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The D.C. Circuit, in turn, resolved the questions — which were no less novel than the ones the panel decides today — two months after oral argument.

  9. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

    251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003)   Cited 51 times
    Stating that the studies were flawed and of limited evidentiary value

    hich provides for judicial review "by a 3-judge court convened pursuant to section 2284 of title 28, United States Code," BCRA § 403(a)(1); FECA § 310 note; 2 U.S.C. § 437h note, FECA's judicial review provision provided — and still provides — that the Federal Election Commission, any national political party committee or any eligible voter "may institute such actions in the appropriate district court of the United States . . . as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of [FECA]" and that such court "immediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality of [FECA] to the United States court of appeals for the circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc," 2 U.S.C. § 437h. Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437h, and noting a comment of the provision's sponsor that "it is in the interest of everyone" to have "serious question[s] as to the constitutionality of this legislation . . . determined by the Supreme Court at the earliest possible time," Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 139 (D.D.C. 1975) (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. $5707 (daily ed. April 10, 1974) (statement of Sen. Buckley)), remanded by Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the district court in Buckley certified 28 such questions to the en banc D.C. Circuit, see Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The D.C. Circuit, in turn, resolved the questions — which were no less novel than the ones the panel decides today — two months after oral argument.

  10. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

    251 F. Supp. 2 (D.D.C. 2003)   Cited 1 times

    403, which provides for judicial review "by a 3-judge court convened pursuant to section 2284 of title 28, United States Code," BCRA § 403(a)(1); FECA § 310 note; 2 U.S.C. § 437h note, FECA's judicial review provision provided- and still provides-that the Federal Election Commission, any national political party committee or any eligible voter "may institute such actions in the appropriate district court of the United States ... as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of [FECA]" and that such court "immediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality of [FECA] to the United States court of appeals for the circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc," 2 U.S.C. § 437h. Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 43 7h, and noting a comment of the provision's sponsor that "it is in the interest of everyone" to have "serious question[s] as to the constitutionality of this legislation ... determined by the Supreme Court at the earliest possible time," Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F.Supp. 135, 139 (D.D.C.1975) (quoting 120 CONG REC. S5707 (daily ed. April 10, 1974) (statement of Sen. Buckley)), remanded by Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817 (D.C.Cir.1975), the district court in Buckley certified 28 such questions to the en banc D.C. Circuit, see Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C.Cir.1975). The D.C. Circuit, in turn, resolved the questions-which were no less novel than the ones the panel decides today-two months after oral argument.