No. 14-03-00501-CR
Memorandum Opinion of March 30, 2004.
Memorandum Opinion filed September 2, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.3(b).
On Appeal from the County Court, Grimes County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 16,808. Affirmed.
Panel consists of Justices EDELMAN, FROST, and GUZMAN.
SUBSTITUTED MEMORANDUM OPINION
EVA M. GUZMAN, Justice.
We withdraw our memorandum opinion of March 30, 2004, and issue this substituted memorandum opinion in its place. Appellant Michael Buckhout appeals a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated ("DWI"). In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause against jurors who, appellant claims, stated they could not consider the minimum punishment provided by law for the offense charged. Appellant also asserts that because his challenges were denied, his right to due process, effective assistance of counsel, and an impartial jury were denied. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Our factual summation is limited to voir dire, as it forms the basis for this appeal. During voir dire, the State correctly informed the venire members of the range of punishment for DWI, stating "at least three days in jail and up to a year in jail." Subsequently, however, the State asked four panel members if they could consider three days of probation as opposed to three days in jail. The panel members responding to that particular question indicated they could not consider three days of probation. Appellant's counsel did not object to the State's question nor attempt to clarify that the minimum range was three days in jail as opposed to three days of probation. In fact, during his voir dire, appellant's counsel continued the prosecutor's line of questioning, asking the following: The State was talking about the range of punishment and some of you had some problems with it and that's fine. . . . [venire member], did you have a problem with it? I don't think the State asked you about it. Considering the entire range on any given set of circumstances, could you find something where the entire range you could consider which may be that, you know, that little probation and all the way up to a year?
Appellant's counsel continued to ask the panel members if they could consider the punishment range, referring to it only as the "minimum" and the "maximum." In all, three panel members stated they could not consider probation as a sentencing option in response to defense counsel's questions. After appellant's voir dire, there was a discussion at the bench that is not contained in the record. The trial judge and the attorneys then went into the judge's chambers and the following discussion ensued: DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, here the problem I've got is I really have a problem with bringing back up and asking them because I feel like that would be asking them to change an opinion that they've already made, that they've already said.
PROSECUTOR: Okay.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, and the reason I'm saying that is because, on the other hand, I think that the evidence that will be presented in the trial itself should be the final criteria, which is the final decision. I have a problem with bringing them up, but I also see both sides of it.
PROSECUTOR: Do you want to make a motion? Go ahead put on the motion the reason and the cause.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: It's not — and I will do that if it becomes necessary. . . . One of the problems we have, Judge, is that we only had 16 people show up and from those two were excused by the Court. We've got to end up with six. I get three strikes. The State gets three strikes, and I think what's going to happen is we're just going to need to call more jurors because those jurors that were out there that said "Yes, I can consider the entire range of punishment," that is a qualified juror. When a juror says that they can't consider whichever end of it or they couldn't consider the low end or they couldn't consider the high end, those that answered no, those that found them guilty, "I could never consider probation," are not a qualified juror; and the State's attempt to bring them back up and rehabilitate them, especially trying to give them facts, I believe is improper when they have been given an opportunity and they have clearly stated that they could not consider the entire range under any imaginable fact scenario.
Appellant's counsel moved to strike eight jurors for cause, claiming those jurors stated unequivocally that they were unable to consider the entire range of punishment for the offense charged. The judge denied the motion. After appellant's counsel exhausted his peremptory challenges to remove objectionable venire members, he requested additional peremptory challenges to strike others. The court denied the request and empaneled the jury. During the lunch recess, before the jury returned, counsel again objected to the panel and identified two other jurors he would have moved to peremptorily strike. Ultimately, three of the individuals who stated they could not consider probation as a punishment option were seated as jurors. The jury convicted appellant and assessed punishment at one year in prison and a fine of $800. II. DISCUSSION A. Appellant's challenges for cause
In his first issue, appellant contends that because several venire members stated they would be unable to consider "the entire range of punishment of the offense" charged, the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause to those venire members. Appellant asserts that these panel members had a bias or prejudice against the law regarding the "minimum range of punishment" permitted for the offense charged and should have been dismissed. A defendant has a right not to have a particular venire member on the jury if the individual is challengeable for cause. Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). A defendant may challenge a potential juror for cause when that potential juror "has a bias or prejudice against any of the law applicable to the case upon which the defense is entitled to rely, either as a defense to some phase of the offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted or as a mitigation thereof or of the punishment thereof." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.16(c)(2). Bias against the law is the refusal to consider or apply the relevant law, meaning the panel member's beliefs or opinions would substantially impair his ability to perform his duties as a juror. Thompson v. State, 95 S.W.3d 537, 544 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (quoting Sadler v. State, 977 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998)). A defendant is entitled to have a jury panel comprised of individuals willing to consider the full range of punishment applicable to the offense charged. Johnson v. State, 982 S.W.2d 403, 405-06 (Tex.Crim. App. 1998); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.16(c)(2). If a venire member is unable to consider the full range of punishment, the court abuses its discretion by denying a challenge for cause as to that member. See Johnson, 982 S.W.2d at 406. It is the burden of the proponent of a challenge for cause to establish his challenge as proper. Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 747 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). The proponent does not meet that burden until he has shown the venire member "understood the requirement of the law and could not overcome his prejudice well enough to follow it." Id. Section 49.04 of the Texas Penal Code provides that a DWI offense is a Class B misdemeanor, with a minimum term of confinement of 72 hours, or three days. See TEX. PEN. CODE § 49.04(b). Accordingly, in this case the venire panel was initially advised by the State's attorney of the proper range of punishment. However, the prosecutor then mistakenly stated that the minimum "punishment" was three days' probation. The venire members being questioned at that point — and subsequently challenged by appellant — specifically stated they could not consider "three days probation." The remaining venire members challenged for cause by appellant also responded that they could not consider "probation." Thus, viewing the voir dire in its entirety, as we must, the record indicates that the challenged jurors stated they could not consider probation, several specifically in reference to a minimum term of three days' probation. We do not agree with appellant that these responses can be properly characterized as "unequivocal statements" of an inability to consider the full range of punishment. Further, though the prosecutor may have misstated the punishment range, at no point did appellant's counsel contend the range was misstated or otherwise object to the misstatement. Failure to object at trial to a prosecutor's misstatement waives error. See Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). It is well established that a trial court must be made aware of a complaint in a manner which allows any alleged error to be corrected. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Loredo v. State, No. 1075-03, 2004 WL 743833, at *3 (Tex.Crim. App. April 7, 2004). "Preservation of error is not merely a technical procedural matter . . . [f]airness to all parties requires a party to advance his complaints at a time when there is an opportunity to respond or cure them." Loredo, 2004 WL 743833, at *3. Indeed, the record reflects appellant's counsel, rather than attempt to clarify the punishment range, contributed to the misstatement by merely referring to the range as the "minimum" and "maximum," including "that little probation." Importantly, not only did appellant's counsel fail to object to the misstatement, but he then objected to bringing the panel members back up to clarify their position on probation. Thus, instead of attempting to correct any misstatement, appellant acquiesced in the misstatement and failed to show that the venire members "understood the requirement of the law and could not overcome [their] prejudice well enough to follow it." See Feldman, 71 S.W.3d at 747. Moreover, we further hold that any error due to the prosecutor's misstatement was harmless. A misstatement of law during voir dire requires reversal only if appellant was harmed by the misstatement. Thompson, 95 S.W.3d at 542. We analyze any harm under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) (stating harm analysis for non-constitutional error); Thompson, 95 S.W.3d at 542; Glauser v. State, 66 S.W.3d 307, 316 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (applying Rule 44.2(b) harm analysis to error regarding prosecutor's voir dire statement); cf. Peak v. State, 57 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (holding misstatement of law in closing argument requires 44.2(b) harmless-error analysis). We disregard the error unless appellant's substantial rights were affected, which occurs when the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Thompson, 95 S.W.3d at 543 (quoting King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). If probation is not a possibility, the venire member's ability to consider it is not relevant to the jury selection process. See GEORGE E. DIX ROBERT O. DAWSON, 43 TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 35.97 (2d ed. 2001); cf. Rodriguez v. State, 513 S.W.2d 22, 26 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974) (concluding it is not improper to question jurors concerning probation, when probation is within the scope of punishment which will be considered by the jury in the event of conviction). Here, the record does not indicate that probation was a sentencing option. Before a defendant is eligible for probation, he must timely file a proper motion seeking probation. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12, § 4(e); DIX DAWSON, 43 TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 35.97. The record does not contain the necessary probation application nor evidence that the requisite finding was entered by the jury. Therefore, the procedural requirements necessary for the jury to have considered probation had not been met. Also, during the State's argument in the punishment phase, the prosecutor stated that probation was not a punishment option in this case and appellant's counsel did not object to this statement, thus tacitly acknowledging that probation was not applicable. Finally, the verdict forms used by the jury did not include probation as a sentencing alternative. Two separate verdict forms were used during the punishment phase, one to be signed if the jury found the previous commission of a DWI to be "true" as an enhancement and the second to be signed if the jury found the enhancement to be "not true." Neither verdict form mentioned probation. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that because probation was not a sentencing option in this case, appellant's substantial rights were unaffected by the prosecutor's misstatement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's challenges for cause. B. Due Process, Ineffective Assistance, and Impartial Jury Trial Challenge
Appellant also perfunctorily asserts in his brief that because the challenged jurors could not consider the entire range of punishment, his right to due process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 19 of the Texas Constitution were denied, and he was denied his rights to effective assistance of counsel and an impartial jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10 of the Texas Constitution. However, appellant failed to present any argument or provide any authority in support of his constitutional claims. Because appellant did not adequately brief these issues, his contentions are waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h); Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 147 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) (finding constitutional arguments waived by inadequate briefing); see also Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (holding that analysis based upon appellant's rights under the Sixth Amendment cannot be further argued under article 1, section 10 of the Texas Constitution without an explanation as to how the two provisions provide different protections); Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690-91 n. 23 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (stating that briefs asserting rights under Texas Constitution are inadequate if they do not provide argument and authority in support). Moreover, based upon our foregoing conclusions, even absent waiver, we find that appellant's constitutional claims are without merit. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.