The court also found, after "[c]onsidering all the available information presented by all parties," the Lorenzanas "believed the documents they signed to be substantially different from their true nature." Thus, relying on Buck v. Superior Court of Orange County (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 153, 42 Cal.Rptr. 527 ( Buck ), the court found the Deo Deed of Trust to be a forgery as a matter of law, and thus, void ab initio. Deo maintains the court erred in concluding the Deo Deed of Trust was forged because the undisputed evidence is that the Lorenzanas signed the various documents related to the Deo loan, including the Deo Deed of Trust.

The contractual promises to pay (which are "property" within the meaning of Pen.Code, § 487) all exceeded the sum of $200. It is stated in Buck v. Superior Court, 232 Cal.App.2d 153, 160 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 527, 11 A.L.R.3d 1064]: "A contractual obligation to pay money is properly subject to the theft statutes [citation] and a written contractual obligation to pay in excess of $200 is property of value in excess of $200, as contemplated by the definition of grand theft [citation]." The evidence of the prosecution was believed by the jury and apparently by the judge who tried the case.

It is not, of course, suggested that the final question and answer added anything to the case. Compare the detailed account of a comparable transaction (which we are told involved this same defendant) as set forth in Buck v. Superior Court (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 153 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 527]. III

On the other hand, defendants' contention the evidence does not establish any property was taken from the victim is meritorious. The People contend the writing executed by the victim created a contractual obligation which is property within the theft statute as held in People v. Parker, 255 Cal.App.2d 664, 671-672 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 413]; Buck v. Superior Court, 232 Cal.App.2d 153, 160 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 527, 11 A.L.R.3d 1064], and People v. Frankfort, 114 Cal.App.2d 680, 702-703 [ 251 P.2d 401]. This contention disregards the rule that where it is understood an agreement is not complete until the writing evidencing it is signed by both parties, no contract exists until both have signed.

[2] As to the two grand theft counts the evidence showed that defendant committed the offense in each instance by inducing the victims to part with value. ( Buck v. Superior Court, 232 Cal.App.2d 153, 160 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 527]. See also Perry v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 276, 282-283 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 1, 368 P.2d 529].

Near the beginning of much small print the "Proposal" states that upon completion of the work, the owner agrees to execute and deliver a note "in accordance with his obligation and a completion certificate as requested by the contractor." Six weeks later when the work was nearly completed, defendant and his employer, Jerry Kaplan, went to the Harrises' house and requested them to sign a sheaf of papers which appears to be similar to that described in Buck v. Superior Court, 232 Cal.App.2d 153, 156 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 527] — three copies, separated by carbon paper, of a document entitled "DO NOT RECORD. LIEN CONTRACT," buried in the fine print of which is the statement "In addition to any other right or remedy given to the holder hereof, the undersigned hereby grants to the holder hereof, a deed of trust to the above described real property as security for the faithful performance of his, her or their obligation under the contract.

The question arises only under Proposition 47, because the value of the forged instrument was previously irrelevant to the crime of forgery. ( Buck v. Superior Court (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 153, 162, 42 Cal.Rptr. 527.)Three possible tests have been proposed. In the Court of Appeal here and in Lowery , supra , 8 Cal.App.5th 533, 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 66, review granted, the defendants argued that the value of a forged check was merely the intrinsic value of the paper itself.

) Specifically, "[w]here a person who has no intention of selling or encumbering his property is induced by some trick or device to sign a paper having such effect, believing that paper to be a substantially different instrument," the signed paper is a forgery. (Buck v. Superior Court (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 153, 162; see also Parker, at pp. 667, 672 [deed of trust forged where victims signed based on representation the document was a contract for aluminum siding].) In People v. Astorga-Lider (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 646 (Astorga-Lider), for example, the victims believed they were signing a document - an agreement consummating the purchase of real property - that was substantially different from the actual document they signed - a deed of trust securing a loan for $275,000 in hard money that the defendant then controlled.

]" ( Id. at pp. 719-720.) The second case is Buck v. Superior Court (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 153 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 527] in which the victims were tricked into signing a blank deed of trust by an aluminum siding salesman. When the defendant presented a purchase contract for signature, he included among the papers a blank deed of trust which the victims inadvertently signed.

Apart from the fact that the plain words of section 739 do not limit the prosecutor's power to offenses charged in the complaint, the cases do not support the point. ( People v. Downer, 57 Cal.2d 800, 810 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 347, 372 P.2d 107]; Buck v. Superior Court, 232 Cal.App.2d 153, 157 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 527, 11 A.L.R.3d 1064]; People v. Griffin, 106 Cal.App.2d 531, 534-535 [ 235 P.2d 424].) The effect of our decisions is, simply, that it is not the complaint but the totality of the evidence produced at the preliminary hearing which notifies the defendant of the potential charges he may have to face in the superior court.