Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2014). "A genuine issue of material fact exists where the facts are in dispute or where reasonable minds could draw different inferences from the undisputed facts. Buck v. Charletta , 2013 IL App (1st) 122144, ¶ 56, 373 Ill.Dec. 576, 994 N.E.2d 61. When determining the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, courts construe the pleadings, exhibits, depositions, affidavits, and admissions against the movant and in favor of the nonmovant.

Hernandez, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 519. At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff must present some evidence that it is more probably true than not true that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Buck v. Charletta, 2013 IL App (1st) 122144, ¶ 58. We review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Hernandez, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 519.

(3) that the resulting injury to the patient was proximately caused by the physician's deviation from the standard of care." Buck v. Charletta, 2013 IL App (1st) 122144, ¶ 57. ¶ 15 A. Summary Judgment Principles

To prove legal cause, a plaintiff must also show that an injury was foreseeable or the type of harm that a reasonable person would expect to see as a likely result of his or her conduct. Id. ; seeSimmons v. Garces , 198 Ill.2d 541, 556, 261 Ill.Dec. 471, 763 N.E.2d 720 (2002) ; Buck v. Charletta , 2013 IL App (1st) 122144, ¶ 59, 373 Ill.Dec. 576, 994 N.E.2d 61 (2013) ; Kedzie v. DeKalb Clinic Chartered , 2016 IL App (2d) 150671-U, ¶ 42, 2016 WL 3406338 (2016). Proximate causation exists where the defendant's negligence was "a material and substantial element in bringing about the injury."

Thus, the trial court properly determined the issue of proximate causation as a matter of law. ¶ 35 Plaintiff further urges this court to discredit Dr. Aggarwal's testimony that had he been notified earlier he would not have treated plaintiff differently. Plaintiff maintains that such testimony cannot defeat proximate causation relying on Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1 (2003) and Buck v. Charletta, 2013 IL App (1st) 122144. These cases fail to support plaintiff's position.

Juries are commonly given the task of resolving questions of what probably would have happened absent allegedly wrongful conduct. See, e.g. , Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority , 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455, 178 Ill.Dec. 699, 605 N.E.2d 493 (1992) (cause-in-fact aspect of proximate cause inquiry requires jury to determine whether, absent defendant's conduct, injury still would have occurred); Clark v. Children's Memorial Hospital , 2011 IL 108656, ¶ 29, 353 Ill.Dec. 254, 955 N.E.2d 1065 (determining compensatory damages requires jury to determine "the position [the injured party] would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed"); Buck v. Charletta , 2013 IL App (1st) 122144, ¶¶ 68-73, 373 Ill.Dec. 576, 994 N.E.2d 61 (in medical negligence cases involving failure to communicate medical information, jury determines whether plaintiff would have received the same medical treatment if communication had occurred); Nelson v. Quarles & Brady, LLP , 2013 IL App (1st) 123122, ¶¶ 71-73, 375 Ill.Dec. 561, 997 N.E.2d 872 (in legal malpractice cases, jury determines what the outcome of underlying litigation would have been if the alleged malpractice had not occurred); Adams v. Family Planning Associates Medical Group, Inc. , 315 Ill. App. 3d 533, 544-46, 248 Ill.Dec. 91, 733 N.E.2d 766 (2000) (jury applying doctrine of res ipsa loquitur determines if injury would ordinarily have occurred in absence of negligence). ¶ 45 Despite the fact that the ultimate legal effect of the Wyeth inquiry involves federal preemption, we believe that its factual underpinnings require it to be classified not as a pure question of law, but as a mixed question of fact and law.

¶ 70 In medical malpractice cases, the element of proximate cause must be established through expert testimony to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill.2d 541, 556, 261 Ill.Dec. 471, 763 N.E.2d 720 (2002) ; Buck v. Charletta, 2013 IL App (1st) 122144, ¶ 59, 373 Ill.Dec. 576, 994 N.E.2d 61. To establish proximate causation, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's negligence “ ‘more probably than not’ ” caused the plaintiff's injury. Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill.2d 95, 107, 223 Ill.Dec. 429, 679 N.E.2d 1202 (1997). Proximate cause may be established where the defendant's conduct “increased the risk of harm” to the patient or “lessened the effectiveness” of the patient's treatment.

"...a cause that, in the natural or ordinary course of events, produced the plaintiff's injury. It need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it combines with another cause resulting in the injury."See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions Civil ("IPI") 15.01. A plaintiff must establish that the defendant deviated from the standard of care and that that deviation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Buck v. Charletta, 994 N.E.2d 61, 72 (2013). Here, the undisputed expert testimony establishes that PSA levels above 4 are considered abnormal and can be associated with prostate cancer.

The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions define proximate cause as "[any] cause that, in the natural or ordinary course of events, produced the plaintiff's injury. [It need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it combines with another cause resulting in the injury.]" Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 15.01 (2009) (second set of brackets in original). In short, the plaintiff must establish both that: "(1) the defendant 'deviated from the standard of care[,]' and (2) 'that that deviation was [a] proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.'" Buck v. Charletta, 373 Ill.Dec. 576, 994 N.E.2d 61, 72 (2013) (quoting Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill.2d 1, 272 Ill.Dec. 610, 787 N.E.2d 796, 821 (2003)). This can be done by presenting "'[e]vidence which shows to a reasonable [degree of medical] certainty that negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment ... lessened the effectiveness of treatment[.]'" Louis A. Weiss Mem'l Hosp, 143 Ill.App.3d 479, 97 Ill.Dec. 524, 493 N.E.2d 6, 12 (1986) (quoting James v. United States, 483 F.Supp. 581, 585 (N.D.Cal.1980)).

The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions define proximate cause as “[any] cause that, in the natural or ordinary course of events, produced the plaintiff's injury. [It need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it combines with another cause resulting in the injury.]” Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 15.01 (2009) (second set of brackets in original). In short, the plaintiff must establish both that: “(1) the defendant ‘deviated from the standard of care[,]’ and (2) ‘that that deviation was [a] proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.’ ” Buck v. Charletta, 373 Ill.Dec. 576, 994 N.E.2d 61, 72 (2013) (quoting Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill.2d 1, 272 Ill.Dec. 610, 787 N.E.2d 796, 821 (2003)). This can be done by presenting “ ‘[e]vidence which shows to a reasonable [degree of medical] certainty that negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment ... lessened the effectiveness of treatment[.]” N. Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Mem'l Hosp., 143 Ill.App.3d 479, 97 Ill.Dec. 524, 493 N.E.2d 6, 12 (1986) (quoting James v. United States, 483 F.Supp. 581, 585 (N.D.Cal.1980)).