Opinion
10-25-2011
John S. Bucalo, Appellant, v. King O'Rourke Buick Pontiac GMC, Respondent.
PRESENT: : , J.P., TANENBAUM and LaCAVA, JJ
Appeal, on the ground of inadequacy, from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, Fifth District (James P. Flanagan, J.), entered June 29, 2009. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $600.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff was employed as a manager by defendant car dealership. His wages included two components: a base salary, and a commission consisting of fixed percentages of the adjusted gross proceeds from the sales of new and used cars, calculated on a monthly basis. Plaintiff had worked for defendant for just over two years when he was discharged by defendant. At the time of discharge, plaintiff had three weeks of accrued vacation time. It was undisputed that, had plaintiff taken a vacation while still employed by defendant, he would have been entitled to receive both components of his salary for the duration of his vacation.
After it terminated plaintiff's employment, defendant paid plaintiff accrued "vacation pay" which included most of his base salary, but excluded that portion of his salary which was based on car sales commissions. Plaintiff brought this small claims action to recover both his base salary for an additional three days, and car sales commissions for the period of his vacation.
The District Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $600, which, it found, was the amount of base salary defendant owed plaintiff for his accrued vacation time; it concluded, however, that defendant had no obligation to pay plaintiff the non-fixed portion of his salary, commenting, "the payment of vacation time is a benefit and is not reimbursement for time worked or services performed." This appeal by plaintiff ensued.
The determination of whether, upon termination, an employee is entitled to be paid for accrued vacation time is governed by the contract between the parties (see e.g. Gennes v Yellow Book of NY, Inc., 23 AD3d 520, 521-522 [2005]; Matter of Glenville Gage Co. v Industrial Bd. of Appeals of NY, Dept. of Labor, 70 AD2d 283 [1979]; see also 52 NY Jur 2d, Employment Relations § 132). At trial, the District Court was presented with conflicting testimony as to defendant's contractual obligations with respect to plaintiff's post-termination right to payment for his accrued, unused vacation time; its decision manifests the court's conclusion that, having terminated plaintiff, defendant was obligated to pay plaintiff only the base salary component of his pay for accrued vacation time, and that defendant had no duty to pay plaintiff the component of his salary attributable to defendant's adjusted gross proceeds from car sales.
The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). The determination of the trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as the trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see e.g. Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]).
As there was evidence to support the District Court's conclusion with respect to defendant's post-termination contractual obligations to plaintiff, it is our view that the judgment rendered substantial justice between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UDCA 1804, 1807). Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Molia, J.P., Tanenbaum and LaCava, JJ., concur.