Bryson v. Vickers, Inc.

2 Citing cases

  1. Baughman v. United-A.G. Cooperative

    586 N.W.2d 836 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 1 times
    In Baughman, we defined the purpose of ยง 48-128 as providing employers an incentive to hire those who suffer from permanent disability, but we acknowledged that the statute restricts the benefits to those employers who do so "with knowledge that they are doing [so]."

    STANDARD OF REVIEW A judgment, order, or award of the Workers' Compensation Court may be modified, reversed, or set aside only upon the grounds that (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order or award. Bryson v. Vickers, Inc., 7 Neb. App. 595, 584 N.W.2d 44 (1998); Snipes v. Sperry Vickers, 251 Neb. 415, 557 N.W.2d 662 (1997). ANALYSIS

  2. Haro v. Beef America

    622 N.W.2d 170 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 1 times

    Cords v. City of Lincoln, 249 Neb. 748, 545 N.W.2d 112 (1996). See, also, Xayaseng v. Chief Indus., 7 Neb. App. 911, 586 N.W.2d 472 (1998); Bryson v. Vickers, Inc., 7 Neb. App. 595, 584 N.W.2d 44 (1998). As such, although Beef America is correct in noting that there is no medical documentation that Haro was temporarily totally disabled between November 1995 and December 1996, there is medical evidence to establish the cause of Haro's injury as work related, and the compensation court was free to consider Haro's own testimony in assessing whether he was totally disabled during the year in question.