Opinion
No. 100, 2002
Submitted: November 19, 2002
Decided: January 16, 2003
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, Cr. ID No. 0101004147
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
ORDER
This 16th day of January, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it appears to the Court as follows:
(1) In November 2001, a Superior Court jury convicted appellant Victor Bryson of Possession of Ammunition By a Person Prohibited, 11 Del. C. § 1448, and Discharging a Gun, 16 Del. C. § 6909. In this appeal, Bryson asserts two grounds of error: (i) the trial judge improperly denied Bryson's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and (ii) the trial judge erred when he instructed the jury that a mistake of law defense constitutes an affirmative defense as opposed to an ordinary defense. We conclude that the trial judge did not err in its various rulings and that the conviction should be affirmed.
(2) As a juvenile, Bryson entered a guilty plea in Family Court to a felony on two separate occasions. As a result, he was prohibited from owning firearms or ammunition until reaching the age of twenty-five. On January 1, 2001, several years before attaining the age of twenty-five, Bryson allegedly discharged a firearm within the town limits of New Castle, Delaware. The police responded and found spent shotgun shells. Bryson complained to the police that because it was New Year's Eve, "everybody is shooting, why are you picking on us."
Immediately after Bryson made that statement, the police had to leave the scene abruptly in order to respond to an unrelated emergency. On January 5, 2001, the police executed a search warrant at the Bryson residence, and found various weapons, including a shotgun. The police arrested Bryson outside and during a post-arrest search, found thirty-six unspent shells in his clothing and a hunting license in his name.
(3) With respect to Bryson's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, we conclude that the trial judge correctly denied the motion. The standard of review in assessing an insufficiency of evidence claim is whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this determination, the court does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.
Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 2001).
At the close of the State's case, Bryson moved for acquittal contending that the State failed to meet its burden to prove the shotgun shells found on his person constituted live rounds without evidence that the State test-fired or forensically examined one of the seized rounds.
Expended or inert shells are excluded from the statutory definition of "ammunition" pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1448(c).
While Bryson's argument on appeal may have constituted a plausible jury argument at trial, it does nothing to refute the fact that a rational jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find that Bryson possessed live shells. This is especially true given Bryson's implicit admission that he shot live shells on New Year's Eve, only a few days before his arrest. In addition, a rational trier of fact could have found that guilt was established by the outward appearance of the shells and the eyewitness testimony that Bryson fired a shotgun on a New Castle city street. Accordingly, the trial judge properly denied Bryson's motion.
(4) With respect to Bryson's mistake of law defense, we conclude that the trial judge properly described the mistake of law defense as an affirmative defense to the jury. We stated in Kipp v. State, that "[a] mistake of law defense is appropriately recognized where the defendant demonstrates that he has been misled by information received from the state." The language, "defendant demonstrates," suggests that the mistake of law defense is the defendant's to prove, and therefore, an affirmative defense. In making the statement, we cited Miller v. Commonwealth. Miller noted that the defendant bears the burden of establishing the affirmative defense of mistake of law. Accordingly, the mistake of law defense is an affirmative defense in Delaware, and therefore, the trial judge properly described it as such.
704 A.2d 839, 842 (Del. 1988) (emphasis added).
492 S.E.2d 482, 486-88 (Va.App. 1997).
Id. at 488.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.