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upholding sentence of 22-60 years' imprisonment on assault with intent to commit murder
Summary of this case from Moore v. BellOpinion
Civil No. 01-70657-DT
August 17, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Kimberly Marie Bryant, ("petitioner"), presently confined at the Scott Correctional Facility in Plymouth, Michigan, seeks the issuance of a writ of a habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In her application, filed pro so, petitioner challenges her sentence on one count of assault with intent to commit murder, M.C.L.A. 750.83; M.S.A. 28.278; one count of arson of a dwelling house, M.C.L.A. 750.72; M.S.A. 28.267; and one count of first-degree child abuse, M.C.L.A. 750.136b(2); M.S.A. 28.331(2)(2). For the reasons stated below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner pleaded guilty but mentally ill to the above charges, after her jury trial had already commenced in the Muskegon County Circuit Court. As part of the plea colloquy, the prosecution introduced a report from Dr. Ronald F. Lewis of the Forensic Center for Psychiatry, who evaluated petitioner for this case. In Dr. Lewis' opinion, petitioner was mentally ill at the time that she committed these offenses, Dr. Lewis also concluded that petitioner was not legally insane or mentally retarded at the time that she committed these offenses. Based upon this report, the trial court found that a verdict of guilty but mentally ill could be considered by the court. (Transcript, hereinafter, "T.", 12/12/96, pp. 6-7).
A copy of Dr. Lewis' report is attached to petitioners application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme court, found in the Rule 5 materials.
In making out a factual basis for these offenses, petitioner informed the court that on February 23, 1996, she attempted to kill herself and her fifteen month old baby, the victim in this case. In attempting to do this, petitioner set the crib in which her baby was sleeping on fire and also set her own bed on fire. Petitioner also acknowledged that a few days prior to this incident, petitioner lit the victim's clothes on fire, which caused a burn to the victim's chest area. Petitioner claimed that she attempted to set herself on fire at that time also. ( Id. at pp. 16-20).
Prior to sentencing, a pre-sentence investigation report was prepared for the trial court. The pre-sentence report indicated that petitioner suffered from a learning disability in school and had an IQ (intelligence quotient) estimated at between seventy and eighty, which put her at the "borderline range" and above the level of mental retardation. The report also indicated that petitioner had a lengthy history of depression, which included a number of suicide attempts. The report indicated that petitioner had a history of contact with the mental health system going back to when she was sixteen, when she first tried to commit suicide by overdosing on a medication. In 1992, petitioner was prescribed Prozac for her depression, but had not taken this or any other medication after having become pregnant with the victim in 1994. The pre-sentence report also noted that Dr. Lewis of the Forensic Center had found that petitioner did not meet the criteria for being either mentally retarded or legally insane. The report also mentioned that petitioner underwent a second sanity evaluation with a Dr. William Decker, who also found that petitioner did not meet the criteria for legal insanity.
A copy of the pre-sentence report is also attached to petitioner's application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme court.
The pre-sentence report also indicated that the victim in this case suffered burns on her body, which required her to be hospitalized in the burn unit at Blodgett Hospital in Grand Rapids. The report also mentioned that the victim suffered an older burn to her abdomen, from when petitioner had set fire to the victim's clothing. Lastly, the report noted that there was evidence of immersion burns on several parts of the victim's body which would be consistent with the victim being placed in scalding water. The sentencing guidelines for the offense of assault with intent to commit murder were scored at ninety six (96) to one hundred and eighty (180) months (eight to ten years).
On January 13, 1997, petitioner was sentenced to twenty two (22) to sixty (60) years in prison on the assault with intent to commit murder conviction, and received concurrent sentences of ten (10) to twenty (20) years on the arson conviction and ten (10) to fifteen (15) years on the first-degree child abuse conviction. (T., 01/13/97, pp. 16-18). The trial court indicated that it was departing above the sentencing guidelines in this case, because of the fact that there were three different assaults on the child. The trial court noted that the first assault took place several days prior to the house fire, when the victim's chest was burned. The court indicated that there was medical testimony that the victim was immersed in a hot liquid on the day of the house fire. Following that incident, petitioner set fire to the baby's crib and to the entire house. Although noting that petitioner had no prior record, the trial court felt that a "disproportionate influence" was being given by the sentencing guidelines to petitioners lack of a prior record. The court felt that the "atrociousness" of the crimes justified the sentence that was imposed. ( Id. at pp. 15-16).
Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. People v. Bryant, 206211 (Mich.Ct.App. October 19, 1999); lv. den. 462 Mich. 868 (2000). Petitioner now seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on the following ground:
Because of the excessive length of Petitioner's sentence and its disproportionate length, it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment contrary to U.S.C.A. Amend. VIII and XIV.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harpster v. State of Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 326 (6th Cir. 1997).
A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. An "unreasonable application" occurs when the state court identifies the correct legal principle from a Supreme Court's decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoners case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000). A federal habeas court may not find a state adjudication to be "unreasonable" "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411.
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends that the sentence imposed in this case was excessive and disproportionate, and thus constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In support of her claim, petitioner points to the fact that she was a first time offender who pleaded guilty but mentally ill to these charges. Petitioner further contends that there was evidence presented to the trial court that petitioner was mentally ill and suicidal when she committed these offenses. Petitioner lastly points to the fact that her IQ was at a borderline range of retardation.
A sentence imposed within the statutory limits is not generally subject to habeas review. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948); Cook v. Stegall, 56 F. Supp.2d 788, 797 (ED. Mich. 1999)(Gadola, J.). A sentence within the statutory maximum set by statute does not normally constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Austin v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 298, 302 (6th Cir. 2000). Generally, federal habeas review of a state court sentence ends once the court makes a determination that the sentence is within the limitation set by statute. Dennis v. Poppel, 222 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2000); Harp v. Yukins, 2000 WL 1772619, *2 (E.D. Mich. October 30, 2000)(Steeh, J.).
In the present case, petitioner claims that her sentence was excessive and disproportionate, because of the fact that she was a first time offender with a history of mental illness and emotional problems. The U.S. Constitution does not require that sentences be proportionate. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991), a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not contain a requirement of strict proportionality between the crime and sentence. The Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001. Thus, successful challenges to the proportionality of a particular sentence in non-capital cases are "exceedingly rare". Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). Federal courts will therefore not engage in a proportionality analysis except where the sentence imposed is death or life imprisonment without parole. Seeger v. Straub, 29 F. Supp.2d 385, 392 (E.D. Mich. 1998)(Tarnow, J). Because petitioner's sentence was within the bounds set by the statute, this Court will not disturb the sentence on habeas review. Welch v. Burke, 49 F. Supp.2d 992, 1009-1010 (E.D. Mich. 1999)(Cleland, J.). It is not the exceptional case.
To the extent that petitioner alleges that the trial court failed to consider evidence of petitioner's mental illness or emotional problems to mitigate her sentence, she is factually incorrect. The trial court, rather, chose to exercise its discretion and give more weight to the aggravating factors. Therefore, the trial court's failure to give more weight to her mental illness, suicide attempts, and emotional problems did not violate the Eight Amendment.
IV. ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.