Opinion
Case No. 2:18-cv-2159-MBS-MGB
10-02-2018
Anthony G. Bryant, Plaintiff, v. US Department of Transportation, Homeland Security, Attorney General of United States, and US Attorney for the District of South Carolina, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Anthony Bryant ("Plaintiff") is a nonprisoner litigant who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the record and to submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. Upon review, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Complaint should be summarily dismissed without prejudice, and without issuance and service of process for the following reasons:
I. Relevant Law
A. Liberal Construction
Pro se pleadings are given liberal construction and are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, "[t]he 'special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view ... pro se filings does not transform the court into an advocate. United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 2401 (2013). Only those questions which are squarely presented to a court may properly be addressed." Weller v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., City of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Giving "liberal construction" does not mean that the Court can ignore a prisoner's clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. "Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints ... [do] not require ... courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).
B. Standard of Review
Upon application, an indigent litigant may commence an action "in forma pauperis" in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows the court to dismiss the case upon finding that the action is "frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte "at any time." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326. "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law." Id.
C. Inherent Authority to Dismiss Frivolous Case
The United States Supreme Court has observed that federal district courts possess inherent authority to dismiss a frivolous case. See Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) ("Section 1915(d) ... authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision."); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537 (1974) (holding that federal district courts may dismiss claims that are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit").
Consistent with such authority, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "frivolous complaints are subject to summary dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court." Ross v. Baron, 493 F.App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2012); and see, e.g., Cabbill v. United States, Case No. 1:14-cv-4122-JMC-PJG, 2015 WL 6905072, *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 9, 2015) (same), appeal dism'd, 2016 WL 1085106 (4th Cir. Mar. 21, 2016); Anderson v. Patterson, Case No. 6:16-761-MGL-JDA, 2016 WL 1743095 (D.S.C. April 12, 2016), adopted by 2016 WL 1732763 (D.S.C. May 2, 2016). "A suit is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009).
Therefore, the present Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous. See e.g., Carter v. Ervin, Case No. 0:14-cv-00865-TLW-PJG, 2014 WL 2468351, *3 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014), appeal dism'd, 585 F.App'x 98 (4th Cir. 2014); Mayhew, 2014 WL 468938 at *1, fn.1 (exercising inherent authority to summarily dismiss a frivolous case).
II. Allegations of the Complaint
In his Complaint, the Plaintiff names the following parties as Defendants: the United States Department of Transportation, Homeland Security, the Attorney General of United States, and the United States Attorney for the District of South Carolina.
The Complaint's "Statement of the Claim" consists of the following (verbatim):
Plaintiff (Exhibits) support claim under sections 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 242, Flood Disaster Protection Act 1975, Coastal Barrier Resources system, IRS 6109 Code First Amendment(DE# 1 at 5, ¶ III).
For relief, Plaintiff states the following (verbatim):
June 23, 2016 letter IG Homeland Security Federal Bureau of Investigation CFBFJ October 2009 U.S. Department of Transportation U.S. Army Corps of Engineer Department of Defense(DE# 1 at 5, ¶ IV "Relief").
Plaintiff attaches 35 pages of exhibits, none of which shed any light on his Complaint. (DE# 1-1). The exhibits include a letter response to Plaintiff's enquiries to the Department of the Army (at 1); a typed "public comment" by Plaintiff that is nonsensical (at 2-8); a colorful unlabeled "pie chart" of unknown relevance (at 9), a newspaper article about law enforcement (at 10); a 2010 letter response from the Department of Justice regarding Plaintiff's FAX about the Charleston County Incinerator (at 11); a Department of Transportation letter indicating it had received Plaintiff's complaint on September 17, 2009 but that "it has been determined that the matters raised in your complaint are not related to the laws or statutes for which the [DOT] has jurisdiction" (at 12); a 2014 DEA letter about an administrative appeal of a FOIA request (at 13-14); a 2008 letter from SCDOT (at 15); a 2009 HUD letter advising Plaintiff that "we have determined that our office does not have the authority (jurisdiction) in these matters" (at 16-17); a 2009 letter from the Department of Education advising Plaintiff that "OCR does not appear to have jurisdiction over this issue" (at 18-19); a 2012 South Carolina Department of Revenue response letter denying a certificate of tax compliance (at 21); newspaper articles about immigration (at 22-23); a pre-printed tax form (at 25); a response letter from a state agency regarding South Carolina's 2013 Annual Action Plan (at 25-29 "we are unable to identify the specific information that you are requesting"); a copy of an arrest warrant for Plaintiff in 2013 (at 30); an IRS notice indicating that Plaintiff's submission was illegible and incomplete (at 31-32); newspaper articles about an arena project and flood insurance (at 33-34); and a 2010 letter from Charleston's Zoning and Planning Department about a name plate (at 35).
III. Discussion
Review of the Complaint reflects numerous grounds for summary dismissal.
A. Failure to State a Claim
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that more than conclusory statements are required to state a plausible claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009). A plaintiff must allege specific facts that adequately support the claim. Id. The present Complaint fails to state any factual or legal basis for any federal claims. Although courts give "liberal construction" to pro se pleadings, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized that federal courts may not "ignore a petitioner's clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim." Wilson, 699 F.3d at 797.
The allegations of the Plaintiff's Complaint are nonsensical and incoherent. Plaintiff does not allege any supporting facts that suggest any constitutional violation or any violation of federal law. The Complaint consists of disjointed phrases that fail to state any sort of coherent claim. The Complaint's lengthy attachments do not clarify matters. Even liberally construing the allegations of the pro se Plaintiff's Complaint, it is not possible to discern any plausible claims from the disconnected sentence fragments in the Complaint. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized that "[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se complaints ... [do] not require ... courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them." Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278. Plaintiff has submitted many pages of attachments, including hand-written "Declarations" that are disconnected in logic and grammar, and refer to unrelated events (DE# 10-11, 15). The attached exhibits shed no light on the Complaint, and any relevance cannot be discerned. The Complaint fails to state any sort of plausible claim, and therefore, summary dismissal is appropriate.
B. Frivolity
Moreover, the Complaint appears to lack any arguable basis in law or in fact, and therefore is subject to dismissal as frivolous. Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. For example, Plaintiff cites 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (the "Enforcement Act") as the basis for federal question jurisdiction. (See DE# 1 at 3). However, Plaintiff has no private cause of action under such criminal statutes. See United States v. McLean, 808 F.2d 1044, 1046 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing a criminal prosecution under such statute). Any claim based on 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 fails as a matter of law since that federal criminal statute does not create a private right of action. See Davis v. Sarles, 134 F.Supp.3d 223, 228 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2015) (citing Crosby v. Catret, 308 F.App'x 453 (D.C.Cir. 2009) (per curiam) ("there is no private right of action under these criminal statutes"). This legal deficiency cannot be remedied through more specific factual pleading. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 76 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995). Given the nature of the Plaintiff's nonsensical pleadings and lengthy irrelevant attachments scattered throughout the record, it is readily apparent that amendment would not cure the deficiencies of this Complaint and would be futile.
Plaintiff has filed a nonsensical Complaint whose meaning the Court can only guess. Plaintiff's allegations are incomprehensible, and even with liberal construction, no claims can be discerned. Although the allegations are nonsensical, this case may also be duplicative of several other pending cases recently filed by the Plaintiff. For example, in Case Nos. 2:18-cv-606-MBS-MGB, 2:18-cv-607-MBS-MGB, and 2:18-cv-1436-MBS-MGB, Plaintiff also sued the U.S. Attorney for the District of South Carolina and the Attorney General of United States. In the present case, Plaintiff again sues those same two officials. In any event, Plaintiff's allegations are indecipherable and consist of random unrelated sentence fragments.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that "district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits and may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)." Cottle v. Bell, 2000 WL 1144623, *1 (4th Cir. Aug.14, 2000) (per curiam) (citing with approval, Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that "district courts may dismiss a duplicative complaint raising issues directly related to issues in another pending action brought by the same party"); Southern Holdings, Inc. v. Horry Cty., South Carolina, Case No. 4:02-1859-RBH, 2014 WL 11071017, *6 (D.S.C. June 11, 2014) (same); Paul v. de Holczer, Case No. 3:15-2178-CMC-PJG, 2015 WL 4545974, *6 (D.S.C. July 28, 2015) ("the instant Complaint should be summarily dismissed as a frivolous duplicate filing in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency"), affirmed, 631 F.App'x 197 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016); Cox v. Cartledge, Case No. 3:13-481-TMC, 2013 WL 1401684 (D.S.C. March 13, 2013), adopted, 2013 WL 1401674 (D.S.C. April 8, 2013) (same); Sherron v. Perry, 2016 WL 407303, *2 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 2, 2016) (same); Witherspoon v. Matthews, Case No. 9:17-20-MGL-BM, 2017 WL 3283855, *5 (D.S.C. July 14, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 3263939 (D.S.C. Aug. 1, 2017) (same); Reynolds v. Third Circuit Pub. Def. Office, Case No. 4:17-cv-3469-BHH-MGB, 2018 WL 1322102, *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 1124592 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2018) (summarily dismissing duplicate case as frivolous). Summary dismissal is appropriate.
C. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In fact, Plaintiff's allegations are so disconnected and incoherent that it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking here. Federal-question jurisdiction requires that a party assert a substantial federal claim. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1976); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962) (holding that if jurisdiction is based on a federal question, the plaintiff must show that he has alleged a claim under federal law that is not frivolous). Plaintiff has failed to do so. His allegations are wholly inadequate to allege a substantial federal claim, and it does not appear that amendment could cure such pleading deficiency. As a result, this case should be summarily dismissed.
This federal court has an "independent obligation" to investigate the limits of its subject-matter jurisdiction. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). The obligation to examine subject-matter jurisdiction is triggered whenever that jurisdiction is "fairly in doubt." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 671. It is well settled that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The burden of establishing jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936). The two most commonly recognized and utilized bases for federal court jurisdiction are (1) "federal question," 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) "diversity of citizenship." 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On the pre-printed complaint form, Plaintiff checks the box for federal question. (DE# 1 at 3, ¶II "Basis for Jurisdiction"). However, he then refers to 18 U.S.C. §§241 and 242, which provides no private cause of action. He also refers to IRS Code 6109, which would have no application against the named Defendants. No cognizable basis for federal jurisdiction is apparent from the face of the pleading.
With respect to "federal question" jurisdiction, the allegations of the Complaint do not indicate that this case is one "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff does not plausibly state any facts that would suggest a violation of any federal statute or constitutional provision by the Defendants. Even though Plaintiff asserts federal question jurisdiction here, this court is not bound by Plaintiff's characterization of his suit because there are no facts alleged to support any federal cause of action.
When considering the issue of whether a case is one "arising under the Constitution . . ." or, in other words, whether "federal question" jurisdiction exists in a case, a federal court is not bound by a party's characterization of the case. District courts are authorized to disregard such characterizations to avoid "unjust manipulation or avoidance of its jurisdiction." Lyon v. Centimark Corp., 805 F. Supp. 333, 334-35 (E.D. N.C. 1992); see Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). Cf. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) ("Not every question of federal law emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of the suit."). Thus, even though Plaintiff appears to assert that his Complaint was filed under federal-question jurisdiction, this court may disregard such assertion because no plausible basis for federal question jurisdiction is actually presented.
Second, the Complaint alleges no basis for diversity jurisdiction. The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00):
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—28 U.S.C. § 1332. Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 & nn.13-16 (1978). Diversity jurisdiction is lacking in this case because according to the information provided by Plaintiff in his Complaint, both Plaintiff and the Defendant US Attorney for the District of South Carolina are residents of the State of South Carolina. Furthermore, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to support a finding that the $75,000 jurisdictional amount would be in controversy in this case.
(1) citizens of different States[.]
D. Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiff's Complaint names the United States Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security (agencies of the federal government) and several federal officials (the Attorney General of United States and the United States Attorney for the District of South Carolina) as defendants. It is well-settled that federal agencies are entitled to sovereign immunity unless Congress waives immunity and consents to suit. Global Mail Ltd. v. U.S. Postal Service, 142 F.3d 208, 210 (4th Cir. 1998); Moore v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 55 F.3d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Bivens-type claims cannot be brought against federal agencies").
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (establishing a cause of action against federal officials for violation of federal constitutional rights). A Bivens claim for damages is not actionable against the United States, federal agencies, or public officials acting in their official capacities.
Plaintiff may not sue the United States or its agencies without their consent. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994) (holding that suit against federal agency could not proceed); Reinbold v. Evers, 187 F.3d 348, 355 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Bivens does not allow for recovery of money damages, or suits in general, against the government itself."). The same is true for actions brought against federal agency officials in their official capacities. Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2002) ("a Bivens action does not lie against either agencies or officials in their official capacity"); Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Estate of Riopedre v. United States, 2015 WL 505584 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2015) (same).
Sovereign immunity deprives a court of jurisdiction. Global Mail Ltd., 142 F.3d at 210; United States v. Jones, 225 F.3d 468, 469 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1053 (2001). Such deficiency cannot be remedied through more specific factual pleading. Rice, 40 F.3d at 76. Thus, the Complaint against the federal agencies and the individual federal officials in their official capacity is subject to dismissal based on sovereign immunity.
E. Prosecutorial Immunity
Plaintiff names the Attorney General of United States and the United States Attorney for the District of South Carolina as defendants. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges no actions by them. If Plaintiff is attempting to complain about any actions taken by them in performing their official duties, any claim against such officials in their individual capacity would be subject to summary dismissal. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) ("[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity."); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (holding that prosecutors have immunity for performing functions "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process"); and see Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 249-50 (4th Cir. 2006) (same); Redden v. McMaster, Case No. 8:08-2845-CMC-BHH, 2008 WL 4458877, *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2008) (emphasizing that prosecutors "have absolute immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings").
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, the Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted, is legally and factually frivolous, and seeks monetary damages against federal defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). In fact, the pleadings are so incoherent that subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking here. Amendment of the pleadings would be futile. Summary dismissal is appropriate.
V. Recommendation
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Complaint (DE# 1) should be summarily dismissed without prejudice, and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE October 2, 2018
Charleston, South Carolina Plaintiff's attention is directed to the Important Warning on the following page:
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).