Opinion
Case No. SC08-658.
April 16, 2009.
Lower Tribunal No(s). 92-791CF-AO2.
Petitioner's motion for rehearing is denied. However, we vacate our February 11, 2009, order and issue the following revised order in its place.
Byron B. Bryant, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals from the circuit court's summary denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief, raising two issues. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.851. We previously affirmed Bryant's convictions and sentence of death. Bryant v. State, 785 So. 2d 422, 426 (Fla. 2001). We also affirmed denial of his first motion for postconviction relief and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810, 815 (Fla. 2005).
In this appeal, Bryant first contends that he was deprived of his right to meaningful postconviction review in his initial postconviction proceeding due to ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. "We have repeatedly held that claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel are not cognizable." Kokal v. State, 901 So. 2d 766, 777 (Fla. 2005) (citations omitted). The summary denial of this claim by the trial court was correct.
Second, Bryant contends that Florida's lethal injection procedures violate the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. Amend. VIII; art. I § 17, Fla. Const. As Bryant admits, however, we have repeatedly upheld these procedures against such constitutional challenges. See Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, No. 08-8614 (U.S. Feb. 11, 2009);Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 321-25 (Fla. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2486 (2008); Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 349-53 (Fla. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2485 (2008). We have also held the procedures constitutional under the requirements of Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). See Ventura v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S71, S72 (Fla. Jan. 29, 2009) ("Florida's current lethal-injection protocol passes muster under any of the risk-based standards considered by the Baze Court (and would easily satisfy the intent-based standard advocated by Justices Thomas and Scalia)."); Henyard v. State, 992 So. 2d 120, 130 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 28 (2008).
In his third claim, Bryant contends that the circuit court erred in denying his request for public records. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.852. We find that the court did not abuse its discretion. See Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1149 (Fla. 2006) ("In reviewing the trial court's denial of . . . public records requests, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard." (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's orders denying relief on Bryant's successive postconviction motion and denying his request for additional public records.
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur.
PERRY, J., did not participate.