Opinion
No. 107,231.
2013-02-8
Craig M. BRYANT, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Anthony J. Powell, Judge. Kristen B. Patty, of Wichita, for appellant. Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Anthony J. Powell, Judge.
Kristen B. Patty, of Wichita, for appellant. Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before ARNOLD–BURGER, P.J., GREEN, J., and HEBERT, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
The district court denied Craig Bryant's motion for habeas relief under K.S.A. 60–1507, finding it to be procedurally barred because it was both untimely and successive. On appeal, Bryant does not challenge those procedural grounds for the district court's decision. Instead, he seeks relief based on an alleged trial error that he raises for the first time on appeal, an error that implicates his due process rights and the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. He argues that even though the trial court ordered him to undergo a competency evaluation, because the record does not conclusively establish that he received a competency hearing prior to his trial, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his trial and sentencing. See State v. Murray, 293 Kan. 1051, 1054, 271 P.3d 739 (2012). We first find that Bryant may properly raise an issue of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. But we find that his claim lacks merit because the record reflects that the court conducted a competency hearing and found him to be competent. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Factual and Procedural History
Bryant is currently in prison serving three consecutive life sentences imposed by the trial court in 2000 after a jury found Bryant guilty on three counts of first-degree premeditated murder. The underlying facts need not be recounted here and can be found in our Supreme Court's decision affirming Bryant's convictions on direct appeal in State v. Bryant, 272 Kan. 1204, 38 P.3d 661 (2002).
The case is now here as a result of a second motion for habeas relief under K.S.A. 60–1507 that Bryant filed in December 2010. This court affirmed the denial of Bryant's first K.S.A. 60–1507 motion in Bryant v. State, No. 92,725, 2005 WL 3289374 (Kan.App.2005) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 281 Kan. 1377 (2006). In his second K.S.A. 60–1507 motion, Bryant challenged his conviction and sentence on five substantive grounds related to alleged trial errors and a disparity between his and his codefendant's sentences.
Following the appointment of counsel for Bryant and a preliminary hearing, the district court denied Bryant's second K.S.A. 60–1507 motion upon finding it was procedurally barred on two independent grounds. First, the district court held Bryant's motion was untimely because it was not filed within the 1–year deadline imposed by K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(1), and Bryant failed to establish the manifest injustice that K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(2) requires for the court to extend that deadline. Second, the district court held Bryant was not entitled to relief because this K.S.A. 60–1507 motion was successive. See Supreme Court Rule 183(d) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 274). This appeal by Bryant followed.
Analysis
This court's standard of review is unlimited.
When, as here, the district court denies a K.S.A. 60–1507 motion based solely upon counsel's legal argument at a nonevidentiary hearing and the court's review of the files and records of the case, an appellate court is in as good a position as the district court to consider the merits. Thus, this court will conduct an unlimited review to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show that Bryant is entitled to no relief. See Barr v. State, 287 Kan. 190, 196, 196 P.3d 357 (2008). If so, then this court will affirm the district court's summary denial of Bryant's motion. If not, then remand for an evidentiary hearing is required. See Supreme Court Rule 183(f).
In addition, to the extent we are asked to review the jurisdiction of the district court, our review is also unlimited. Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which this court's scope of review is unlimited. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corporation, 293 Kan. 633, 637, 270 P.3d 1074 (2011). Bryant has waived any challenge to the procedural bases for the district court's decision
At the outset, it should be noted that Bryant has not challenged the procedural bases for the district court's judgment. As a result, the fact that the motion was both untimely and successive is undisputed. Likewise, Bryant does not specifically dispute the district court's failure to find any manifest injustice to justify an extension of the statutory time limits. See K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(2) (providing that court can extend 1–year time limit for filing of action for relief under K.S.A. 60–1507 “only to prevent a manifest injustice”). Accordingly, Bryant has waived any challenge to those clear procedural bars. See State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 709, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived or abandoned). But, as explained more fully below, this does not necessarily mean that this court cannot reach the merits of the issue Bryant has briefed because sometimes procedural bars can be trumped upon certain showings. Bryant raises a new issue on appeal about whether the district court had jurisdiction to subject him to trial and to sentence him.
Bryant's sole argument on appeal is one he raises for the first time. He argues that because the record does not indicate whether he received a competency hearing prior to his trial and after the trial court ordered him to undergo a competency evaluation under K.S.A. 22–3302(1), this court should remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on whether there was a competency hearing.
The State argues that we do not have jurisdiction to consider Bryant's claim because his K.S.A. 60–1507 motion is procedurally barred and he does not challenge that finding. But subject matter jurisdiction is subject to challenge by the parties or the court at any time. Trotter v. State, 288 Kan. 112, 200 P.3d 1236 (2009). If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, any judgment is void. Murray, 293 Kan. at 1054.Cf. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005) (recognizing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60[b]—which, similarly to K.S.A. 60–260[b], permits motions seeking relief from void judgments-“preserves parties' opportunity to obtain vacatur of a judgment that is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—a consideration just as valid in habeas cases as in any other, since absence of jurisdiction altogether deprives a federal court of the power to adjudicate the rights of the parties”).
So we will next consider whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Bryant's trial and sentencing.
Bryant's argument is premised on our Supreme Court's recent decision in Murray, 293 Kan. 1051. In that case, decided after the district court's decision here, our Supreme Court reviewed a judgment that summarily denied a motion to correct an illegal sentence in which the defendant asserted that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to try and sentence him 28 years ago. In support, the defendant asserted that he did not receive a competency hearing after the district court had ordered him to undergo a competency evaluation. In addressing that issue, our Supreme Court explained:
“Once an order to determine competency is issued, a criminal prosecution must be suspended until competency is determined. K.S.A. 22–3302(1); [State v.] Davis, 281 Kan. [169,] 177[, 130 P.3d 69 (2006) ]. Failure to suspend prosecution until it is decided that the defendant is competent to stand trial deprives the district court of jurisdiction for trial and sentencing. Davis, 281 Kan. at 180.” Murray, 293 Kan. at 1054.
Because our Supreme Court was unable to discern from the silent record whether a postevaluation competency hearing had been held, our Supreme Court reversed the summary denial of the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine the accuracy of Murray's factual assertion that he never received a competency hearing. 293 Kan. at 1053–55.
We find the facts of Murray to be distinguishable from the facts of the case before us. First, unlike the defendant in Murray, Bryant has never affirmatively asserted, either below or in this appeal, that he did not receive a competency hearing. Rather, Bryant argues that this court should remand for an evidentiary hearing because the underlying record of his criminal conviction shows that the court ordered him to undergo a competency evaluation but is silent on whether Bryant ever received a postevaluation competency hearing prior to his trial or sentencing. Thus, Bryant asks this court to follow the lead of our Supreme Court in Murray and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the factual question of whether he received a competency hearing.
We disagree that the record is silent. In fact, the record establishes that the district court, as required by K.S.A. 22–3302(1), first found that there was reason to believe the defendant should undergo a competency evaluation and then suspended all further proceedings until further order of the court regarding Bryant's competency to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense. Bryant filed an objection, pro se, to the court's order. In it he alleged that he was competent, that he had “had a number of competency evaluations throughout all the years of his life, and have passed every one of them.” Bryant further alleged that a competency evaluation was a waste of time and money and instead he wanted the matter set for trial as soon as possible without any further delays. He also filed several other pro se motions at the time which clearly set out his legal positions, applicable statutes, and succinctly relayed his concerns to the court. Two months after the evaluation was ordered, and three months prior to trial, the record reflects that there was a court appearance on November 19, 1999, at 9 a.m. in front of Judge Clark Owens, with a court reporter present, in which Bryant was “Found Competent.” Granted, the record does not contain a copy of the evaluation or a transcript of the proceeding. But we find it significant that, unlike Murray, Bryant does not allege that a hearing did not take place or that he was not present, and the record appears to support a finding that there was a hearing and Bryant was present. Accordingly, we find that Bryant has failed to establish that the district court did not conduct a competency hearing, as necessary to warrant an evidentiary hearing to resolve a material factual dispute.
Accordingly, because we find that the files and records in this case demonstrate that the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction over Bryant's trial and sentencing and because Bryant does not otherwise challenge the district court's order denying his K.S.A. 60–1507 motion, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Affirmed.