Bryant v. Colvin

7 Citing cases

  1. Taborn v. Saul

    Case No. 19-CV-155 (E.D. Wis. Jun. 24, 2020)

    Therefore, the court cannot order remand pursuant to both sentence six and sentence four. See Kabele v. Colvin, No. 12 cv-776-wmc, 2015 WL 1430343, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2015) (quoting Bryant v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-0307-CAN, 2013 WL 6800127, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2013)). "The prototype of a sentence six remand would be a case in which relevant new evidence had come to light since the agency's decision under appeal, and the parties asked the district court to remand the case to allow the agency to consider the case further in light of the new evidence ...."

  2. Baker v. Colvin

    No. 1:15-cv-01928-SEB-TAB (S.D. Ind. Sep. 1, 2016)

    Seventh Circuit case law provides no clear guidance when remand could be appropriate under both sentences, and district courts have split on this issue. For example, while Bryant v. Colvin, 2013 WL 6800127, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2013), held that a dual remand would result in conflicting relief, Felver v. Barnhart, 243 F. Supp. 2d 895, 908 (N.D. Ind. 2003), granted a dual remand with instructions for the ALJ under each sentence. Campbell v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 741, 744-45 (7th Cir. 1993), provides some insight.

  3. Bannister v. Colvin

    Civil Action No. 1:14CV741 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 25, 2015)   Cited 3 times

    While an ALJ "may choose to give less weight to the testimony of a treating physician if there is persuasive contrary evidence," Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35, "the ALJ may not cherry-pick trivial inconsistencies between a treating physician's opinion and the record or take evidence out of context to discount the physician's opinion." Meyer-Williams v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-393, 2015 WL 339631, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2015) (Eagles, J.) (unpublished) (citing Ellis v. Colvin, 5:13CV00043, 2014 WL 2862703 (W.D.Va. June 24, 2014); Bryant v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-307-CAN, 2013 WL 6800127, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2013) (citing Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011))). An ALJ's decision not to afford controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion must be supported by substantial evidence in the record.

  4. Sparks v. Colvin

    No. 1:14-cv-01519-SEB-MJD (S.D. Ind. May. 18, 2015)

    Id. The Court therefore cannot consider the GAF score of 35, and the Court cannot remand the case on the basis of that score. See id.; see also, e.g., Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[Claimant's] company medical records submitted for the first time to the Appeals Council, though technically a part of the administrative record, cannot be used as a basis for a finding of reversible error."); Bryant v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-0307-CAN, 2013 WL 6800127, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2013) ("If the Appeals Council denied review, the reviewing court must ignore the evidence submitted to the Appeals Council and review the ALJ's decision and only the evidence that was before the ALJ."). If Plaintiff wanted the Court to consider evidence that was not before the ALJ, then Plaintiff should have argued that remand was appropriate under sentence six of 28 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Luna, 22 F.3d at 692 n.5. Plaintiff did not do so, and has therefore waived that argument, and the Court will not remand the ALJ's decision on the basis of evidence that was not before the ALJ.

  5. Kabele v. Colvin

    12 cv-776-wmc (W.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2015)   Cited 2 times

    Because "the relief would be conflicting," a "[c]ourt cannot grant both sentence four and the sentence six remands." Bryant v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-0307-CAN, 2013 WL 6800127, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2013). This conflict was earlier recognized in Melkonyan, where the Supreme Court held that:

  6. Bays v. Colvin

    Case No.: 2:14-cv-01564 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 30, 2015)

    This is not a case where an ALJ "cherry-picked" a single inconsistency out of the treatment records to discredit a treating physician's opinion. Cf. Bryant v. Colvin, No. 3:12-cv-0307, 2013 WL 6800127, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2013) (recognizing that ALJ cannot "cherry-pick" one inconsistency out of treatment records to reject treating physician's opinion, but multiple inconsistencies may constitute good cause to deny treating physician's opinion controlling weight). Instead, after reviewing all of Claimant's treatment records with Dr. Shramowiat from 2010 through 2012, the ALJ appropriately relied on at least two of Claimant's recent treatment records and the overall course of treatment with Dr. Shramowiat for those two years to determine the evidentiary value that Dr. Shramowiat's opinion was entitled to. Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, the ALJ also supported his analysis with treatment records from other providers.

  7. Meyer-Williams v. Colvin

    87 F. Supp. 3d 769 (M.D.N.C. 2015)   Cited 7 times
    Remanding for reward of benefits rather than for reconsideration, because "the record [was] clear and denial of benefits [was] not supported by substantial evidence" and "[r]eopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose, especially since [claimant's] claim has already been remanded twice because of ALJ errors"

    While an ALJ “may choose to give less weight to the testimony of a treating physician if there is persuasive contrary evidence,”Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir.1992), the ALJ may not cherry-pick trivial inconsistencies between a treating physician's opinion and the record or take evidence out of context to discount the physician's opinion. Ellis v. Colvin, 5:13CV00043, 2014 WL 2862703 (W.D.Va. June 24, 2014) ; Bryant v. Colvin, No. 3:12–CV–0307–CAN, 2013 WL 6800127, at *12 (N.D.Ind. Dec. 20, 2013) (citing Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir.2011) ). In this case, Dr. Wise, a psychiatrist, has examined Ms. Meyer–Williams many times.