Bryant v. Arkansas Public Serv. Comm'n

9 Citing cases

  1. Consumer Utils. Rate Advocacy v. Ark. Pub. Serv

    184 S.W.3d 36 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 2 times

    Bryant, 64 Ark. App. at 307, 984 S.W.2d at 63; Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 46 Ark. App. 88, 98, 877 S.W.2d 594, 599 (1994). A stipulation represents a compromise of the parties' positions, and it is the total effect of a rate order that must be reviewed. Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 Ark. App. 73, 89, 941 S.W.2d 452, 461 (1997). If the total effect of a rate order cannot be said to be unjust, unreasonable, unlawful, or discriminatory, judicial inquiry is concluded. Id.; Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 46 Ark. App. at 103, 877 S.W.2d at 602. Although we agree that the individual points raised by the AG must be considered in the context of the entire Agreement, we do not agree that this court need only determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's approval of the Agreement.

  2. Consumers Utils. v. Ark. Pub. Serv

    99 Ark. App. 228 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 2 times

    To establish the absence of substantial evidence, an appellant must show that the proof before the administrative tribunal was so nearly undisputed that fair-minded persons could not reach its conclusion. Bryant v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 Ark. App. 73, 941 S.W.2d 452 (1997). The Commission emphasizes Bradley's testimony that her recommended classification percentages were similar to percentages that would be obtained using "the Average and Peak allocation methodology," an alternative methodology that the Commission has accepted as reasonable and used in the Commission's two most recent gas cases to separate demand and commodity related costs. It also relies on the AOG's E-12 schedule to support its finding that approximately 68% of AOG's weather-normalization sales occur during the winter (peak) usage period, the months of November through April. The Commission's argument, however, does not address the issue raised by the AG.

  3. AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission

    344 Ark. 188 (Ark. 2001)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that an appellant must fully develop an issue at the lower court level in order to preserve it for appellate review

    Further, to establish an absence of substantial evidence to support a decision, the appellant must demonstrate that the proof before the administrative tribunal was so nearly undisputed that fair-minded persons could not reach its conclusion. Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 Ark. App. 73, 941 S.W.2d 452 (1997) (citing ATT Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 40 Ark. App. 126, 843 S.W.2d 855 (1992); Arkansas Elec. Energy Consumers v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 35 Ark. App. 47, 813 S.W.2d 263 (1991)). The question on review is not whether the testimony would have supported a contrary finding but whether it supports the finding that was made.

  4. Arkansas Gas Consumers v. Arkansas P.S.C

    80 Ark. App. 1 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 2 times

    The statute, however, does not prohibit rate differences; it merely prevents unreasonable rate differences. In Bryant v. Arkansas Public Service Commission, 57 Ark. App. 73, 941 S.W.2d 452 (1997), we affirmed the Commission's order approving a stipulation allowing a natural gas distribution company to raise rates and to allocate 98% of the rate increase to residential ratepayers. We found that substantial evidence supported the Commission's approval of corridor rates for customers for whom bypass to an alternative natural gas source was economically feasible.

  5. Southwestern Bell Tel. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv Comm'n

    946 S.W.2d 730 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 8 times
    In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission, 58 Ark. App. 145, 946 S.W.2d 730 (1997), the term "interexchange carrier" or "IXC" was also used to describe pure long-distance carriers.

    The appellate court is generally not concerned with the method used by the Commission in calculating rates as long as the Commission's action is based on substantial evidence and the total effect of the rate order is not unjust, unreasonable, unlawful, or discriminatory. See Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 Ark. App. 73, 941 S.W.2d 452 (1997). Here, substantial evidence existed to support the Commission's reduction in the AICCLP's rate of return, and appellants have not come forward with any evidence to show the reduction is unjust, unreasonable, unlawful, or discriminatory.

  6. Arkansas Gas Consumers v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n

    354 Ark. 37 (Ark. 2003)   Cited 21 times
    Rejecting Act 301 as justification for a surcharge in part because it did not involve a utility's “existing facilities”

    The Commission's findings of fact, based upon the testimony of an expert witness, shall be conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. See Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 Ark. App. 73, 941 S.W.2d 452 (1997). There is an assurance that no double recovery would be allowed, and there is no evidence that the Commission will fail to assure this result.

  7. Entergy Ark. v. Arkansas Pub

    104 Ark. App. 147 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 7 times
    Approving use of hypothetical capital structure when applicant's debt-to-equity ratio was equity-heavy and significantly different from the ratios of comparable companies

    On this point, it is sufficient to say that we defer to the Commission's discretion and expertise and that our concern is not with the Commission's methodology but the total effect of the rate order, which we find to be fair, reasonable, and based on substantial evidence. See Bryant v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 Ark. App. 73, 941 S.W.2d 452 (1997). Entergy also argues that the Staffs calculations involving the DCF method were flawed. Entergy's expert testified that the DCF formula must be adjusted to account for quarterly payment of dividends rather than annual payments.

  8. AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission

    67 Ark. App. 177 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 5 times

    In response, the Commission argues that the forms, which were submitted under oath, do in fact constitute substantial evidence supporting the Administrator's determination and that the Commission was not required to accept the testimony of Pauls. See Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 Ark. App. 73, 941 S.W.2d 452 (1997). It further argues that, because ATT has not abstracted the forms that were submitted by the requesting-ILECs to the Administrator, this court cannot determine what information was included and omitted. When an exhibit is necessary to an understanding of the testimony about an issue, but is not included in the abstract, the issue may be summarily affirmed.

  9. Harness v. Arkansas Public Serv. Comm'n

    60 Ark. App. 265 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 5 times

    [1-3] This court's review of the Commission's orders is limited and governed by Ark. Code Ann. § 23-2-423(c), which provides that the finding of the Commission as to facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive and that the court's review shall not be extended further than to determine whether the Commission's findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order or decision under review violated any rights under the laws or Constitution of the United States or of the State of Arkansas. See Bryant v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 Ark. App. 73, 941 S.W.2d 452 (1997). To set aside the Commission's action as arbitrary and capricious, the appellant must prove that the action was a willful and unreasoning action, made without consideration and with a disregard of the facts or circumstances of the case.