Opinion
Action No. 4:02-CV-783-Y.
May 27, 2005
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pending before the Court is defendant United States of America's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 13, 2004. Having carefully considered the motion, response, and reply, the Court concludes that the motion should be GRANTED.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Susan Bryan and Joseph Bryan (collectively referred to as "the Bryans"), who are married, are employed with the United States Postal Service. In October 2000, both of the plaintiffs were assigned to the Watson General Mail Facility ("Watson GMF") in Fort Worth, Texas. On October 15, 2000, Susan went to the Watson GMF on her day off to deliver a message to Joseph. She also believes that she had some letters to mail. After trying to gain access into the building through both the customer entrance and the employee entrance, she fell in the parking lot and broke her kneecap. Susan claims that she slipped on a sticky, slick spot in the parking lot that was created by Ed A. Wilson Inc., a company that had contracted with the defendants to repair the "K building flashing" at the Watson GMF. Thereafter, on September 19, 2002, Susan and Joseph filed a premises-liability suit against the United States of America, the Unites States Postal Service, and several unnamed defendants pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary-Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper when the record establishes "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56©). An issue is considered "genuine" if "it is real and substantial as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham." Bazan v. Hidalgo Cty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Wilkinson v. Powell, 149 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1945)). Facts are considered "material" if they "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, the Court must first consult the applicable substantive law to ascertain what factual issues are material. Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. Tool Works, 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990). Next, the Court must review the evidence on those issues, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.; Newell v. Oxford Mgmt. Inc., 912 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1990); Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1989).
In making its determination on the motion, the Court must look at the full record including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56©); Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). Rule 56, however, "does not impose on the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support" a party's motion for, or opposition to, summary judgment. Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1992). Thus, parties should "identify specific evidence in the record, and . . . articulate" precisely how that evidence supports their claims. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1536 (5th Cir. 1994). Further, the Court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A defendant moving for summary judgment may submit evidence that negates a material element of the plaintiff's claim or show that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the plaintiff's claim. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-24; Crescent Towing and Salvage Co. v. M/V Anax, 40 F.3d 741, 744 (5th Cir. 1994); Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178.
To negate a material element of the plaintiff's claim, the defendant must negate an element that would affect the outcome of the action. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247. If the defendant moves for summary judgment alleging no evidence to support an essential element of the plaintiff's claim, the defendant need not produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on that essential element. Rather, the defendant need only show that the plaintiff, who bears the burden of proof, has adduced no evidence to support an essential element of his case. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Teply v. Mobil Oil Corp., 859 F.2d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1988).
When the moving party has carried its summary-judgment burden, the respondent must go beyond the pleadings and by his own evidence set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). This burden is not satisfied by creating some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
B. Premises Liability
To recover for premises liability based on negligence, the plaintiff must prove the existence and violation of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant. Lechuga v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 949 F.2d 790, 794 (5th Cir. 1992). The duty owed by the premises owner is determined by the status of the person injured on the premises. Id. "The status is a legal question except when sufficient issues of fact exist to warrant submission to the jury." Id. A person who enters the property of another will normally be classified as an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser. Id.
An invitee is either a public invitee or a business invitee. A business invitee is "a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land." Lechuga, 949 F.2d at 795.
To recover on a premises-liability claim as a business invitee, the plaintiff must prove: (1) actual or constructive knowledge of a condition on the premises by the owner or occupier; (2) that the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) that the owner or occupier did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and (4) that the owner or occupier's failure to use such care proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 99 (Tex. 2000). To recover on a premises-liability claim as a licensee, the plaintiff must prove that the defendants wantonly, willfully, or with gross negligence injured the plaintiff. See Lechuga, 949 F.2d at 794.
II. ANALYSIS
The United States claims that it is entitled to summary judgment because, regardless of whether Susan is classified as a business invitee or a licensee, there is no evidence of most of the elements that the plaintiffs must prove to hold the United States liable for Susan's injuries. The Court agrees.
Assuming that Susan is classified as a business invitee, the Court concludes that, at the very least, the Bryans have wholly failed to provide any evidence that the defendants did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk that Susan would fall in the parking lot. Instead, the Bryans argue that even though the defendants did go to great lengths to ensure that the roofing contractor did a safe job, "they knew that [the sticky, slick spot] was there, they knew it should have been cleaned it [sic] up immediately, but they failed to do so." Such a statement is conclusory and actually supports the defendants' claim that they did exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk that Susan would fall.
Likewise, assuming that Susan should be classified as a licensee, the plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence that the defendants wantonly, willfully, or with gross negligence injured Susan. Consequently, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the United States of America's Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. # 31-1] is GRANTED.