Opinion
OP 21-0546
12-09-2021
PATRICK STEVEN BRYAN, II, Petitioner, v. JESSE SLAUGHTER, Cascade County Sheriff, Respondent.
ORDER
Through counsel, Patrick Steven Bryan, II, seeks a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he is being held on excessive bail while he awaits disposition of his criminal charges in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, Cause No. CDC-21-660. Currently detained at the Cascade County Detention Center (CCDC), Bryan alleges that he cannot afford bail and asserts that the District Court has violated his constitutional and statutory rights by imposing $10,000 bail to secure his pretrial release. The State opposes Bryan's petition.
Bryan contends that the imposition of bail in this case violates the Due Process and Excessive Bail Clauses of the U.S. and Montana Constitutions, and §§ 46-9-108 and -301, MCA. He argues that insufficient evidence supports the District Court's determination that bail is warranted and the evidence instead demonstrates that he should be released on his own recognizance.
Bryan was arrested on September 7, 2021, and charged with felony criminal endangerment and four misdemeanor offenses. The charges arose from a single-vehicle accident on September 6, 2021, in which Bryan allegedly crashed a motor vehicle into several concrete barriers, launching one barrier onto a nearby pedestrian trail and injuring his passenger, and fled the scene of the accident on foot.
On September 8, 2021, Bryan made his initial appearance in the District Court before Hon. David J. Grubich. In his petition before this Court, Bryan asserts, "Defendant's counsel of record argued for him to be released on his own recognizance with alcohol monitoring and chemical dependency evaluation as conditions of release, but the Court set bail at $10,000 with alcohol monitoring based solely on the nature of the offense charged." Bryan further asserts that it was "impossible" for his counsel to obtain a transcript of this hearing. The State has provided a hearing transcript to this Court as an exhibit to its response in opposition to Bryan's petition. We have reviewed the transcript and it does not entirely comport with the recollection of Bryan's counsel.
The State requested that the court impose bail in the amount of $15,000, as well as certain conditions of release, including alcohol monitoring at Bryan's expense. Bryan, via counsel, agreed to the conditions, but argued that he could not afford $15,000 bail. Bryan asked that the court set bail in an amount not to exceed $5,000 or to release him on his own recognizance. Bryan's counsel informed the court that Bryan was employed with longstanding ties to the community and had upcoming medical appointments that he wished to attend. He also asserted that Bryan had no felony convictions and one misdemeanor from several years earlier, and he had never failed to appear. He also advised the court that Bryan had a DUI case pending in Havre. After hearing argument from counsel, the court noted its concern with the seriousness of the current allegations and with the existence of an unrelated DUI charge. Balancing its concerns with Bryan's ties to the community, it set bail at $10,000.
Bryan did not make bail and requested a bail hearing. This hearing was held on October 19, 2021, before the Hon. John Kutzman. Bryan testified that he remained in CCDC because he had not posted bail and he wanted the court to release him on his own recognizance. Bryan asserted that he had employment and housing available upon his release and that he would agree to and abide by conditions of release including alcohol monitoring. Bryan further testified that he had significant ties to the community, he had no felony convictions on his criminal record, and he had never failed to appear in court. Bryan also testified that he had cooperated in detention and had become a trustee.
The State opposed Bryan's request for release on his own recognizance. It argued that Bryan may be a flight risk because he allegedly had fled the scene of an accident. The State argued that a bond was necessary to ensure that Bryan appeared. Reciting the allegations from the charging document, the District Court concluded that Bryan was a flight risk. The court denied Bryan's request to be released on his own recognizance, noting that the court was unconvinced the previously set bail amount of $10,000 was incorrect.
Bryan then filed this petition. He states that the issue before this Court is whether the District Court should have imposed bail in the first place. He asserts, "The rules governing whether to impose restrictions on liberty must not be conflated with the rules governing a motion to modify such restrictions. The burden is different under those scenarios." He argues that the State failed to provide an evidentiary basis for imposing bail at Bryan's initial appearance and therefore the bail imposition cannot stand.
Habeas corpus is available to review a decision of a district court on a motion to set bail, and this Court properly may examine the legality of the restraint of an incarcerated inmate in a habeas proceeding. Miller v. Eleventh Judicial Dist. Court, 2007 MT 58, ¶ 4, 336 Mont. 207, 154 P.3d 1186. A petition for writ of habeas corpus is an original, independent proceeding filed in this Court pursuant to Title 46, chapter 22, MCA, and such petitions praying for release on bail, filed directly in this Court, are considered independent of the legal proceeding under which the detention is sought to be justified. Miller, ¶ 5.
Section 46-9-301, MCA, provides that the court shall determine whether bail is necessary. The statute provides:
In all cases in which bail is determined to be necessary, bail must be reasonable in amount and the amount must be: (1) sufficient to ensure the presence of the defendant in a pending criminal proceeding; (2) sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions set forth in the bail; (3) sufficient to protect any person from bodily injury; (4) not oppressive; (5) commensurate with the nature of the offense charged; (6) considerate of the financial ability of the accused;(7) considerate of the defendant's prior record; (8) considerate of the length of time the defendant has resided in the community and of the defendant's ties to the community; (9) considerate of the defendant's family relationships and ties; (10) considerate of the defendant's mental health status and of the defendant's participation in a mental health treatment program; (11) considerate of the defendant's employment status; and (12) sufficient to include the charge imposed in 46-18-236.
It is true that the State based its plea for bail in the amount of $15,000 on the allegations of Bryan's pending charges. Bryan, though, initially acquiesced to bail, albeit for a lower amount than the court ultimately set. The transcript shows that the District Court considered more than the allegations connected to the charges Bryan faced in determining that imposition of bail was warranted. The court advised:
Considering the bond factors in 46-9-301, there's a few factors I'm considering here, that is obviously compliance. We want to ensure compliance and attendance at the proceeding, protect persons from bodily injury. At least we're aware of the second instance, at least that was discussed, where there's an alleged DUI. This was a situation where a lot of people were really lucky. Sol want to make it commensurate with the nature of the offense, as well as all his ties, his family relationships.
Based on this record, including Bryan's agreement to imposition of some amount of bail, the trial court's consideration of the factors of § 46-9-301, MCA, and what would appear to be a reasonable amount in light of the evidence presented-we are unable to conclude that the court erred in imposing bail in the amount of $10,000 at Bryan's initial appearance.
Bryan argues further that the District Court should have granted him release on his own recognizance after hearing evidence at the October 19, 2021 bail hearing. Bryan argues that the State again failed to provide an evidentiary basis for imposing bail and that the District Court relied solely upon the allegations of the criminal charges to conclude that Bryan was a "flight risk." Bryan argues that he presented unrefuted evidence of his significant ties to the community and points to his testimony that he had never failed to appear in court.
Under § 46-9-108(1)(k), MCA, a court may impose bail to reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant or that will ensure the safety of any person or the community. Section 46-9-108(2), MCA, however, provides that a court may not impose an unreasonable condition that results in pretrial detention and shall subject the defendant to the least restrictive condition or combination of conditions that will ensure the defendant's appearance and provide for protection of any person or the community.
Bryan is entitled to reasonable bail that comports with § 46-9-301, MCA. At Bryan's initial appearance, he expressed a desire to have bail set at no more than $5,000. The District Court weighed this request along with the State's request for $15,000, and on balance with the evidence before it, determined $ 10, 000 to be an appropriate amount. At the bail hearing, Bryan requested to be released on his own recognizance and offered testimony in support of that request. The District Court weighed that evidence against its concerns that Bryan might pose a flight risk given the allegation that he fled the scene of an accident, that the allegations against Bryan indicated that he might pose a danger to others, and that the charged offenses were serious in nature.
A defendant has a presumptive right to be released on a reasonable bail or on his own recognizance. Miller, ¶ 14. "While the district court has broad discretion in fashioning the conditions, they must be the least restrictive conditions necessary to meet the goals of public safety and the appearance of the defendant." State v. Spady, 2015 MT 218, ¶ 36, 380 Mont. 179, 354 P.3d 590 (citing § 46-9-108(2), MCA). A defendant's wealth or financial circumstances should not be the determining factor in whether the defendant secures conditional pretrial release. The decision should be whether the defendant is of such high risk he should be incarcerated pending trial. The judicial branch has made the Public Safety Assessment risk tool available for use in Cascade County to assist in such pre-trial decision-making. If a defendant has low- to medium-risk of failing to appear or of committing additional offenses pretrial, the risk tool suggests she or he should be released on recognizance if regular monitoring or other conditions are determined adequate to assure the defendant's appearance. Bryan's counsel indicates the Public Safety Assessment risk tool was not scored and thus not used for Bryan's case in determining bail but believes had it been it would have indicated him to fall into the low-risk category for failing to appear or committing an offense pending trial, and the State does not suggest otherwise.
As Miller instructs, however, Bryan has the burden of presenting to this Court a record that is sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the District Court's order constituted a violation, deprivation, infringement, or denial of his constitutional, statutory, or legal rights. Miller, ¶ 14. The record indicates that both Judge Grubich and Judge Kutzman gave consideration to the required statutory factors and made an "individualized assessment" after hearing directly from Bryan, his counsel, and the State. See State v. Spady, 2015 MT 218, ¶ 36, 380 Mont. 179, 354 P.3d 590 (citing §§ 46-9-108(2), -109(2), MCA). We are reluctant to substitute our own interpretation of the evidence in this case for that of the two different district court judges who considered it. See Barrus v. Mont. First Judicial Dist. Court, 2020 MT 14, ¶22 n.5, 398 Mont. 353, 456 P.3d 577 ("When, as here, apetition seeks review of a district court order by a petition for extraordinary relief, we do not commence proceedings anew but review the district court's decision based on the record it developed, consistent with appellate practice and procedure . . . [and] under applicable standards of review." We conclude that Bryan has not met his burden for a writ of habeas corpus.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Clerk is directed to provide copies of this Order to all counsel of record and to the Hon. John Kutzman.