Opinion
February 13, 1951. As Corrected on Denial of Rehearing April 2, 1951.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Charles A. Carroll, J.
Anderson Nadeau, Miami, for appellant.
J.W. Watson, Jr., Miami, for appellees.
This is the second time we have been confronted with different aspects of this case. Barnes et al. v. City of Miami, Fla., 47 So.2d 3. Under Section five, City Charter of Miami, Chapter 10847, Special Acts of 1925, and amendments thereto, the City is authorized to propose ordinances to the electorate granting franchises and for other purposes if approved at a plebiscite. The case just cited was an attempt to enjoin such an election but the injunction was denied and the election proceeded.
The primary grievance charged in this case goes to the legality of the ballot used at the election which was not involved in the former case. The ordinance submitted to the electorate was one involving the approval or disapproval of a low cost housing project for Miami. Section five of the City Charter requires that the ballot on which such elections are held contain the title with a general statement of the substance of the ordinance. The ballot in this case contained no statement of the contents of the ordinance but did contain the title as follows:
"Shall the measure entitled: `An Ordinance Providing for Low Cost Housing and Slum Clearance: Providing for Application for Preliminary Advance of Funds by the Housing Authority of the City of Miami, Florida: Providing for a Cooperative Agreement Between the City of Miami, Florida, Dade County, and the United States of America, Acting by and Through Their Respective Duly Authorized Officials and Employees: and Authorizing and Instructing the City Manager and Any and All the Attached Agreements" be approved or disapproved?"
For said deficiency in the ballot appellant as citizen, freeholder and taxpayer, brought this suit by petition, praying that the election be decreed (1) to be null and void, (2) that the clerk was without authority to certify the result thereof to the City Manager, (3) that the City Manager was without authority to execute the contract pursuant to the election, and (4) that the action of defendants be enjoined. A motion to dismiss the petition was granted and the complainant appealed.
The legislature of 1937 enacted Chapters 17981, 17982 and 17983, Laws of Florida, F.S.A. § 421.01 et seq. providing for the establishment of housing authorities throughout the State in coordination with Federal law. The ordinance in question authorized the City of Miami to undertake one of these low cost housing projects as contemplated by the State and Federal Acts, provided such undertaking be approved by the electorate. It was accordingly necessary that the ballot approving or disapproving such a project contain all the ordinance requires to put the people on notice of what they were voting on.
As heretofore pointed out, the ordinance in terms requires that the ballot contain the title of the ordinance with a general statement of its substance. If the title is full enough to put the electorate on notice as to the contents of the ordinance, we might say that it was sufficient, but an examination of the title and body of the ordinance in this case show that the title is far from sufficient to put the electorate on notice of the contents of the ordinance.
An examination of the title as quoted discloses that it does nothing more than put the voter on notice that the City, the State and the Federal Authority were about to enter into a contract for a low cost housing project in Miami, that there would be an advance of funds by the City for certain preliminaries and that the City would execute the necessary contract to carry it out. It does not say one word to put the voter on notice whether sewers, water mains, sidewalks and all municipal services would be furnished at the expense of the City, whether streets would be layed out, graded and paved or whether all real and personal taxes, including special assessments would be remitted which necessarily means that the City would become responsible for them.
It is quite true that a very substantial majority at the election approved the project, but we are convinced from the above analysis of the title and body of the ordinance that the matter was not presented to the electorate as the law required. The people of this country have a right to undertake socialistic experiments like this, when done as the law provides. The ordinance contemplates the widest knowledge of the experiment and that the public be fully advised of what they are undertaking. It would be ridiculous to presume that the voters read the ordinance when they signed the petition for the referendum and since the law requires that both the title and general substance of the ordinance be placed on the ballot it was not contemplated that the voters be required to go on a search for the ordinance to be advised of its contents. It was necessary that the ballot contain everything essential to put them on notice.
It is also contended that appellant has not shown such an interest in the subject matter of the litigation as will entitle him to prosecute this suit and that the election should have been limited in its participation to freeholders. We find no merit to these contentions and do not discuss them further.
It follows that the ballot fell short of the legal requirements to put the electorate on notice of the purpose of the ordinance, for which the election was void, so the judgment is reversed.
Reversed.
TERRELL, Acting C.J., and THOMAS, ADAMS, HOBSON and ROBERTS, JJ., and OGILVIE, Associate Justice, concur.
CHAPMAN, J., dissents.