To do so in a case involving a fall, a plaintiff must point to "some evidence beyond speculation that a condition of the premises caused the fall." Bryan Bank & Trust v. Steele , 326 Ga. App. 13, 15 (1), 755 S.E.2d 828 (2014) (citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). Nevertheless, circumstantial evidence that raises a reasonable inference of the cause of a fall may be sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Id. at 873; see Bryan Bank &Trust v. Steele, 326 Ga.App. 13, 13-14, 15 (1) (755 S.E.2d 828) (2014) (reversing denial of summary judgment to defendant and finding that plaintiff's evidence of causation was "speculation[,]" where plaintiff fell on a sidewalk, recalled seeing "'very noticeable'" metal edging around a flower bed near the sidewalk, but deposed that while she "believe[d]" or assumed the edging caused her fall, she "did not know how she fell or what caused her to fall"); compare Smith v. Tenet HealthSystem Spalding, 327 Ga.App. 878, 880 (1) (761 S.E.2d 409) (2014) (finding evidence sufficient to create an inference of a foreign substance on the floor where, although plaintiff who fell saw no liquid on the floor, there was evidence that a janitor had just finished wiping down the area, that a cart and mop bucket were previously in the area, and that plaintiff's daughter-in-law noticed "something" on the floor that caused h
See Henson v. Ga.-Pacific Corp., 289 Ga.App. 777, 779 (1) (658 S.E.2d 391) (2008) (the plaintiff's "belief" that counterweights on elevator doors in which he injured his hand were "too loose" was "nothing more than mere personal speculation that could not defeat summary judgment") (punctuation omitted); Emory Univ. v. Smith, 260 Ga.App. 900, 902 (581 S.E.2d 405) (2003) (the plaintiff's testimony "that she thought the ramp [on which she slipped and fell] was more slippery than regular pavement because it appeared to be freshly painted" amounted to mere speculation insufficient to defeat summary judgment because "she did not support her belief with any proof"); see also generally Bryan Bank &Trust v. Steele, 326 Ga.App. 13, 14 (1) (755 S.E.2d 828) (2014) ("[W]hen the plaintiff cannot show the existence of a hazardous condition, she cannot prove the cause of her injuries and there can be no recovery because an essential element of negligence cannot be proven.") (citation and punctuation omitted). That is especially so when viewed together with Sheffield's own equivocal deposition testimony that she did not know whether she hit her foot on a surface of the water pool, the slide, or both, and a water park incident report signed by Sheffield stating that she "fell out of [the inner] tube in [the water slide] runout and injured [her] knee on [the] bottom of [the] slide."
"[T]he threshold point of our inquiry in a [trip]-and-fall case is the existence of a hazardous condition on the premises." Bryan Bank & Trust v. Steele , 326 Ga. App. 13, 14 (1), 755 S.E.2d 828 (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). Brixmor argues that invitees must always anticipate wheel stops and parking bumpers in parking lots, so that in most cases, as a matter of law, such structures may not be considered to be a hazard.
Pennington v. WJL, Inc. , 263 Ga.App. 758, 760 (1), 589 S.E.2d 259 (2003) (footnotes omitted).We have consistently reversed trial courts that have refused to grant summary judgment to the defense in cases in which the plaintiffs were unable to point to more than mere speculation as to what caused their fall. See, e.g., Canaan Land Props., Inc. v. Herrington , 330 Ga.App. 17, 18–21 (1), 766 S.E.2d 493 (2014) (plaintiff's testimony that hole in parking lot "had to be" the cause of his shopping cart veering and tripping him shows "mere possibility" that the divot caused his fall and thus defense was entitled to summary judgment); Bryan Bank & Trust v. Steele , 326 Ga.App. 13, 14–16 (1), 755 S.E.2d 828 (2014) (summary judgment warranted where plaintiff testified that it was not clear to her whether her foot caught on something and she could not say for certain that flower bed fencing she blamed for the fall was on the sidewalk before she fell); see also Imperial Invs. Doraville, Inc. v. Childers , 303 Ga.App. 490, 493 (1), 693 S.E.2d 834 (2010) (trial court erred in denying defense motion for directed verdict where plaintiff testified that he did not know what he tripped over). We have reversed denials of summary judgment even when there was evidence of the presence of a hazard that clearly might cause a fall in certain circumstances.
On appeal from the denial of summary judgment the appellate court is to conduct a de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.Hood v. Todd, 287 Ga. 164, 165, 695 S.E.2d 31 (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted); Bryan Bank & Trust v. Steele, 326 Ga.App. 13, 755 S.E.2d 828 (2014).A defendant who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party's case; instead, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by pointing out by reference to the affidavits, depositions and other documents in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. If the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on [his] pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.
Hollis, 2008 WL 504396, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2008). See Bryan Bank & Tr. v. Steele, 326 Ga.App. 13, 16 (2014) (reversing denial of summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to introduce evidence to connect an allegedly defective sidewalk with her fall, thus “causation [was] not established”); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 290 Ga.App. 450, 452 (2008) (reversing trial court's denial of summary judgment where the plaintiff could only speculate whether she “stepped in a hole, stepped on a rock or other obstacle, or simply improperly placed her foot on the ground while walking”); Garrett v. Hanes, 273 Ga.App. 894, 895 (2005) (affirming summary judgment in the defendant's favor where the plaintiff presented no evidence that the step she tripped on was hazardous, meaning she “proved only that she fell, which is insufficient to establish liability”). Because Denis cannot consistently point to the cause of her fall, let alone Cracker Barrel's fault in causing it, Denis only speculates as to causation.
The trial court, therefore, erred in denying the Johnsons' motion for summary judgment on Stephenson's premises liability claim, as well as his wife's derivative claim for loss of consortium. See Bryan Bank & Trust v. Steele , 326 Ga.App. 13, 15, 755 S.E.2d 828 (2014) (property owner entitled to summary judgment where claimant offered only speculation about what caused her to fall on property); Pirkle , supra at 601(2)(a), 754 S.E.2d 387 (claimant cannot avoid summary judgment through speculation); Benson–Jones v. Sysco Food Svcs. of Atlanta , 287 Ga.App. 579, 583(1)(b), 651 S.E.2d 839 (2007) (“An inference cannot be based upon evidence which is too uncertain or speculative or which raises merely a conjecture or possibility.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). See Briddle v. Cornerstone Lodge of America , 288 Ga.App. 353, 355, 654 S.E.2d 188 (2007) (husband's loss of consortium claim not viable where defendant entitled to summary judgment on wife's personal injury claims).