Summary
confirming that the Swierkiewicz "fair notice" standard "applies to discrimination cases," including claims under the Equal Pay Act
Summary of this case from Bernstein v. MONY Group, Inc.Opinion
02 Civ. 1372 (LAK)
August 21, 2002
ORDER
This is an action by the former coach of the women's basketball team at Iona College against that institution and its president, Brother James A. Liguori. The former coach, Michele L. Brusseau, contends that she and the women's team of which she was the coach were victims of gender discrimination in that both she and the team were treated less favorably than the coach of and the men's team itself, that they were subjected to a hostile work environment, and that she was the victim of defamation, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract and retaliation for protesting against the alleged wrongs. The first amended complaint contains claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. L. § 296 et seq., the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and the common law of New York. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint.
1. Defendants contend first that the Title VII, Title IX, NYSHRL, and Equal Pay Act claims are asserted only in conclusory terms and therefore fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. They argue that the complaint does not adequately allege the four elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case and that the allegations of unequal pay are to general. They ignore entirely, however, the salutary proposition that a complaint, assuming it is not subject to the specialized pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9, may not be dismissed for legal insufficiency unless it is clear that plaintiff could prove no facts thereunder that would entitle her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). They ignore also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 122 S.Ct. 922 (2002), which confirmed that this standard applies to discrimination cases. As the amended complaint gives fair notice of the plaintiff's discrimination claims, this aspect of the motion is baseless.
2. Defendants next argue that Title VII is the exclusive federal remedy for employment discrimination by educational institutions, that plaintiff's Title IX claim is but a duplicate of her Title VII claim, and that the Title IX claim therefore should be dismissed. The Court agrees that an employment discrimination claim against an educational institution subject both to Title VII and to Title IX may be asserted only under Title VII and, to that extent, agrees with defendants. E.g., Gardner v. St. Bonaventure University, 171 F. Supp.2d 118, 127 (W.D.N.Y. 2001). Plaintiff's Title IX claim, however, is broader in that plaintiff complains also that the Iona women's basketball program was treated less advantageously than the men's program and seeks a remedy placing the women's program on an equal footing. While it is far from clear that plaintiff has standing to sue under Title IX for such relief or, for that matter, for any damages she may have suffered as a consequence of any Title IX violation separate and apart from alleged employment discrimination, the Court does not consider the papers before it an adequate basis upon which to decide that question and declines to do so without proper briefing.
3. The defamation count is patently deficient, as it fails to allege any defamatory statement.
4. The fraud/negligent misrepresentation claim patently fails to plead the elements of either claim, much less the circumstances of any alleged fraud with the particularity required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b).
5. The suggestion that there was a breach of contract by virtue of the existence of a hostile work environment conceivably might give rise to a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every agreement. Accordingly, that aspect of defendants' motion is without merit, at least on the present record.
6. Defendants attack the sufficiency of the retaliation claim by contending that the complaint fails to allege either that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (as, defendants' claim, she was not terminated but merely experienced the expiration of her contract in accordance with her terms) or that any such action was causally related to the alleged protected activity, which defendants assume was only the making in 2001 of a complaint to the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") of the U.S. Department of Education, an event that occurred over a year prior to the alleged termination. The arguments, however, both are without merit.
The first fails because the allegations of the complaint, including that allegation that plaintiff was terminated from her position, are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. As defendants implicitly acknowledge, termination of plaintiff's employment, if that occurred, would have been an adverse employment action.
The Court declines to convert the motion into one for summary judgment and therefore does not consider the evidentiary material submitted by the parties.
The second is insufficient because the complaint does not allege that the alleged termination was the only adverse employment action. See Am. Cpt. ¶¶ 51-53. It therefore cannot be said with certainty, as defendants would have the Court assume, that the only relevant events are the OCR complaint in 2001 and the termination in 2002. In all the circumstances, the complaint would permit plaintiff to prove a causal connection between the as-yet not fully defined adverse employment actions and the alleged termination.
7. Defendants correctly point out, and plaintiff concedes, that Brother Liguori is not subject to suit under Title VII, as he was not plaintiff's employer. (Pl. Mem. 6) Plaintiff further concedes that he is not subject to suit under Title IX, goes on to say that she "suspects Brother Liguori takes seriously his vow of poverty," and asks that the Court "[d]ismiss Brother James Liguori from the lawsuit en toto." (Id. 19)
Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss the first amended complaint is granted to the extent that:
(a) The action is dismissed as to Brother James Liguori.
(b) So much of plaintiff's Title IX claim as seeks damages or other relief for any injury allegedly suffered by her as a result of employment discrimination is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
(c) The common law claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, to the extent indicated above, failure to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b).
The motion is denied in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.