Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-1255
January 10, 2002
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated below, it is recommended that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) be granted and that this case be dismissed with prejudice.
II. REPORT
BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff Allen N. Brunwasser ("the Plaintiff" or "Mr. Brunwasser"), a lawyer and member of the Pennsylvania Bar, filed this action pro se on July 9, 2001, naming as the sole Defendant Charles W. Johns, the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ("the Prothonotary"). See generally Compl. (Doc. 1). In essence, Mr. Brunwasser's pleadings allege that Rules 3305, 3306 and 2744 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure are "unconstitutional[,] facially and as applied . . . ." See id. at ¶ 4. Accordingly, he seeks a judicial declaration that the aforementioned Rules are unconstitutional, and he requests that the Prothonotary be enjoined from engaging in any "future application[s]" of said Rules. See id. at Wherefore clause (emphasis in original). In clarifying that he seeks only prospective relief, the Plaintiff repeatedly disavows any "request [that] previous application[s]" of the Rules be "reversed or vacated." See id. at ¶ 3; see also id. at ¶ 15(I)(1)-(2) (reiterating Plaintiff does not request that prior state decisions be "overruled or vacated," and stating that he seeks only "future relief against the rules challenged"); id. at ¶ 18(c) (same); id. at ¶ 2 (Plaintiff "is not asking that any previous Pennsylvania court decision or judicial proceeding be reversed or reviewed"); and id. at Wherefore clause ¶ 4 (same).
Though the Plaintiff disavows any request for review of prior state decisions, he does make "refer[ence] . . . to the conduct detailed in" certain Pennsylvania Supreme Court proceedings "for [the] purpose alone" of demonstrating the alleged unconstitutionality of the Rules. See id. at ¶ 15(I). Specifically, Mr. Brunwasser highlights and attaches to his Complaint two Pennsylvania Supreme Court orders filed under the caption, "Allen N. Brunwasser, Petitioner, v. John E. Steiner, Respondent." See Orders (attached as unmarked exhibits to Compl.). In the first order, entered on March 1, 2000, the state Supreme Court among other things granted an application for sanctions against Mr. Brunwasser and assessed against him "reasonable attorney's fee[s] of $1,000." See Order in Brunwasser v. Steiner, Nos. 924-826 W.D. Alloc. Dkt. 1998 (Pa. 2000) (per curiam) at 1. The court also ordered that "the Prothonotary shall not accept any further pleading, petition, application, or other document from [Mr. Brunwasser] relating to" the matters on appeal "unless [he] first seeks and obtains permission from the Court to make such a filing." See id. at 1-2.
In the second order, dated May 5, 2000, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted an "Emergency Petition [to] Enforce" the above-referenced order against Mr. Brunwasser. See Order inBrunwasser v. Steiner, 42 W.D. Misc. Dkt. 2000 (Pa. 2000) (per curiam). Among other things, the court also granted "an additional award of $3,000 attorney fee[s] due to [Mr. Brunwasser's] obdurate, dilatory, and vexatious conduct in filing a patently frivolous removal action in federal court." See id.
The Plaintiff states that, although he does not request relief from or reversal of the aforementioned orders, they "illustrate [the] unconstitutional application" of Pennsylvania Appellate Rules 3305, 3306 and 2744.
Appellate Rule 3305 provides:
The Prothonotary [of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court], in the first instance, is authorized to dispose of motions relating to the preparation, printing and filing of appendix and briefs and those motions generally relating to calendar control, along with the authority to recommend the appropriate sanction for the violation of any applicable rule or order.See Pa. R. App. P. 3305. Rule 3306 provides, in relevant part:
The prevailing party to an appeal in the Supreme Court may file a verified bill of costs . . . . [After any objections and replies thereto are filed], the Prothonotary shall enter an order taxing costs.
The action of the Prothonotary may be reviewed by the Court if the party seeking review files an application within 7 days after entry of the order.See Pa. R. App. P. 3306(a)-(c). Finally Appellate Rule 2744, which applies to the Pennsylvania appellate courts generally, states:
In addition to other costs allowable by general rule or Act of Assembly, an appellate court may award as further costs damages as may be just, including . . . a reasonable counsel fee and . . . damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum in addition to legal interest, if it determines that an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay or that the conduct of the participant against whom costs are to be imposed is dilatory, obdurate or vexatious. . . .See Pa. R. App. P. 2744(1)-(2).
As referenced above, Mr. Brunwasser alleges that these Rules are unconstitutional "facially and as applied" because they deprive litigants of equal protection, due process, and their First Amendment rights to "court access." See Compl. at ¶ 4. Regarding Rules 3305 and 3306, the Plaintiff's grievances center around the Prothonotary's authority to act in certain capacities and the alleged lack of procedural process surrounding such functions. See generally, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 15(A)-(P). How the Prothonotary's conduct allegedly is implicated under Rule 2744, which delegates authority to the Pennsylvania appellate courts alone, remains a mystery. Compare, e.g., id. at ¶ 15(Q) (alleging that Rule 2744 is unconstitutional for the same reasons as Rules 3305 and 3306) with Pa. R. App. P. 2744 ("an appellate court may award as further costs damages as may be just") (emphasis added). In any event, the Plaintiff purportedly challenges the constitutionality of these Rules on behalf of an unspecified class. See Compl. at ¶¶ 9-14 (stating "class action allegations," but failing to identify the relevant class).
On July 30, 2001 the Defendant filed the instant Motion, seeking dismissal on the following grounds: (1) the Plaintiff lacks standing; (2) his claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (3) his claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (4) his action is barred under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion; and (5) the challenged rules are constitutional. See generally Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1. For the reasons that follow, this magistrate judge agrees that the Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the claims asserted in his Complaint. Because Mr. Brunwasser fails the threshold standing inquiry, the District Court need not reach the Defendant's other arguments for dismissal.
ANALYSIS
The doctrine of standing "goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court and the validity of its judgment" and, thus, is a "threshold question in every federal case." See Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 537 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing Article III standing, and one of the elements he must show is that he "suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest [that] is . . . concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." See ATT Communications of New Jersey, Inc. v. Verizon New Jersey, Inc., 270 F.3d 162, 170 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotations omitted, emphasis added).
The other two elements of standing are "causal connection," under which "the injury [must] be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant," and redressability, which requires "it [to] be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." See id. (emphasis added). At least with respect to Pennsylvania Appellate Rule 2744, this magistrate judge cannot imagine how these elements could be satisfied regarding the sole Defendant, the Prothonotary. See discussion supra at 5 (noting that authority granted in Rule 2744 runs to appellate courts, not the Prothonotary). In any event, the court need not address these issues because all of the Plaintiff's claims fail under the "injury in fact" element of standing. See discussion supra and infra in text.
In this case, Mr. Brunwasser has expressly and repeatedly disavowed any claims "request[ing that] previous application[s]" of the Appellate Rules be "reversed or vacated." See discussion supra at 2. Thus, he "is not asking that any previous Pennsylvania court decision or judicial proceeding be reversed or reviewed," i.e., he seeks only "future relief" from the application of the challenged Rules. See id. The potential injuries of which he complains are not unique to him, as further evidenced by his purported entitlement to relief by way of a class action. See discussion supra at 5.
It seems beyond doubt that Mr. Brunwasser so limited his requests for relief in recognition of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which "prohibits federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a state's highest court or to evaluate constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision] in a judicial proceeding." See Ernst v. Child Youth Servs. of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir.) (citations and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 (1997). The doctrine is necessary to preserve the United States Supreme Court's statutory, exclusive jurisdiction "to review the decisions of the highest state courts for compliance with the Constitution." See id. ( citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257, other citation omitted). The implications of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in this case will be further addressed below.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court shows why such claims fail for want of standing. See id., 252 F.3d 828 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 355 (2001). In Grendell, an attorney-plaintiff filed federal suit after the Ohio Supreme Court imposed sanctions against him in a case before it. See id. at 831. Although the plaintiff initially sought a temporary restraining order to prevent enforcement of the sanctions, "[i]n recognition of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine" he later amended his pleadings "to [assert] a general constitutional challenge" to the state Rule, "seeking declaratory and injunctive relief." See id. at Grendell, 252 F.3d at 831. The plaintiff asserted that the rule was unconstitutional "on its face" because it violated the Due Process Clause, and he alleged that "the Ohio Supreme Court's prior imposition of sanctions pursuant to the Rule" had led him "to withdraw from two cases before that Court, for fear of exposing himself to unconstitutionally imposed sanctions." See id. The district court dismissed the action, and the circuit court affirmed on the basis that the plaintiff lacked standing. See id. at 830.
In so ruling, the Grendell Court rejected three arguments for standing asserted by the plaintiff: (1) that he previously had been sanctioned under the state rule in question; (2) that he was "subject to the continuing (sic) present adverse effects of the unconstitutionality of . . . [the] Rule," thereby chilling his "exercise of protected conduct"; and (3) that his claim "ar[o]se under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine of jurisdiction," which allegedly provided him "standing to bring his facial challenge to the constitutionality of [the] Rule." See id. at 832 (internal quotations omitted).
In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that his past exposure to sanctions afforded standing, the Grendell Court highlighted that "past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief" absent "any continuing, present adverse effects." See id. at 833 ( quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). Because the sanctions imposed by the Ohio Supreme Court "ha[d] already been perfected," the court found that such past injury "ha[d] no continuing, present adverse effects and [could]not establish standing for declaratory and injunctive relief." See id.
Though the Grendell Court recognized that "[p]revious sanctions might be evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury, . . . where the threat of repeated injury is speculative or tenuous, there is no standing to seek injunctive relief." See id. at 833 (citation omitted, emphasis added). The court explained as follows why the plaintiff's injury was too speculative and tenuous to afford standing:
[T]he threat of [the plaintiff']s future injury is highly conjectural, resting on a string of actions the occurrence of which is merely speculative. In short, to show a palpable threat of future injury necessary to achieve standing for declaratory and injunctive relief, [the plaintiff] must present evidence establishing: (1) that he is bringing or highly likely to bring a lawsuit before the Ohio Supreme Court; (2) that such lawsuit . . . expos[es] him to sanctions under [the relevant] Rule . . .; (3) that the . . . Court would, in its discretion, impose such sanctions; and (4) that the imposition of those sanctions would violate due process. Such a chain of events is simply too attenuated to establish injury in fact, and to confer the required standing in this case.See id. (emphasis added).
Turning to the plaintiff's assertion that a continued subjection to the rule would "chill" his representation of clients, the Grendell Court clarified that "fears of prosecution" that are "merely imaginary or speculative" cannot confer standing. See id. at 834 (citations omitted). On the facts before it, the court held:
The Grendell Court distinguished from the case before it decisions holding that "it is not necessary that [a plaintiff] first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights." See id. (citation omitted, quotations in original). As addressed below, many of the cases cited by Mr. Brunwasser stand for this proposition and they, likewise, are distinguishable from the instant case.
[T]he mere fact that [the plaintiff] subjectively fears . . . sanctions, or `feels inhibited' by the Ohio Supreme Court's sanctioning power, does not objectively establish an imminent threat that chills protected activity. . . . While the previous imposition of sanctions is a factor [that courts may] consider in [the] standing determination, [the plaintiff] presents no evidence that the Ohio Supreme Court threatened to sanction him in the cases from which he [alleged to have] voluntarily withdrew, nor does he present evidence that the Ohio Supreme Court currently threatens him with sanctions in any other case.See id. at 835 (citations omitted, internal quotations in original, emphasis added).
Finally, the Grendell Court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine affirmatively established standing. See id. at 835-37. The court explained:
[The Rooker-Feldman doctrine] dr[aws] a distinction between state court determinations that [a]re `judicial' in nature, and those that [a]re `legislative, ministerial or administrative.' . . . Under such a distinction, a review of [a] state court decision denying . . . [, for example, a] bar application might run afoul of federalism, but a `general challenge to the constitutionality' of the bar admission rule would not. This is because a general constitutional challenge would not require a district court `to review a final state-court judgment in a judicial proceeding'; rather, the `district court may simply be asked to assess the validity of a rule promulgated in a nonjudicial proceeding.'See id. at 836 (citations omitted); see also generally discussion supra at 7 n. 2 (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "prohibits federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction to review final adjudications of a state's highest court or to evaluate constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision]").
The court went on to explain, though, that the Supreme Court's Rooker-Feldman jurisprudence "cannot be construed as implying that all general constitutional challenges made in recognition of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine confer standing on those litigants." See id. at 837 (emphasis added). Thus, theGrendell Court joined the "other circuit courts [that] have refused to endorse the notion that a claim's conformity with the strictures of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine absolves a litigant from establishing proper standing." See id. at 837 (citations omitted).
The circumstances surrounding Mr. Brunwasser's claims are remarkably similar to those presented in Grendell, and his arguments for standing are even weaker than those rejected in that case. First, Mr. Brunwasser makes no argument that his past exposure to the Pennsylvania Rules in question confers standing; to the contrary, he has limited his pleadings regarding past exposure "for fear that the court will rule [that] he is asking for a review of the Supreme Court orders" identified in his Complaint. See Compl. at ¶ 8(A). Even if Mr. Brunwasser had relied on his past exposure to the Rules, though, he identifies "no continuing, present adverse effects" to establish "standing for declaratory and injunctive relief." See Grendell, 252 F.3d at 833.
In Grendell, the sanctions imposed by the Ohio Supreme Court "ha[d] already been perfected . . . ." See id. Based on the Supreme Court orders attached to the Complaint, this magistrate judge finds no basis for concluding otherwise here. See discussion supra at 2-3 (summarizing Supreme Court orders).
Second, to the extent Mr. Brunwasser asserts that his potential future appearances before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pose a "real and immediate threat of repeated injury," this claim is too speculative and tenuous to confer standing. See Grendell, 252 F.3d at 833. Such potential future injury "rest[s] on a string of actions the occurrence of which is merely speculative." See id. As observed in Grendell, Mr. Brunwasser would be required to present evidence establishing: that he is bringing or highly likely to bring a lawsuit before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that such a lawsuit would expose him to the Rules he challenges, that the Prothonotary would exercise his authority under the challenged Rules, that such exercise would be to Mr. Brunwasser's detriment, and that the operation of the Rules would deprive him of constitutional rights. Cf. id. "Such a chain of events is simply too attenuated to establish injury in fact, and to confer the required standing . . . ." See id.; see also, e.g.,Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 859, 862 (9th Cir.) (plaintiff-attorney lacked standing to seek injunction restraining state supreme court from sanctioning him because he "failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate an appreciable likelihood that the [court would] do anything in the future to violate his rights"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 999 (1992).
Mr. Brunwasser's pleadings specifically state that he "has nothing presently pending either as a party or counsel in the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court." See Compl. at ¶ 24(A). And though he claims to presently have cases in Pennsylvania trial and intermediate appellate courts that "will be finally resolved by petitions for [review]" before the state's Supreme Court, see id. at ¶¶ 24(B)-(C) (emphasis added), this statement itself is pure conjecture.
Next, Mr. Brunwasser appears to claim standing based on the assertion he "is afraid . . . that any disagreement with any employee of the . . . Prothonotary's office . . . will result in a harsh sanction" and that "[t]his fear, at least subconsciously, will `chill' [his] absolute duty to properly represent [his] clients." See Compl. at ¶ 8 (emphasis added). Mr. Brunwasser's reference to "subconscious" fears only serves to emphasize the "merely imaginary or speculative" nature of his claim. See Grendell, 252 F.3d at 834. Moreover, his position is even weaker than the one rejected in Grendell, where the plaintiff expressly alleged that he "withdr[ew] from two cases before" the state Supreme Court "for fear of exposing himself to unconstitutionally imposed sanctions." See id. at 831. In any event Mr. Brunwasser's asserted fears, "subconscious" or otherwise, are insufficient to confer standing. See id.; cf. also, e.g., K v. Complaints Comm. of Mississippi State Bar, 618 F. Supp. 307, 311 (S.D.Miss. 1985) ("The `chilling effect' [that] [p]laintiff alleges from remaining under the `sweeping investigatory powers' of the Defendants is . . . insufficient to breathe life into [his] claim [of standing], since there is no showing that [p]laintiff is or will be the subject of another bar investigation.") (citation omitted).
The last argument addressed in Grendell, the plaintiff's claim of standing under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, is not advanced by Mr. Brunwasser. To the contrary, he has made every effort to avoid an application of the doctrine, emphasizing time and again that he "is not asking that any previous Pennsylvania court decision or judicial proceeding be reversed or reviewed . . . ." See discussion supra at 2 (emphasis added).
Even if the Plaintiff had alleged standing under Rooker-Feldman, though, such a claim would fail. As the Grendell Court aptly observed, Supreme Court jurisprudence "cannot be construed as implying that all general constitutional challenges made in recognition of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine confer standing on those litigants." See id. at 837 (emphasis added). This conclusion is consistent with the law of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ("the Third Circuit Court"), and it precludes Mr. Brunwasser from affirmatively establishing standing based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Ernst, 108 F.3d at 491, 499-500 (finding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not preclude court from exercising jurisdiction, but holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert claim based on "generalized injury shared by the plaintiff with the public at large"); cf. also generally, e.g., Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1424, 1430 (3d Cir. 1989) (in reversing district court's holding that claims were barred by Rooker-Feldman, court stated that plaintiff still was required to allege facts "enabl[ing] him to establish standing").
In Centifanti the Third Circuit Court held that the plaintiff, a lawyer who was disbarred by the state supreme court, was not precluded under Rooker-Feldman from bringing a generalized constitutional challenge regarding the rules under which he was disbarred. See id., 865 F.2d at 1424. As referenced above, however, the court acknowledged that the plaintiff still bore the independent burden of establishing standing. See discussion supra in text. Thus, Centifanti does not support Mr. Brunwasser's potential (but un-asserted) argument that his presumed ability to satisfy the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides him standing. To the extent the Centifanti Court reached the issue of standing, moreover, the case is distinguishable on its facts. The plaintiff in Centifanti "remain[ed] suspended from the practice of law" at the time he brought suit; thus, he "allege[d] what [wa]s in essence a continuing wrong." See id. at 1433. Here, Mr. Brunwasser "cannot establish such continuing, present adverse effects," and the " Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . effectively foreclose[s] review of the . . . Supreme Court's decision[s] to impose sanctions." See Grendell (holding same).
Based on the foregoing, this magistrate judge concludes that Mr. Brunwasser lacks standing to assert the claims stated in his Complaint. Nevertheless, a couple of matters raised in the Plaintiff's pleadings and briefing warrant further comment.
First is the Plaintiff's assertion that, in light of the District Court's ruling in another case, "he is the only person who has standing to challenge the constitutionality of [the challenged R]ules and that[,] if he is denied standing[,] . . . no one will be able to challenge [the Rules] as unconstitutional." See, e.g., Compl. at 7. The court has already concluded that Mr. Brunwasser does not have standing, and the "assumption that if [the Plaintiff has] no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing." See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (citation omitted); Doe v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (D.Md. 1994) ("it [is not] sufficient to argue that, if [the p]laintiff is not given standing, no one will be able to litigate [the] issue") (citation omitted).
Mr. Brunwasser refers to the case of Schaefer v. Johns, Civil Action No. 00-839 (W.D.Pa.). In that case the plaintiff, represented by Mr. Brunwasser, filed a purported class action seeking to invalidate the same Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure addressed here. See generally Mem. Order (Doc. 25) inSchaefer v. Johns, Civ. Action No. 00-839 (W.D.Pa.). District Judge William L. Standish dismissed the case for want of standing. See id. And though the Defendant's Motion here makes reference to "the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion," see Def.'s Mot. at ¶ 4, his counsel fails to articulate the elements of these doctrines, let alone show that they have been satisfied. See generally Def.'s Mem. in Supp. (Doc. 6) at 1-7.
Next is the Plaintiff's summary citation, in rapid-fire succession, to numerous decisions of various state and federal courts purportedly supporting his claim of standing. See Compl. at ¶¶ 22(A)-(G), 23(A)-(O). Each of his citations is followed by a parenthetical commentary that provides little in the way of meaningful legal analysis. See id. This magistrate judge sees no benefit to explaining why the Plaintiff's various citations are either irrelevant or do not bear favorably on his claim of standing. The court will, however, briefly comment on two of the decisions Mr. Brunwasser cites.
The first is the case of Spencer v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Court of Pa., 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D.Pa. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1985). In Spencer, the district court held that the plaintiff-attorney had standing to challenge newly amended state rules of professional responsibility "limit[ing] the content as well as the time, place, and manner of lawyer advertising and/or solicitation . . . ." See id. at 882. The Spencer Court cited precedent to the effect that "[i]t is not necessary [for] a plaintiff [to] first expose himself to arrest or prosecution" when "the alleged threats of prosecution [are] . . . more than merely imaginary or speculative." See id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). Because the plaintiff alleged that he "intend[ed] to [continue] engag[ing] in conduct proscribed by the [recently amended] disciplinary rules," and because the disciplinary board "ha[d] actively enforced the rules in the past and there [wa]s [evidence] that it [would] continue to do so," the court found that "his fear of threatened discipline or prosecution" was "more than imaginary or speculative." See id. at 883-84.
Spencer is plainly distinguishable from the instant case. Here, the Plaintiff's future subjection to the Pennsylvania Rules "rest[s] on a string of actions the occurrence of which is merely speculative." See discussion supra at 9-10. Like in Grendell, the Plaintiff "presents no evidence that the . . . Supreme Court [has] threatened [or] . . . currently threatens him with sanctions in any other case." See Grendell, 252 F.3d at 835; see also id. at 834-35 (distinguishing cases holding that "it is not necessary that [a plaintiff] first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution" to have standing). Simply stated, there are far too many intervening events that must occur before Mr. Brunwasser may in the future be subjected to the Rules he challenges. "Such a chain of events is . . . too attenuated to establish injury in fact," and Spencer and the numerous similar decisions cited by the Plaintiff are of no avail.
See discussion supra at 13 (noting that Mr. Brunwasser has failed to show that he is bringing or highly likely to bring suit before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, that such a lawsuit would expose him to the challenged Rules, that the Prothonotary would exercise his authority under said Rules, that such exercise would be to Mr. Brunwasser's detriment, and that the operation of the Rules would deprive the Plaintiff of constitutional rights).
The second case warranting comment is Mattas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 576 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D.Pa. 1983). In Mattas, the plaintiff-attorney brought federal suit after the state supreme court suspended his license. See generally id. at 1179-80. The court found that the plaintiff's claims "relat[ing] specifically to [his] personal situation and his . . . suspension" were barred by what is now known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See id. at 1183-84. The court found jurisdiction over the plaintiff's "general constitutional attacks" on certain court rules, however, stating:
Though the [generalized constitutional] claims related indirectly to [the plaintiff's] particular case, he states that he is not seeking direct review of the two-year suspension order and the rules as they affect him. We note that he must have some interest in the rules or we would have to dismiss for lack of standing, yet under the [ Rooker-Feldman] doctrine, he cannot have such an individual interest as to put us in the position of reviewing the state court decision.
We believe that the allegations regarding the hearings and the make-up of the boards are sufficiently general to permit this Court to review the specific order of suspension. Any decision we would make on the merits of these constitutional attacks would apply to any Pennsylvania lawyer facing disciplinary procedure. We . . . therefore . . . have jurisdiction to consider the claims . . . .See id. 1184 (emphasis added).
The Mattas Court appears to suggest that, because the plaintiff's generalized constitutional challenges satisfied what is now known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the plaintiff had standing to bring such claims. As addressed above, however, the notion that Rooker-Feldman provides an affirmative basis for standing is inconsistent with Third Circuit and other federal precedent. See discussion supra at 11-12. Thus, to the extentMattas can be read as holding or implying the same, the District Court should decline to follow it.
In all fairness, the Mattas Court's decision was made shortly after the Supreme Court handed down its decision inDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). That decision laid the groundwork for the now fully-developed Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and this court enjoys the benefit of years of jurisprudence unavailable at the time Mattas was decided. In addition, Mattas arguably can be harmonized with the later precedent under the "continuing wrong" theory of standing, i.e., the Mattas plaintiff's suspension from the practice of law continued as of the time of his lawsuit. Compare Mattas, 576 F. Supp. at 1180-81 with Centifanti, as discussed supra at 16 n. 6.
In addition, the Mattas Court's observation that "[a]ny decision [it made] on the merits of [the plaintiff's generalized] constitutional attacks would apply to any Pennsylvania lawyer facing disciplinary procedure" counsels against, not in favor of, Article III standing. The Third Circuit and other federal courts have long recognized that "[a] generalized injury shared by the plaintiff with the public at large is insufficient to create a concrete case or controversy over which a federal court may exercise its jurisdiction." See Ernst, 108 F.3d at 500 ( citing and quoting Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 219-20) (emphasis added).
See also Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 219-20 ("[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind . . . which is held in common by all members of the public because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share.Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. It adds the essential dimension of specificity to the dispute by requiring that the complaining party have suffered a particular injury caused by the action challenged as unlawful. This personal stake is what the Court has consistently held enables a complainant authoritatively to present to a court a complete perspective upon the adverse consequences flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding the grievance.") (emphasis added).
Admittedly the class of "[all] Pennsylvania lawyer[s] facing disciplinary procedure" envisioned in Mattas, like Mr. Brunwasser's presumed class of all lawyers appearing before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is narrower than the "public at large." Cf. Ernst, 108 F.3d at 500. Nevertheless, the principles underlying the standing doctrine's prohibition of lawsuits alleging a "generalized injury" that is shared by all potential, relevant litigants apply with equal force in Mattas and here. See discussion herein at n. 10.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court apply the well-reasoned principles in Grendell, as consistent with the law of this Circuit, and hold that the Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the claims alleged in this case. CONCLUSION
Because the Plaintiff lacks standing, the District Court should not reach the merits of his proposed class action. See Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1988) ("the proper disposition of a case in which the putative class plaintiff lacks standing is to dismiss the complaint . . . and . . . avoid reaching a decision on the merits of the claims presented") (citation omitted).
For the reasons stated above, the District Court should grant the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) and dismiss this case with prejudice.
In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(l)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.1.4(B) of the Local Rules for Magistrates, objections to this report and recommendation are due by January 28, 2002. Responses to objections are due by February 7, 2002.