Brunswick Acceptance Co. v. MEJ, LLC

77 Citing cases

  1. Regions Bank v. Thomas

    422 S.W.3d 550 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 10 times

    In Brunswick Acceptance Co., appellant debtor asserted that notice was not sufficient where, inter alia, it did not include a time after which disposition of the collateral—boats—would be made and did not provide debtor with the opportunity to find an alternative buyer. Brunswick Acceptance Co. v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638, 643–44 (Tenn.Ct.App.2008). We affirmed the trial court's finding that notice was sufficient where debtor had actual notice of the sale through email notifications; had the opportunity to seek competitive offers; had an opportunity to review the materials sent to dealers prior to a private sale; and where debtor did not object to potential immediate remarketing of the collateral.

  2. Regions Bank v. Thomas

    No. W2011-02320-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2013)   Cited 1 times

    In Brunswick Acceptance Co., appellant debtor asserted that notice was not sufficient where, inter alia, it did not include a time after which disposition of the collateral - boats - would be made and did not provide debtor with the opportunity to find an alternative buyer. Brunswick Acceptance Co. v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638, 643-44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). We affirmed the trial court's finding that notice was sufficient where debtor had actual notice of the sale through email notifications; had the opportunity to seek competitive offers; had an opportunity to review the materials sent to dealers prior to a private sale; and where debtor did not object to potential immediate remarketing of the collateral.

  3. Apace Commc'ns, Ltd. v. Burke

    17 F. Supp. 3d 238 (W.D.N.Y. 2014)   Cited 2 times

    Thus, this agreement could not have induced any reliance on the part of Apace, and if Apace believed that the sale itself was somehow improper, it could have challenged it, either in its capacity as a secured creditor or as the majority shareholder of NetSetGo. It failed to do so. See Brunswick Acceptance Co., LLC v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638, 644 (Tenn.Ct.App.2008) (noting that debtor had an opportunity to object to the sale of collateral but did not do so); see also In re Winer, 39 B.R. 504, 509 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1984) (recognizing right to challenge an Article 9 sale).As stated, Aggarwal's brother Naresh attended the UCC sale as an “observer” for Apace. Aggarwal Tr. (Dkt. # 168–3) at 624.

  4. Peoples Bank v. Bluewater Cruising LLC

    Case No. C12-00939RSL (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2014)   Cited 3 times
    In Peoples Bank, the district court found genuine issues of material fact existed because extrinsic facts—especially the creditor's decision to record a "Satisfaction of Mortgage" after the debtor transferred rights in the collateral—indicated the creditor may have consented to strict foreclosure.

    Id. At best, the Bank's communications informed Ms. Nettleship that Plaintiff was in the process of readying the Vessel for sale, not that it had already listed the Vessel. Unlike the circumstances presented in Brunswick Acceptance Co., LLC v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008), on which Plaintiff relies, Ms. Nettleship received no notice of the listing price of the Vessel, or offers to purchase the Vessel. Moreover, the sale in this case took place less than two weeks after Plaintiff informed Ms. Nettleship that it was working with an agent in New Zealand to sell the boat.

  5. Singh v. Singh

    No. W2017-02091-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 3, 2019)

    The trial court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo and "are accorded no presumption of correctness." Brunswick Acceptance Co., LLC v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tenn. 2008). Moreover, while we are cognizant of the fact that Ms. Singh is representing herself in this appeal, it is well-settled that "pro se litigants are held to the same procedural and substantive standards to which lawyers must adhere."

  6. J-Star Holdings, LLC v. Pantry, Inc.

    No. M2012-01035-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2013)   1 Legal Analyses

    In making a determination about the reasonableness of attorney fees, a trial court must consider the guidelines set out in Connors v. Connors, 594 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1980), and the similar factors stated in Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.5(a); Brunswick Acceptance Co., LLC v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638, 646 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). J-Star asserts that the trial court failed to provide an adequate explanation for its decision, but has cited no Tennessee precedent stating that the trial court was required to provide a detailed explanation of how it reached its award.

  7. Amodio v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC

    Case No. 3:18-cv-00811 (M.D. Tenn. May. 17, 2019)

    See Westbrook v. NASA Fed. Credit Union, No. 3:17-CV-00534-AKK, 2019 WL 1056356, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 6, 2019) (observing that an entity seeking to enforce a security interest in a property may become liable under § 1692f(6) if it "los[es] its present right to possession" but takes possession anyway); Wright v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., No. 6:18-cv-263-Orl-22KRS, 2018 WL 2095171, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 1, 2018) (holding that plaintiff had stated a claim against auto repossessor because he had alleged that his lender "lacked a present interest to possess the" car). Under Tennessee law, "a secured party may take possession of the collateral and may sell or otherwise dispose of it," but, at least generally, only "[a]fter default." Brunswick Acceptance Co., LLC v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Auto Credit of Nashville v. Wimmer, 231 S.W.3d 896, 899-900 (Tenn. 2007)).

  8. Morgantown Excavators, Inc. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank (In re Godfrey)

    537 B.R. 271 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    The requirement of authentication was intended to overturn cases that read former § 9–504(3) as validating oral notifications. American Law Institute, 6AP4–Revised Article 9 UCC Reporter–Digest § 9–611, cmt. 5 (1998). Additionally, in Brunswick Acceptance Co., LLC v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Tenn.App.2008), the secured creditor sent notice of a proposed disposition of collateral to the business-debtor's counsel and not to the business itself. The court held, however, that the sole owner of the business entity had actual notice of the proposed disposition because he was informed of the disposition by email from counsel, he had specifically agreed that notices may be sent to his attorney, specifically approved of some of the proposed dispositions before they occurred, and had the opportunity to solicit competitive offers.

  9. Hudson v. Hudson

    No. M2023-00879-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2024)

    The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and "are accorded no presumption of correctness." Brunswick Acceptance Co., LLC v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tenn. 2008).

  10. Davison v. Johnson

    No. M2024-00412-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2024)

    Issues involving statutory interpretation present questions of law, In re Estate of Stringfield, 283 S.W.3d 832, 834 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008), which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Brunswick Acceptance Co., LLC v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tenn. 2008). When applying any statute, a court's duty is to ascertain and fully effectuate the "legislative intent [of the statute], taking care not to broaden [it] beyond its intended scope ...."