Opinion
No. 05-16-00090-CV
05-04-2017
ELIA BRUNS, Appellant v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee
On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-08459
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Brown, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Whitehill
After Elia Bruns sued Dallas Independent School District (DISD) for disability discrimination and retaliation, the trial court granted DISD's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and summary judgment motion. Bruns, appearing pro se, now asserts two general issues with approximately nine subparts, arguing that (i) her TCHRA claims "should be upheld," and (ii) her retaliation claims do not fail as a matter of law.
The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. See TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.001 et. seq.
We conclude that Bruns' issues are forfeited for non-compliance with the rules of appellate procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. Background
The facts are well known to the parties, so we focus only on those facts material to our disposition here.
Bruns sued DISD alleging (i) disability discrimination for denial of a reasonable accommodation and (ii) retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, opposing unlawful disability discrimination, and requesting reasonable accommodation. DISD subsequently moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for summary judgment, asserting both no-evidence and traditional grounds.
Bruns requested and received three continuances to respond to the motions. During the hearing on the third request, the trial court ordered Bruns to file her response no later than Tuesday January 12, 2016, and to hand-deliver it to DISD's office by the close of business that day. Bruns did not comply.
Instead, Bruns filed a three page response with eighty three pages of documents attached at 4:31 p.m. on January 13, 2016, and hand-delivered the document to DISD after 5:00 p.m.
DISD objected to the response as untimely filed, objected to the attached evidence on various grounds, and requested that the response be stricken in its entirety. The trial court granted DISD's motion to strike, objections to the evidence, motion to dismiss, and motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
After this appeal was filed, Bruns requested and was granted an opportunity to file an amended appendix. That appendix is the subject of an appellate motion to strike that we address in a separate order.
II. Analysis
Bruns' appellate points distill to two main issues concerning her TCHRA and retaliation claims. These issues and their various subparts, however, have not been briefed according to the rules of appellate procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.
Litigants appearing on their own behalf are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with all applicable laws and rules of procedures. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978). Thus, a pro se litigant must properly present his case on appeal, and we may not apply different standards for litigants appearing without the advice of counsel. Morris v. A. Home Mortg. Serv. Inc., 360 S.W.3d 32, 26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
An appellant's brief must "contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. Error may be forfeited through inadequate briefing. See Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284-85 (Tex. 1994).
Here, Bruns' brief consists of conclusory statements unsupported by citations to the record or to authority that supports the arguments. Conclusory statements are not enough to raise an issue on appeal. See Izen v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 322 S.W.3d 308, 321-22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).
It is an appellant's burden to discuss his assertions of error, and appellate courts have no duty—or even the right—to perform an independent review of the record and the applicable law to determine whether there was error. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 318 S.W.3d 464, 465 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.). "We will not do the job of the advocate." Happy Harbor Methodist Home, Inc. v. Cowins, 903 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
In addition, Bruns cites to documents that were stricken by the trial court and documents included within the voluminous appellate appendix that are not part of the appellate record. We cannot consider summary judgment or jurisdictional evidence evidence that was not before the trial court. Univ. of Texas v. Morris, 344 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. 1961). Likewise, an appellate court may not consider materials outside the appellate record. See Mitchell v. Citifinancial Mortg. Co., 192 S.W.3d 882, 883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Bruns' issues are forfeited as inadequately briefed. See Washington v. Bank of N.Y., 362 S.W.3d 853, 854-855 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) and affirm the trial court's judgment
/Bill Whitehill/
BILL WHITEHILL
JUSTICE 160090F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-08459.
Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill. Justices Lang and Brown participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT recover its costs of this appeal from appellant ELIA BRUNS. Judgment entered May 4, 2017.