The rejected amendment would produce a savings statute similar in structure to Utah's, and Janson therefore does not support the conclusion that the Ewings urge here. ¶ 17 UDOT refers us to the Oklahoma Supreme Court decision of Bruner v. Sobel, 1998 OK 60, 961 P.2d 815, as further support for its contention that our precedent properly interprets the savings statute. We find Bruner to be both useful and persuasive.
Rout v. Crescent Public Works Auth., 1994 OK 85, ¶ 10, 878 P.2d 1045.Burner v. Sobel, 1998 OK 60, ¶ 9, 961 P.2d 815; Magnolia Pipe Line Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 1946 OK 113, ¶ 11, 167 P.2d 884. Where the legislative intent was previously doubtful, an amendment may be intended to clarify the statute's meaning. American Airlines v. Hickman, 2007 OK 59, ¶ 11, 164 P.3d 146; Wilson v. Catoosa Public Schools, 2007 OK 20, ¶ 11, 157 P.3d 1149; Barnhill v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 114, ¶ 11, 37 P.3d 890.
Ledbetter v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Com'n, 1988 OK 117, 764 P.2d 172, 179.Bruner v. Sobel, 1998 OK 60, ¶ 9, 961 P.2d 815, 817.City of Tulsa v. Public Employees Relations Board, 1998 OK 92, ¶ 14, 967 P.2d 1214, 1220.
¶ 9 As a matter of statutory construction, we are bound to "ascertain and follow the intent of the Legislature." Bruner v. Sobel, 1998 OK 60, ¶ 9, 961 P.2d 815, 817. And, the plain language of an enactment governs its construction: "[W]here the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent, the use of additional rules of construction are unnecessary and a statute will be applied as written." Id.
This presents a question of law, which we review de novo. State, ex rel. Dep't of Human Serv. v. Baggett, 1999 OK 68, ¶ 4, 990 P.2d 235, 238. Under this standard, we have "plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's legal rulings."Id. ¶ 7 The goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and apply the legislature's intent; if that intent is clear, no additional rules of construction are necessary. Bruner v. Sobel, 1998 OK 60, ¶ 9, 961 P.2d 815, 817. Section 30 generally provides "[a] claim for legal services shall be determined by the court on a quantum meruit basis . . . ."
However, we find nothing in the version of section 22-111[ 11-22-111] in effect at the time this matter commenced indicating a legislative intent to give municipalities exclusive jurisdiction in this matter.See Bruner v. Sobel, 1998 OK 60, ¶ 9, 961 P.2d 815, 817 (the goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and apply the legislature's intent; if that intent is clear, no additional rules of construction are necessary). Prior to November 1, 1998, section 22-111 provided that a "municipal governing body may cause property within the municipal limits to be cleaned of trash and weeds." 11 O.S.Supp. 1998 § 22-111[ 11-22-111](A) (emphasis added).
¶ 10 As a matter of statutory construction, "[t]he primary goal of statutory construction is, of course, to ascertain and follow the intent of the Legislature." Bruner v. Sobel,1998 OK 60, ¶ 9, 961 P.2d 815, 817. And, "where the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent, the use of additional rules of construction are unnecessary and a statute will be applied as written." Id.
Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 33 P.3d 302, 307 (Okla. 2001) (citing Bruner v. Sobel, 961 P.2d 815, 817 (Okla. 1998) ); Murray County v. Homesales, Inc., 330 P.3d 519, 524 (Okla. 2014). The plain meaning of the statute is conclusive except in the rare case when literal construction produces a result demonstrably at odds with the legislative intent.
Frysinger v. Leech, 512 N.E.2d 337, 342 (Ohio 1987) ("a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1) constitutes failure 'otherwise than upon the merits' within the meaning of the savings statute"); Taylor v. Int'l Union of Elec., Elec., Salaried, Mach. & Furniture Workers, 968 P.2d 685, 689 (Kan.Ct.App. 1998) (holding that plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of lawsuit did not constitute failure "upon the merits," meaning that plaintiff could refile lawsuit under K.S.A. 60-518's saving statute); Luke v. Bennion, 106 P. 712, 715 (Utah 1908) ("We are therefore of the opinion that the voluntary dismissal of the action in the justice court was a failure of the action otherwise than upon the merits, and within the meaning of section 2893, and that the court erred in holding the action brought in the district court barred by the statute of limitations."); Bruner v. Sobel, ¶ 12, 961 P.2d 815, 818 (Okla. 1998) (Suit "was not time-barred because § 100 gave appellant one year from the first suit's dismissal without prejudice to file a new action against her."); see generally 79 A.L.R.2d 1290 (1961).
Where a former statute is clear or its meaning has been judicially determined, the Legislature's amendment of it may reasonably indicate legislative intent to alter the law. Bruner v. Sobel, 1998 OK 60, 961 P.2d 815. Based thereon, we conclude the Legislature intended to eliminate any minimum period for a parent's incarceration before the State could move on that independent basis for termination. ¶ 14 However, the Legislature has continued to recognize "the duration of incarceration and its detrimental effect of the parent/child relationship," as one of several factors in a non-exclusive list that a factfinder may consider when determining the fourth element of § 7006-1.