Pltf's Response Brief at 6. Both of the cases cited for this proposition, Brummel v. Brummel, 363 Mich. 447 (1961), and Hazime v. Martin Oil of Indiana, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1992), involved real estate transactions, not guarantees. In Brummel, the court enforced an oral contract to convey real property not only because plaintiff fully executed her obligation (namely, by building a house on the land in question), but also because the parties' agreement was evidenced by a note signed by defendants.
"We have reaffirmed that principle time and time again," Justice MCCORMACK emphasized. North American Brokers, 502 Mich. at 884, citing Brummel v Brummel, 363 Mich. 447, 452; 109 N.W.2d 782 (1961) (citing cases). Moreover, up to that point, the Legislature had also reaffirmed this practice.
In other words, there is no reason that "it would be a fraud upon [plaintiff] to allow the other party to repudiate the contract" by raising the statute of frauds as a defense. Brummel v Brummel, 363 Mich 447, 452; 109 NW2d 782 (1961). Therefore, equity may not intervene and order specific performance of an alleged oral agreement. Id.; Kent Furniture Mfg Co, 111 Mich at 389-390.
The language quoted by the Judge from that case is: 363 Mich. 447, 109 N.W.2d 782 (1961). "`* * * If one party to an oral contract, in reliance upon the contract, has performed his obligation thereunder so that it would be a fraud upon him to allow the other party to repudiate the contract, by interposing the statute, equity will regard the contract as removed from the operation of the statute.
We have reaffirmed that principle time and time again. Brummel v. Brummel , 363 Mich. 447, 452, 109 N.W.2d 782 (1961) (citing cases). So too has the Legislature.
The emphasis is upon the plaintiff and the consequence to him. See, also, Brummel v. Brummel, 363 Mich. 447, 452. Hunter v. Slater, 331 Mich. 1, 7, quotes from Cramer v. Ballard, 315 Mich. 496, 510: