Although the court ruled the statute to be constitutional and also held adversely to appellant on other enumerations, a new trial was granted appellant by reason of an error in the charge. See Brumby v. Brooks, 234 Ga. 376 ( 216 S.E.2d 288). Upon re-trial the jury again ruled against appellant.

The statute is sufficiently precise as to meet the due process standard of definiteness, and therefore it is not void for vagueness. See Brumby v. Brooks, 234 Ga. 376, 381 ( 216 S.E.2d 288) (1975); Campbell v. J. D. Jewell, Inc., 221 Ga. 543, 547 ( 145 S.E.2d 569) (1965). Furthermore, the state's interest in assuring that malt beverages be taxed uniformly throughout the state provides a sufficient rational basis for imposition of the tax even though the tax may be imposed without strict regard to the financial needs of a particular local taxing unit.

In addition, we hold it was not error to overrule the father's motion for a directed verdict or the motion for judgment n.o.v. as there was a conflict in the evidence requiring a jury verdict. See Brumby v. Brooks, 234 Ga. 376, 381 ( 216 S.E.2d 288). There is sufficient evidence to authorize the jury's verdict and therefore a new trial is not authorized. Moss v. Moss, 169 Ga. 734 ( 151 S.E. 506). Having found no merit in the enumerations of error, we affirm the trial court. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Because the jury instruction in this case was not a correct statement of the applicable law and likely prejudiced the Kings' case, a new trial is required in which the jury instructions are consistent with OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d). C. W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Gover, 263 Ga. at 108-110 (2), (3); see Brumby v. Brooks, 234 Ga. 376, 382-383 (III) ( 216 SE2d 288) (1975) (when it is likely that an erroneous jury instruction prejudiced a litigant's case, the grant of a new trial is warranted). OCGA § 40-8-76.

A written request to charge should be given only if it embraces a correct and complete principle of law, not included in the general instructions, and if it is pertinent and adjusted to the facts of the case. Brumby v. Brooks, 234 Ga. 376, 383 ( 216 S.E.2d 288) (1975). The refusal to give the requested charge was not error.

Teague v. Keith, 214 Ga. 853 ( 108 S.E.2d 489)." Campbell v. J. D. Jewell, Inc., 221 Ga. 543, 547 ( 145 S.E.2d 569); Brumby v. Brooks, 234 Ga. 376, 381 ( 216 S.E.2d 288). "A civil statute will withstand an attack of vagueness or indefiniteness if it provides fair notice to those to whom the statute is directed and enables one to determine from the provisions of the Act what the legislative intent was in enacting the Act."

2, which contained identical language with regard to the liability of an individual. In Brumby v. Brooks, 234 Ga. 376 (1975), the only published Georgia case dealing with any of these three statutes, the Supreme Court held that the language of Ga. Code Ann. § 54-650.2 was "sufficiently certain and definite to inform a person of normal intelligence, in the class upon which the statute operates, of the meaning of the statute."

1(b) mirrors that of Rule 609(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the statutes based on Rule 609(b) that have been enacted by several other states, we look for guidance to the judicial decisions of the federal courts construing Rule 609(b) and the courts of our sister states construing their statutes modeled on Rule 609(b). See Independent Ins. Agents of Ga. v. Dept. of Banking, etc., of Ga., 248 Ga. 787, 788-789, 285 S.E.2d 535 (1982); Brumby v. Brooks, 234 Ga. 376, 380, 216 S.E.2d 288 (1975). See also Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811(7), 631 S.E.2d 365 (2006).