Opinion
EDCV 24-0952-SSS (AS)
09-25-2024
MARQUICE BRUCE, Plaintiff, v. TWIN TOWERS COUNTY FACILITY, et al., Defendants.
ORDER (1) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; AND (2) DENYING REQUESTS (DKT. NOS. 14, 21, 24)
ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
On May 3, 2024, Marquice Bruce (“Plaintiff”), a California pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, filed a Civil Rights Complaint (“Complaint”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Twin Towers Correctional Facility (“Twin Towers”) in Los Angeles, California, and three Twin Towers correctional officers - Leora, Gonzalez, and Moran - sued in their individual capacities. (Dkt. No. 1). The Complaint appeared to assert a variety of claims and allegations, including that Defendants had subjected him to food poisoning and deprived him of medical care. (See Complaint at 4-5, 7). On June 21, 2024, the Court dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend for violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and other deficiencies. (Dkt. No. 9).
On July 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (or “FAC”), which sues the same four Defendants as the Complaint (Twin Towers and officers Leora, Gonzalez, and Moran) and again alleges that Defendants subjected him to food poisoning and deprived him of medical care, among other claims. (Dkt. No. 23). Plaintiff has also filed multiple motions pending before the Court, including a request for a subpoena (“Subpoena Request”), a request for the Court to “take a closer look at medical results and treatment” (“Request re Medical Records”), and a request to amend his complaint and for appointment of counsel (“Request for Amendment/Counsel”). (Dkt. Nos. 14, 21, 24).
The Court has screened the First Amended Complaint as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. For the reasons discussed below, the Court (1) DISMISSES Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMENDand (2) DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's Subpoena Request, Request re Medical Records, and Request for Amendment/Counsel (Dkt. Nos. 14, 21, 24).
Magistrate judges may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without approval from the district judge. McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges that on April 11, 2022, Defendant Moran “openly accused [Plaintiff] of being a molester after [Defendant] Gonzalez gave Moran a burrito that was received from another inmate with knowledge that the food was tampered that Gonzalez had prepared to be served to [Plaintiff]” so that Plaintiff “would become ill and pass away or have to require surgery in the near future.” (FAC at 7).Plaintiff indicates that Defendant(s) did so “[w]ithout medically addressing health issues that [were] caused by personnel and neglected ....” (FAC at 7).
In quoting from Plaintiff's handwritten First Amended Complaint, this Order omits some arbitrary capitalization.
In addition, elsewhere in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that Defendant Twin Towers “[c]aused and neglected to recognize the grievances filed by [Plaintiff]”; that Defendant Gonzalez “[o]rdered personnel to carry out different acts against [Plaintiff] while dismissing grievance procedures”; that Defendant Leora “[o]rder[ed] medical personnel to screen [Plaintiff's] lab results but deny treatment”; and that Defendant Moran “[g]ave nursing staff [a] reason for denying [Plaintiff's] treatment.” (FAC at 3-4).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress mandates that district courts initially screen civil complaints filed by prisoners seeking redress from a governmental entity or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A court may dismiss such a complaint, or any portion thereof, if the court concludes that the complaint: (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b); see also id. § 1915(e)(2) (“[The court] shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”); accord Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In addition, dismissal may be appropriate if a complaint violates Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996); Nevijel v. Northcoast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
In considering whether to dismiss a complaint, a court is generally limited to the pleadings and must construe “[a]ll factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) . Moreover, pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards” than those drafted by a lawyer. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, dismissal for failure to state a claim can be warranted based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of factual support for a cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint warrants dismissal for violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and failure to state a claim for relief, among other deficiencies addressed below. Leave to amend is granted, however, because it is not “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012).
First, the First Amended Complaint violates Rule 8 because, as with the initial Complaint, it fails to provide Defendants with fair notice of the claims Plaintiff is asserting and the legal and factual basis for such claims. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“[Rule 8(a)(2)] requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” (quoting, in part, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a))); McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178 (a complaint is subject to dismissal if “one cannot determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory”); McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that under Rule 8(a) a complaint must contain “sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them”). Indeed, aside from generally filing his pleading on the Court's Civil Rights Complaint form, Plaintiff does not specify any legal grounds for a federal civil rights claim against Defendants (for example, violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), as he must do to proceed in this federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also still fails to include enough factual allegations to show how each Defendant violated his rights, as discussed further below. Because Defendants would have difficulty understanding and responding to Plaintiff's claims, dismissal is warranted. See Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2011).
To remedy this problem, Plaintiff must, at a minimum, set forth specific, individual claims which expressly state the legal grounds at issue (for example, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause) and expressly identify which Defendant(s) are sued in each claim and which factual allegations are being offered in support of each claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3 (complaint must allege enough specific facts to provide both “fair notice” of the particular claim being asserted and “the grounds upon which [that claim] rests”). Plaintiff's allegations must show how each individual Defendant personally caused a violation of Plaintiff's rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A person deprives another ‘of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].' The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” (citations omitted)).
Second, even if Plaintiff had specified the legal basis for his claims, the allegations of the First Amended Complaint do not suffice to state any viable federal claims for relief. As indicated above, Plaintiff appears to allege, in part, that Defendants Gonzalez, Moran, and Leora caused Plaintiff to be subjected to food poisoning and/or deprived him of proper medical care. (See FAC at 3-4, 7). Pretrial detainees such as Plaintiff have the right, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free from any punishment. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 57 6 U.S. 389, 400 (2015) (“[P]retrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all ....”). Intentionally subjecting Plaintiff to food poisoning would seem to violate this right. Jail officers also violate this right if their intentional acts cause a detainee to be placed at a substantial risk of serious harm and they fail to “take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved,” and such failure causes the detainee's injuries. Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069-71 (9th Cir. 2016).
Here, Plaintiff offers only a brief, vague account of the circumstances of his alleged poisoning. As indicated above, he states that on April 11, 2022, Defendant Moran “openly accused [Plaintiff] of being a molester after [Defendant] Gonzalez gave Moran a burrito that was received from another inmate with knowledge that the food was tampered that Gonzalez had prepared to be served to [Plaintiff]” so that Plaintiff “would become ill and pass away or have to require surgery in the near future.” (FAC at 7). From this, it is unclear which of these three people (Gonzalez, Moran, or the other inmate) “had knowledge” that the food had been “tampered” with. More importantly, the facts do not clearly show whether Defendants Gonzalez and Moran actually knew or should have known that the food was likely to cause Plaintiff serious harm, as required to state a Due Process claim on this basis. He also does not specify whether he in fact became ill or was otherwise harmed as a result.
Although Plaintiff has included some additional information about these circumstances in other filings in this case (see Dkt. Nos. 14, 18, 21), such facts cannot be considered as part of Plaintiff's claims unless they are included within the operative complaint, to provide fair notice of the claims. See, e.g., Smith v. Warden, Deuel Vocational Inst., 2019 WL 1367809, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019) (“The charging allegations must be set forth in the [operative] complaint so defendants have fair notice of the claims plaintiff is presenting.”).
As for medical treatment, Plaintiff states only that Defendant Leora “[o]rder[ed] medical personnel to screen [Plaintiff's] lab results but deny treatment” and that Defendant Moran “[g]ave nursing staff [a] reason for denying [Plaintiff's] treatment.” (FAC at 3-4). Plaintiff does not state what treatment he needed or why, and he fails to plead any facts showing that either of these Defendants knew or should have known Plaintiff needed such treatment and personally caused Plaintiff to be deprived of it. Without such facts, Plaintiff fails to state a Due Process claim based on the deprivation of medical care.
Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff intends to claim that Defendants are liable for denying or rejecting grievances, such allegations also fail to support any claim for relief. As indicated above, Plaintiff states that Defendant Twin Towers “[c]aused and neglected to recognize the grievances filed by [Plaintiff]” and that Defendant Gonzalez “[o]rdered personnel to carry out different acts against [Plaintiff] while dismissing grievance procedures.” (FAC at 3). However, such conduct generally does not amount to a constitutional violation, as detainees such as Plaintiff have no “separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Todd v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 615 F. App' x 415, 415 (9th Cir. 2015) (district court properly dismissed claim based on improper “processing and handling of [] prison grievances,” since prisoners have no “constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure” (quoting Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860) (quotation marks omitted)); Lewis v. Ollison, 571 F.Supp.2d 1162, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing corrections personnel who participated in the review and denial of plaintiff's inmate appeals). Although a jail official's alleged failure to process a detainee's grievance may implicate his First Amendment right of access to the courts, a claim on this basis requires showing that the detainee suffered an “actual injury” as a result of a defendant's actions, meaning that the defendant hindered the detainee's efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim concerning his conviction or conditions of confinement. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-54, 354-55 (1996); see generally Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) (well-established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts), abrogated in part on other grounds by Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Plaintiff does not allege such facts here.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert federal claims against Twin Towers - construed as claims against the County of Los Angeles- Plaintiff must allege facts showing that a policy, custom, or practice of the municipal entity was the cause of a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008). “[P]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity,” or even a series of “isolated or sporadic incidents,” will not give rise to the entity's liability under § 1983. Gant v. County of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) . Rather, liability must be “founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Even if it implicated a constitutional right, Plaintiff's vague allegation regarding his grievances at Twin Towers does not plausibly show that any policy, custom, or practice of Twin Towers or Los Angeles County was responsible for such conduct or harms.
It is unclear whether Twin Towers itself is properly subject to suit, but the Court need not resolve that issue at this juncture.
Accordingly, the First Amended Complaint violates Rule 8 and fails to state a federal claim for relief. Additionally, because Plaintiff thus far has failed to state a plausible claim for relief in this Court, Plaintiff's Request for Subpoena (Dkt. No. 14) and Request re Medical Records (Dkt. No. 21) are premature, as it is unnecessary at this stage of the case for Plaintiff to prove his claims with evidence. Instead, as explained above, Plaintiff must simply plead sufficient factual allegations to support claims for relief in this Court and provide Defendants with adequate notice of the claims against them.
Finally, Plaintiff's Request for Amendment/Counsel (Dkt. No. 24) fails to demonstrate that appointment of counsel is warranted at this time. As the Court has previously advised Plaintiff, the decision to appoint counsel is within “the sound discretion of the trial court and is granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To decide whether exceptional circumstances exist, the court must evaluate both “the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, Plaintiff has not shown that his claims have any potential merit, and the Court continues to believe that Plaintiff has the ability to articulate his claims without the assistance of counsel, as neither the facts nor the legal issues involved in this case are unusually complex.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court (1) DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims WITH LEAVE TO AMEND and (2) DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's Subpoena Request, Request re Medical Records, and Request for Amendment/Counsel (Dkt. Nos. 14, 21, 24).
The Request for Amendment/Counsel (Dkt. No. 24) is also moot, in light of this Order, to the extent that it seeks an opportunity to amend Plaintiff's claims.
If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, he shall file a Second Amended Complaint no later than 30 days from the date of this Order. The Second Amended Complaint must cure the pleading defects discussed above and shall be complete in itself without reference to prior complaints. See L.R. 15-2 (“Every amended pleading filed as a matter of right or allowed by order of the Court shall be complete including exhibits. The amended pleading shall not refer to the prior, superseding pleading.”). This means that Plaintiff must allege and plead any viable claims again.
In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify the nature of each separate legal claim and confine his allegations to those operative facts supporting each of his claims. For each separate legal claim, Plaintiff should state the civil right that has been violated and the supporting facts for that claim only. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), all that is required is a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” However, Plaintiff is advised that the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint should be consistent with the authorities discussed above. In addition, the Second Amended Complaint may not include new defendants or claims not reasonably related to the allegations in the previously filed complaint. Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to utilize the standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of which is attached.
Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file a Second Amended Complaint, or failure to correct the deficiencies described above, may result in a recommendation that this action, or portions thereof, be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with court orders. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The failure of the plaintiff eventually to respond to the court's ultimatum - either by amending the complaint or by indicating to the court that it will not do so -is properly met with the sanction of a Rule 41(b) dismissal.” (quoting Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted)). Plaintiff is further advised that if he no longer wishes to pursue this action in its entirety or with respect to particular defendants or claims, he may voluntarily dismiss all or any part of this action by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff's convenience.
IT IS SO ORDERED.