Bruce v. Child

4 Citing cases

  1. Pryor v. Kopp

    342 Mo. 887 (Mo. 1938)   Cited 14 times
    In Pryor v. Kopp, Admr., 342 Mo. 887, 119 S.W.2d 228, the facts were: From December 1, 1925, to (about) November 1, 1930, Pryor and Thomson were equal partners under an oral agreement, and were engaged in constructing roads, etc.

    (6) The court erred in rendering a decree for plaintiff, because the evidence concerning the income and disbursements and the resulting profits and losses of the alleged partnership was neither clear, cogent, convincing nor definite. Craddock v. Jackson, 223 S.W. 924; Benne v. Benne, 56 Mo. App. 504; State ex rel. Robinson v. Trimble, 43 S.W.2d 1044; Parker v. Blakeley, 93 S.W.2d 981; Norton v. Norton, 43 S.W.2d 1024; Long v. Long, 192 S.W. 948; Bruce v. Child, 11 N.C. 381; Price v. Boyle, 287 Mo. 257; Burdett v. May, 100 Mo. 13; McKee v. Downing, 224 Mo. 115; Garnett v. Wills, 24 Ky. Law 617, 69 S.W. 695; McCauley v. Elrod, 28 S.W. 782; 1 C.J. 628; Ryan v. Gorman, 183 S.W. 594; Simpson v. Shadwell, 264 Ill. App. 480; Hall v. Clagett, 48 Md. 223; Ryman v. Ryman's Executors, 40 S.E. 96; Slaughter v. Danner, 46 S.E. 289; Fineman v. Goldberg, 329 Ill. 507, 161 N.E. 57; Oglesby v. Thompson, 51 N.E. 878; Ashley v. Williams, 21 P. 556; Lewelling's Admr. v. Lewelling, 67 S.E. 362; Rogers v. Guthrie, 264 Ill. App. 525; Ziegel v. Ziegel, 124 So. 315; Hinkson v. Irvin, 20 S.E. 849; Burgess v. Ransom, 72 Mo. App. 207; Runyeon v. Eaches, 79 Pa. Sup. Ct. 267. (7) The court erred in holding that the burden was on defendant to produce records showing the condition of the account as between the partners. (8) The court erred in holding that the burden of proof was on defendant to show that deceased paid plaintiff his full share of the profits of the partnership.

  2. McDonald v. McLeod

    36 N.C. 221 (N.C. 1840)   Cited 9 times

    Although a doubt could scarcely be entertained but that the reference, report and proceedings thereon were intended or supposed by the parties, according to the loose practice formerly very prevalent in the courts below, not to decide the great question of mortgage or no mortgage on which the controversy depended, but simply to speed the cause and put it in a state for an immediate final decree in case the court, upon a hearing, should declare the plaintiffs entitled to relief as mortgagors, the established rules of practice of courts of equity would have probably compelled us to acquiesce in the soundness of the position taken by the counsel for the plaintiffs. See Bruce v. Child, 11 N.C. 377; McLin v. McNamara, 21 N.C. 409. We have been relieved, however, from all difficulties on this subject by a petition for (225) a rehearing of the interlocutory decrees below, which we very readily granted, and we now proceed upon the pleadings and proofs to examine the claim of the plaintiffs to relief.

  3. McLin v. McNamara

    21 N.C. 407 (N.C. 1836)   Cited 2 times

    2. The rules of practice as settled in Bruce v. Child, 11 N.C. 372, approved. THIS bill was filed against the defendant, as administrator of S. L. Ferrand, for an account of certain dealings between the plaintiff and the intestate, including some articles of merchandise which had been consigned to Ferrand for sale, on the plaintiff's account.

  4. Carter v. Alston

    3 N.C. 237 (N.C. Super. 1803)

    It should, therefore, be taken, as one of the materials for making up a decree, in case it should turn out that he is liable to account. NOTE. — See Bruce v. Child, 11 N.C. 376, and McLin v. McNamara, 21 N.C. 407, which seem contra.