Opinion
3:23-cv-00214-JES-JLB
07-24-2024
BRANDON SINCLAIR BRUCE, Plaintiff, v. XAVIER BECERRA, acting in his official capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECUSAL
[ECF No. 30]
HONORABLE JAMES E. SIMMONS JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On June 3, 2024, Plaintiff Brandon Sinclair Bruce (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“Defendant”) alleging disability-based harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. ECF Nos. 1, 22. Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to remove the undersigned based on perceived bias. ECF No. 30. After due consideration and for the reasons below, the Court DENIES the motion.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court recites the relevant procedural background of the case as it relates to the pending motion. Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on February 6, 2023, and a Summons was issued the same day. ECF Nos. 1, 2.
On March 16, 2023, Plaintiff moved to consolidate this action with another pending employment discrimination action. ECF No. 6. On that same day, both actions were transferred to the undersigned. ECF No. 8. On April 4, 2023, Defendant moved to dismiss. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff filed an opposition on April 10, 2023. ECF No. 10. Defendant replied on April 26, 2023. ECF No. 13. On May 18, 2023, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate. ECF No. 17.
On February 13, 2024, the Court Granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, with a 30-day leave to amend. ECF No. 20. Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on March 14, 2024. ECF No. 22. On June 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Recusal. ECF No. 30. To which, Defendant opposed on June 10, 2024. ECF No. 31.
II. DISCUSSION
A judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” or “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). “To provide grounds for recusal, prejudice must result from an extrajudicial source.” Duckworth v. Dep't of Navy, 974 F.2d 1140, 1142 (9th Cir. 1992). Any bias must be evaluated under an “objective” standard that focuses on if it would appear to a reasonable person with all the facts that a judge's impartiality may be questioned. United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2008). The burden to show bias rests with the party moving to disqualify the judge. See Denardo v. Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1992). “The motion or affidavit must allege with particularity the facts that would convince a reasonable person that a bias exists of a personal, not judicial, nature.” Guadarrama v. Small, No. 09-cv-2544, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81872, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010) (citing United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980)). Thus, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see also Duckworth, 974 F.2d at 1142 (“A judge's previous adverse ruling alone is not sufficient bias.”).
Plaintiff explains his basis for perceived bias as follows. First, Plaintiff appears to take issue that the Court denied his request to consolidate both pending employment discrimination cases, and Plaintiff alleges that this denial evinces bias because the Court has not yet issued an Order on the parties' competing Motions for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 30, at 4-5. Second, Plaintiff takes issue with the Court presenting concerns about Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in a recent hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Id. In full, the Court articulated the following concerns:
The second issue - general issue that the defense has raised in regards to the Rule 8 violation, the Court's tentative is to grant the motion to dismiss on that issue. And these are the questions the Court has, the concerns the Court has.
In reading and reviewing the first amended complaint, the Court could not determine the exact number of causes of action that are alleged.
The Court cannot determine the specific causes of action that were alleged. The Court had to do extensive reviewing of the exhibits to try to determine the causes of action.
The law is clear that the complaint itself must provide a short and plain statement that provides the defendant notice of the - sufficient notice of the causes of action. I know there were some citations by Mr. Bruce, in his opposition, but those citations occurred before the U.S. - those cases were decided before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Twombly and Iqbal, which changed the standard for - in regards to the sufficient notice that is required for a complaint and factual statements. So I don't believe that the standard under Iqbal or Twombly has been complied with, and I will address Mr. Bruce in regards to addressing those particular issues.
In regards to the prima facie showing for the retaliation claims themself, the Court's tentative is to grant summary judgment on that issue. Excuse me. Not summary judgment. A motion to dismiss. And here's my concern. The exhibits that were attached for each of the reports of investigation and each of the claims alleged, they each allege that Mr. Bruce believes he was being retaliated against for prior protected activity. But the third element, in regards to retaliation, showing that there's a causal link between the - the assertion of his rights as well as the adverse employment action, there's no information as to when the prior protected activity occurred that the Court can establish or make a prima facie showing.
ECF No. 29. Plaintiff's allegations fail to demonstrate grounds for recusal. In his moving papers, Plaintiff relies on nothing more than mere speculation that the pending unresolved Cross Motions for Summary Judgment are post hoc proof that the Court's previous denial of consolidation constitutes bias. Evaluated under an objective standard, a reasonable person would find that Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the pace of civil litigation and the Court's judicial rulings, rather than any alleged bias.
However, judicial actions, without more, fail to show judicial bias. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; Holland, 519 F.3d at 914. Even if the Court were to consider the merits of Plaintiff's complaints about the prior consolidation ruling, the Court finds no error. It is well-established that district courts have broad discretion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a) to consolidate cases. See Invs. Rsch. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of California, 877 F.2d 777, 777 (9th Cir. 1989); Pierce v. Cty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2008). As for the amount of time it takes to resolve matters, Plaintiff's distaste for the perceived pace of civil litigation does not provide a basis for recusal. Nor does Plaintiff's disagreement with the Court's concerns with Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in the referenced hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Neither allegation identifies a bias, let alone an extrajudicial source. Conclusory allegations are legally insufficient to establish a reasonable question as to an undersigned's impartiality. See Diaz v. Fox, No. 2:14-cv-2705 JAM CKD P, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186382, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2017). As such, “a judge has ‘as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.'” Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of California, 428 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005).
Because Plaintiff has not identified a bias, extrajudicial or otherwise, that would lead a reasonable person to question the undersigned's impartiality, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to show a basis for recusal. Therefore, the motion to remove the undersigned is DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to remove the undersigned.
IT IS SO ORDERED.