Opinion
CV-10-00649-TUC-SMM
10-31-2022
Richard Brubaker, et al., Plaintiffs, v. City of Tucson, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Partial Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for a New Trial (Doc. 325). Defendants have filed their response (Doc. 328) and Plaintiff has filed his reply (Doc. 331).
I. Background
The Court held a jury trial in this case from August 15, 2022, to August 18, 2022. On August 17, 2022, at the close of evidence and pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 50(a), Plaintiff orally moved for judgment as a matter of law as to the falsity of two statements made by Officer Pelton in his affidavit. (Doc. 306). The Court denied the oral motion. (Id.)
After deliberation, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in the Defendant's favor- finding against Plaintiff on the claim of judicial deception. (Doc. 318). Judgment was entered in Defendant's favor on August 22, 2022. (Doc. 321). On September 13, 2022- within the 28-day window allowed by Rules 50 and 59-Plaintiff filed a renewed motion for partial judgment as a matter of law and a motion for new trial. (Doc. 325).
II. Renewed Motion for Partial JMOL
Plaintiff-in both his preverdict and renewed motions for JMOL-argues that the Court should find as a matter of law that two of the statements that Officer Pelton made in his oral affidavit were false. This would establish the first of the three elements that Plaintiff must prove to succeed on his § 1983 claim of judicial deception. Those elements are: (1) Officer Pelton's affidavit contained falsehoods or omissions; (2) those falsehoods or omissions were made intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth; and (3) the falsehoods or omissions were material to the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause. See Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2009).
The Court notes that although Plaintiff's motions and briefs make reference to testimony heard at trial, they do not cite to any portion of the trial transcript. Nor did Plaintiff properly request a transcript. The Court construes Plaintiff's motion based on its recollection of the trial testimony and evidence.
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) allows a court to enter judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on an issue if it finds that “a reasonable jury would not have legally sufficient evidentiary basis” to find for the nonmoving party. If a party has made a motion for JMOL at trial that the court denied that party may make a renewed motion for JMOL within 28 days of entry of judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). In ruling on a Rule 50(b) motion, the court may “(1) allow judgment on the verdict ...; (2) order a new trial; or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
In reviewing a renewed motion for JMOL, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Barnard v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013). To grant the motion, a court must determine that “the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict.” Id. (quoting Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005). A court must not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (citation omitted).
Further, a court must always remain conscious that “[t]he jury is the constitutional tribunal provided for trying facts in courts of law.” Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Berry v. United States, 312 U.S. 450, 453 (1941)).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the Court should find as a matter of law that two of the statements in Officer Pelton's oral affidavit were false. The Court will address each statement in turn.
1. The “Area of a Residence” Statement
First, Plaintiff argues Officer Pelton's statement “[h]e was in the area of a residence that we have had-received information from concerned citizens that they were selling narcotic drugs” is false and that no reasonable jury could hold otherwise. At issue is the precise meaning of this statement. Plaintiff argues that the plain meaning of the statement is that the officers had received information from concerned citizens that narcotic drugs were being sold from the residence-that is, the Brubaker's residence. If this was the case, then the statement is indeed false.
Defendants, however, contend that the statement's meaning-especially when one listens to the recording rather than reads the transcript and places the statement in the context of the entire affidavit-is that the officers had received information from concerned citizens that narcotic drugs were being sold in the area of the Brubaker residence, rather than from the residence itself.
To succeed on his renewed motion for partial JMOL, Plaintiff must show that- even when drawing all reasonable inferences in Defendants' favor and giving credence to all evidence-his interpretation is the only reasonable one. To this effect, Plaintiff points to two remarks of the Ninth Circuit. First, that the statement's “obvious import is that the officers had received complaints about drug sales at the Brubaker residence. That statement is inaccurate.” (Doc. 126-1 at 2). The Ninth Circuit, however, was not making a finding of fact that Officer Pelton's statement constituted a “false statement” as an element of a judicial deception claim. Nor could the Ninth Circuit make such a finding of fact. Rather, the Ninth Circuit was writing in the context of reviewing Defendants' motion for summary judgment-a motion that forced the Ninth Circuit to review all evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the nonmoving party. Further, despite declaring the “obvious import” of the statement, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the ambiguity in its phrasing, noting that “the quoted statement is hardly a model of clear draftsmanship....”
Second, Plaintiff points to the Ninth Circuit's reference to “Officer Pelton's false statement in his telephonic affidavit implying that police had received reports of drugs being sold at Brubaker's address.” (Doc. 230-1 at 2). Again, however, this was not a finding of fact. Instead, the Ninth Circuit was hearing an appeal from the District Court's granting of Defendants' motion for JMOL and was required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. At this juncture, however, the Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party-here, to Defendants.
At trial, Defendants offered testimony that they interpreted the statement as referring to an area rather than to a specific residence. Defendants introduced into evidence a recording of the phone call in which Officer Pelton gave the affidavit. Defs.' Ex. 62. In doing so, they argued the meaning could better be understood by listening to the words as they were spoken rather than by reading a transcript. (Doc. 328 at 2). Defendants also argued that the statement must be understood in the context of the entire affidavit. (Id. at 2-3). The ambiguous phrasing, they argue, is clarified when-later in the phone call- Pelton informs the magistrate judge that the officers “could not positively identify the address” and used Deal to identify the house, while driving by. (Id. at 3); Defs.' Ex. 62. Defendants argue that this shows that they did not know of any particular address, meaning that they could not have received information from concerned citizens about drug sales at a particular house-if they had received such information, they would already know what the address was and wouldn't need Deal to identify it for them. (Id.)
Giving credence to this evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in Defendants' favor, the jury could reasonably have found that the statement in question referred to the area of the Brubaker residence, rather than the residence itself. As such, the Court denies Plaintiff's renewed motion for partial JMOL as it relates to the falsity of this statement.
2. The “Back Door” Statement
Plaintiff also claims that he should have been granted partial JMOL as to the falsity of Officer Pelton's statement that “Mr. Deal went to the back door where he was previously told to go, and make contact with Felix, a subject that had purchased crack cocaine from in the past.” (Doc. 325 at 2-3). At issue is whether Deal had told Woolridge that he had visited the “back door” or whether he had instead told Woolridge that he visited the backyard or back gate of the property.
Defendants argue that Pelton and Woolridge did not recall what specific words Deal used. (Doc. 328 at 3). Defendants also disclaim the significance of the distinction, but this argument pertains to materiality rather than falsity. (Id.)
When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendants and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, there was more than one reasonable conclusion as to the interpretation of the statement. Plaintiff's renewed Motion for partial JMOL is thus denied.
Further, as explained below, there is no basis for a new trial as to Defendants' intent to deceive the magistrate judge or whether the allegedly false statements were material. As a result, even assuming the falsity of the identified statements, Plaintiff has not established the other two elements and is not entitled to relief from judgment.
III. Motion for New Trial
Plaintiff makes several arguments in support of his motion for a new trial. First, Plaintiff argues that this Court erred in allowing the officers to be questioned about whether they intended to deceive the magistrate judge. (Doc. 325 at 4). Second, Plaintiff argues that information evidence that was not contained in the four corners of the affidavit should not have been admitted. (Id. at 4-5). Third, Plaintiff argues that allowing evidence regarding the potential effect of this litigation on Defendants' careers was prejudicial because it was not relevant and allowed the jury to make a decision based on sympathy rather than the facts before the jury. (Id. at 5-6.) Fourth, Plaintiff argues that this Court erred by submitting the issue of materiality to the jury and by failing to provide them with the relevant law. (Id. at 6). Fifth, Plaintiff argues that the jury instructions should have informed the jury that an officer's “good faith” is not a defense to judicial deception. (Id.) Sixth, Plaintiff argues that the jury instructions should have included Plaintiff's proposed definition of “reckless disregard for the truth.” (Id. at 7). Finally, Plaintiff argues that this Court erred by failing to give a jury instruction declaring as false the two statements at issue in Plaintiff's motions for partial JMOL. (Id.) Defendants argue against all of Plaintiff's claims of error and assert that several of Plaintiff's arguments fail to explain what specific evidence they consider prejudicial. (Doc. 328).
A. Legal Standard
Rule 59(a) allows a trial court to grant a new jury trial “for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1). Historically recognized grounds include, but are not limited to, claims “that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251, (1940)). “The trial court may grant a new trial only if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Id. (quoting Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n. 15 (9th Cir. 2000)).
A new trial is only warranted on the basis of an incorrect evidentiary ruling if the ruling substantially prejudiced a party. E.g., United States v. 99.66 Acres of Land, 970 F.2d 651, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). A trial judge retains “wide latitude in the admission or exclusion of evidence where the question is one of materiality or relevancy.” Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 773 (9th Cir.1981).
To deny a motion for new trial, there must be some “reasonable basis” for the jury's verdict. Molski, 481 F.3d at 729.
B. Analysis
1. Officers' Intent to Deceive
Plaintiff argues that this Court erred in denying his Motion in Limine No. 2 (Doc. 278), which sought to preclude evidence as to whether the officers intended to deceive the magistrate judge. (Doc. 325 at 4). Plaintiff contends that specific intent to deceive is not an element of a judicial deception claim and therefore such testimony was irrelevant, prejudicial, and/or misleading. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that this testimony either allowed the jury to believe that specific intent to mislead was an element or a defense or confused the jury as to why this testimony was being solicited if it was not relevant. (Id.)
Defendants do not dispute that the specific intent to deceive is not an element of Plaintiff's judicial deception claim. (Doc. 328 at 5). Instead, they argue that the testimony was relevant because if the officers had intended to deceive the judge, this would have fulfilled the intent element. (Id.) Essentially, Defendants argue, specific intent to deceive is sufficient rather than necessary to establish the element of intent. (Id.) Further, Defendants claim that Plaintiff has not identified any specific testimony or evidence as unduly prejudicial. (Id. at 6).
In reply, Plaintiff argues that referencing “portions [of the evidence] related to whether the defendants intended to deceive the magistrate” is sufficient identification of evidence. (Doc. 331 at 7).
The Court did not err in denying Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2. Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Rule 401 provides that relevant evidence is that which tends to make a fact “more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Furthermore, the court may exclude relevant evidence where “its probative value is substantially outweighed” by risk of prejudice, confusion, or wasting time. Fed.R.Evid. 403.
As the Court explained in its order denying Plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2, the officers' credibility and their actions in securing the affidavit are relevant-and indeed, critical-to the case. The Court did not err in finding that this relevance was not substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice or confusion to the jury. Plaintiff was able to cross-examine officers about any such testimony and contextualize it in his closing arguments. Further, the jury was instructed as to the elements of a judicial deception claim, alleviating any potential confusion. (Doc. 314). Finally, there was more than sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Defendants did not have the requisite intent to deceive the magistrate judge. Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the Court should have granted his Motion in Limine No. 2.
2. Non-Affidavit Information Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in denying his Motion in Limine No. 4 (Doc. 253), which sought to preclude evidence of probable cause that was not submitted to the magistrate judge. (Doc. 325 at 4). Plaintiff argues that the Court should not have allowed in information evidence that was not contained within the four corners of the affidavit. (Id. at 4-5).
Defendants do not dispute that probable cause must be determined based on information in the affidavit. (Doc. 328 at 6). Instead, Defendants point out that determining probable cause is not the central issue in the case and that Plaintiff himself has raised omissions from the affidavit as an argument and as evidence. (Id.) To determine the elements of falsity and/or omissions, both of which are at issue in this case, a jury needs to compare the investigative information that the officers had to the information that went into the affidavit.
In reply, Plaintiff claims that the jury did not need to compare information from the officers' investigation to the information in the affidavit, dismissing such comparison as irrelevant corroboration. (Doc. 331 at 8).
The Court did not err in admitting evidence regarding information the officers learned in their investigation but that was not included in the affidavit. In order to determine whether information included in the affidavit was false, the jury needed to compare that information to what the officers had learned during their investigation. To determine whether the officers omitted relevant information from their search warrant, the jury needed to determine what information the officers had that was omitted. The jury did not decide whether probable cause supported the request for a search warrant.
In short, Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the Court should have granted his Motion in Limine No. 4.
3. Consequences of Litigation on Defendants' Careers
Plaintiff next argues that the Court erred in denying his Motion in Limine No. 8 (Doc. 257), which sought to preclude Defendants from testifying as to the potential consequences of a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on their careers. (Doc. 325 at 5). Plaintiff argues that such testimony is irrelevant and allowed the jury to make a determination based on sympathy. (Id. at 5-6).
Defendants claim that they did not testify as to the effect any decision in the case might have on their careers and point out that Plaintiff's motion did not highlight any specific testimony to this effect. (Doc. 328 at 7). Even if they did testify as such, they argue, such testimony would have been appropriate. (Id.)
In reply, Plaintiff points to Pelton's testimony when recalled to the stand by Defendants for their case in chief. (Doc. 331 at 9). Plaintiff does not highlight any specific testimony from this point in the trial.
Defendants did not testify about the effect of this litigation on Defendants' careers until Plaintiff opened the door. Any such testimony was extremely brief. There is no basis to conclude any stray remark affected the jury's verdict or constituted substantial prejudice.
Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the Court should have granted his Motion in Limine No. 8.
4. Materiality
Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in submitting the issue of materiality to the jury, resulting in prejudicial error. (Doc. 325 at 6). Plaintiff cites a number of Ninth Circuit cases for the proposition that materiality is a matter of law to be decided by the judge. (Id.) The Court's error here is further compounded, Plaintiff argues, by its failure to give Plaintiff's requested jury instructions 6, 7, 8, 10, and 12. (Id.) Without them, Plaintiff contends, the jury was not informed of the law governing determinations of materiality. (Id.)
Defendants respond that Plaintiff has not demonstrated how this resulted in prejudice or an unfair trial. (Doc. 328 at 7).
In reply, Plaintiff claims that the resulting prejudice is that non-law-trained jurors made the finding, contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent. (Doc. 331 at 10). Plaintiff also reiterated his argument that the error was compounded by the Court's refusal to instruct the jury as to the law surrounding materiality. (Id.)
Nevertheless, the Court finds that this error did not result in a verdict contrary to the clear weight of evidence and did not lead to a miscarriage of justice. The jury instructions explained what Plaintiff would have to demonstrate to succeed on the element of materiality and provided an adequate definition of probable cause. (Doc. 314). Moreover, the Court does not view the allegedly false statements as material such that the warrant would not have been issued without them. As such, the submission of the issue of materiality to the jury does not warrant a new trial.
5. Jury Instructions
Plaintiff's final three arguments center around the Court's refusal to adopt his Proposed Jury Instruction No. 1. (Doc. 297). A trial court has broad discretion in fashioning jury instructions. Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 1987). Such instructions “must fairly and adequately cover the issues presented, must correctly state the law, and must not be misleading.” White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002). A party is not entitled to any particular form of jury instruction, so long as the instructions fairly and adequately cover the relevant law. See U.S. v. Solomon, 825 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Brewer v. City of Napa, 210 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that jury instruction provided plaintiff “with ample room to argue his theory of the case to the jury”).
(a) “Good Faith Defense”
First, Plaintiff argues that the Court erred by refusing to give this Proposed Jury Instruction, because it would have informed the jury that an officer's “good faith” is not a defense to judicial deception. (Doc. 325 at 6).
In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's proposed instructions would have deviated from the Ninth Circuit's model instructions without valid basis and would have amounted to argument and improper commentary on the evidence. (Doc. 328 at 7). Defendants also argue that Plaintiff failed to explain in what way the Court's instructions were insufficient or resulted in an unfair trial. (Id. at 8).
In reply, Plaintiff asserts that the proposed instructions were valid based on the authority submitted. (Doc. 331 at 11).
The Court did not err in refusing to give Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 1, as it pertained to a “good faith” defense. The Court finds that its final jury instructions fairly, adequately, and correctly covered the elements of a judicial deception claim and were not misleading. The instructions explained that “[i]n the context of this [judicial deception] claim, deliberately does not require that Defendants intended to violate the Plaintiff's constitutional rights.” (Doc. 314). Further, Plaintiff had “ample room to argue his theory of the case to the jury.” As such, Plaintiff is not entitled to an instruction as to the inapplicability of a particular defense, even if the proposed instruction correctly states the relevant law.
Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the Court should have included a statement in the final jury instructions that an officer's “good faith” is not a defense to judicial deception.
(b) “Reckless Disregard for the Truth” Definition
Plaintiff next argues that the Court erred in refusing to give Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instruction No. 1, which “contain[ed] a different definition of ‘reckless disregard for the truth.'” (Doc. 325 at 7).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to explain how the Court's instructions were insufficient or resulted in an unfair trial. (Doc. 328 at 8).
The Court did not err by providing the definition of ‘reckless disregard for the truth' as found in the final jury instructions. First, a comparison of Plaintiff's proposed definition (Doc. 297 at 4) with the definition provided by the final jury instructions (Doc. 314 at 12) reveals no difference whatsoever. Even if Plaintiff's proposed jury instructions did provide a different definition of the phrase, Plaintiff has not explained how the final jury instruction's definition-which was taken from the Ninth Circuit's Model Jury Instructions-was inadequate or resulted in an unfair trial.
Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the Court should have included a different definition of “reckless disregard for the truth” in its final jury instructions.
(c) Falsity
Finally, Plaintiff raises the same arguments, as to the falsity of two statements in the affidavit, that formed the basis of his Renewed Motion for Partial JMOL. (Doc. 325 at 67). Plaintiff reframes these arguments here as the Court's failure to provide the jury with instructions that the two statements were false. (Id.) For the same reasons that the Court denied the Renewed Motion for Partial JMOL, the Court also rejects these arguments as a basis for a new trial.
Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the Court should have amended its final jury instructions to instruct the jury that two statements in the affidavit were false.
IV. Conclusion
Overall, Plaintiff has not met his burden to show how the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or that the trial was unfair to him. The Court finds that the jury had a “reasonable basis” for its verdict. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Partial Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. 325) and Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial (Doc. 325) are denied.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Partial Judgment as a Matter of Law. (Doc. 325).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED.