In that regard, it is well established that the duly-executed warrant is prima facie evidence that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime. See generally Sellers v. Griffin, supra, 226 Ga. at 566; Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659 (1) ( 30 S.E.2d 48) (1944). It was thus

"Where a person is convicted of felony committed by him in one State, and he goes into another State, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, before serving the full term for which he was sentenced, he thereby becomes a fugitive from justice, within the meaning of section 2 of article 4 of the constitution of the United States, and the act of Congress [of] February 12, 1793 (U.S. Comp. St., section 10126)." Brown v. Lowry, 185 Ga. 539 ( 195 S.E. 759) (1938); Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659 ( 30 S.E.2d 48) (1944); Frazier v. Grimes, 221 Ga. 375 ( 145 S.E.2d 39) (1965). A probationer is one serving a sentence outside, rather than inside, prison.

We agree with the trial court that the Governor of Alabama's requisition is supported by documents that are in compliance with Section 44-404 of the Act (Code Ann. § 44-404; Ga. L. 1951, pp. 726, 727). See Frazier v. Grimes, 221 Ga. 375 ( 145 S.E.2d 39) (1965); Winslow v. Grimes, 214 Ga. 262 ( 104 S.E.2d 76) (1958); Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659 ( 30 S.E.2d 48) (1944). Interstate extradition is intended to be a summary proceeding.

3. "Where, in the trial of a habeas corpus case, it appears that the respondent is holding the petitioner in custody under an executive warrant based on an extradition proceeding, and the warrant is regular on its face, the burden is cast upon the petitioner to show some valid and sufficient reason why the warrant should not be executed, since there is a presumption that the Governor complied with the Constitution and law, and this presumption continues until the contrary appears. Blackwell v. Jennings, 128 Ga. 264 ( 57 S.E. 484); Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659 ( 30 S.E.2d 48); Matthews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699 (4) ( 75 S.E.2d 427)." Baldwin v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 390 ( 116 S.E.2d 207).

A paroled convict whose parole has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited from one State to another, on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired and who therefore is "charged with crime" within the meaning of Art. IV, Sec. II of the Constitution of the United States and the Act passed pursuant thereto relating to interstate extradition. Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659, 661 (2) ( 30 S.E.2d 48). 3. The contention is here made that an affidavit by W. P. Ball which is one of the exhibits to the Governor's demand for extradition of Frazier was sworn to before a notary public and not a "magistrate" and for that reason affords no support for the Governor's requisition. 18 USCA § 662 provides that "Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the Governor or Chief Magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause no

The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avert the execution of the warrant of arrest are insufficient to overcome the presumption that the Governor has complied with the Constitution and laws. See Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659 ( 30 S.E.2d 48); Blackwell v. Jennings, 128 Ga. 264 ( 57 S.E. 484); Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699 ( 75 S.E.2d 427). It was not error to remand the petitioner to the custody of the respondent.

"A paroled convict who violates the terms of his parole may be extradited from one State to another, on the ground that he is a convict whose term has not expired, and who therefore is `charged with crime' under the United States Constitution relating to interstate extradition." Deering v. Mount, 194 Ga. 833, 840 ( 22 S.E.2d 828); Bartlett v. Lowry, 181 Ga. 526 ( 182 S.E. 850); Johnson v. Lowry, 183 Ga. 207 ( 188 S.E. 23); King v. Mount, 196 Ga. 461 ( 26 S.E.2d 419); Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659 ( 30 S.E.2d 48); Taylor v. Foster, 205 Ga. 36 ( 52 S.E.2d 314); Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699 ( 75 S.E.2d 427). It is further contended by the petitioner that he is now under Federal sentence which must be terminated before the warrant of extradition can be executed.

1. Where a person is convicted of a crime in another State and given a probationary sentence, with permission to return to his home in this State under the supervision of a probation officer of this State, and before the expiration of his probationary sentence, his probation is revoked by the court in which he was convicted, he is a fugitive from justice subject to extradition. Compare Brown v. Lowry, 185 Ga. 539 ( 195 S.E. 759); Deering v. Mount, 194 Ga. 833 ( 22 S.E.2d 828); Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659 ( 30 S.E.2d 48); Taylor v. Foster, 205 Ga. 36 ( 52 S.E.2d 314); Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699 (2) ( 75 S.E.2d 427). 2.

Where, in the trial of a habeas corpus case, it appears that the respondent is holding the petitioner in custody under an executive warrant based on an extradition proceeding, and the warrant is regular on its face, the burden is cast upon the petitioner to show some valid and sufficient reason why the warrant should not be executed, since there is a presumption that the Governor complied with the Constitution and law, and this presumption continues until the contrary appears. Blackwell v. Jennings, 128 Ga. 264 ( 57 S.E. 484); Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659 ( 30 S.E.2d 48); Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699(4) ( 75 S.E.2d 427). No evidence other than the warrant was introduced; hence the court did not err in remanding the custody of the petitioner to the respondent. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

The presumption is that the Governor has complied with the constitution and the law, and this presumption continues until the contrary appears." Blackwell v. Jennings, 128 Ga. 264(2) (57 S.E. 484); Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659, 660 ( 30 S.E.2d 48). The executive warrant is only prima facie sufficient to hold the accused, and he is entitled to show, in a habeas corpus proceeding, some valid and sufficient reason why the warrant should not be executed. Dawson v. Smith, 150 Ga. 350 ( 103 S.E. 846).