However, Justice Viviano (joined by Justice Zahra), dissented and would have remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether various Supreme Court AOs were "invalid because they were an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power." Browning v Buko, ___ Mich. ___, ___; 979 N.W.2d 196, 197, 201 (2022) (Viviano, J., dissenting) (concluding that the defendants "raise a solid argument that we lacked any legal basis for tolling the statutes and that doing so usurped the Legislature's power").

The majority is correct that the administrative orders purported to exclude days that fell during the state of emergency issued by the Governor related to COVID-19 from being included in the computation of time under MCR 1.108(1). But the practical effect of the orders "was to toll statutory limitations periods." Browning v Buko, 510 Mich. 917, 917 (2022) (Viviano, J., dissenting).

The doctrine of "[e]quitable tolling, unlike judicial tolling, has a legal basis arising out of our common law, and it may be invoked [to avoid a limitation period] when traditional equitable reasons compel such a result." McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 480 Mich. 191, 204; 747 N.W.2d 811 (2008). However, as Justice VIVIANO recently recognized in his dissenting opinion in Browning v Buko, __ Mich. __; 979 N.W.2d 196, 199 (2022), the doctrine of equitable tolling has been "largely discredited" and courts are reluctant to apply the doctrine unless the situation is one in which the party asserting the doctrine was prevented "in some extraordinary way from exercising his or her rights" (citation and quotation marks omitted). We are not persuaded that the trial court erred by refusing to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling on the basis of plaintiff's first appeal.