Browning, Petitioner

3 Citing cases

  1. Trahern v. Woolwine

    109 W. Va. 623 (W. Va. 1930)   Cited 1 times

    In some cases, the word 'descend' in wills and deeds has been allowed a strongly persuasive influence, in the interpretation of ambiguous or doubtful provisions found in other parts of the instruments or to resolve a doubt as to the intent expressed by an entire instrument. Chipps v. Hall, 23 W. Va. 504; Browning's Petition, 16 R.I. 441; Eaton v. Tillinghast, 4 R.I. 276; Taney v. Fahnley, 126 Ind. 88." As may be observed from a study of the opinion, the court held that the presumptive or technical meaning of the word "descend" was controlled by the language of the deed giving to the first taker a life estate in express terms, thus overruling the dictum of JUDGE GREEN in the Chipps-Hall case.

  2. Green v. Edwards

    31 R.I. 1 (R.I. 1910)   Cited 8 times
    In Green v. Edwards, 31 R.I. 1, at page 33, Mr. Justice Sweetland in a concurring opinion pointed out that to support the plea of res judicata a judgment, decree, or final order should have been actually rendered and entered in the prior action or suit. Therefore we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that any of the issues in the instant case was finally determined in Equity No. 13349, inasmuch as no final decree was ever entered in that case and it was discontinued by agreement of counsel and with the consent of the court.

    estates are given to the three children ( Sammis v. Sammis, 14 R.I. 123; Pierce v. Pierce, ib. 514; Taylor v. Lindsay, ib. 518), and equitable remainders in fee to their lineal descendants ( Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, 7 R.I. 383; Morris v. Potter, 10 R.I. 58; Read v. Power, 12 R.I. 16; Nightingale v. Nightingale, 13 R.I. 113; Angell Petr. ib. 630; Sprague v. Sprague, ib. 701; Taylor v. Lindsay, supra) hence under the rule in Shelly's case, which, until the enactment of Gen. Laws, cap. 201, § 6, was enforced as an imperative rule of law in Rhode Island, applicable to both legal and equitable estates ( Eaton v. Tillinghast, 4 R.I. 276; Manchester v. Durfee, 55 R.I. 549; Bullock v. Waterman St. Bap. Sy., ib. 273; Cooper v. Cooper, 6 R.I. 261; Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, supra; Jillson v. Wilcox, 7 R.I. 515, Brownell v. Brownell, 10 R.I. 509; Nightingale v. Nightingale, supra; Angell, Petr. supra; Sprague v. Sprague, supra; Pierce v. Pierce, supra; Taylor v. Lindsay, supra; Browning, Petr. 16 R.I. 441; Andrews v. Lowthrop, 17 R.I. 60; Cowing v. Dodge, 19 R.I. 605; Manchester, Petr., 22 R.I. 636; McNeal v. Sherwood, 24 R.I. 314), the estates given to the testator's children were equitable estates tail."

  3. Paine v. Sackett

    27 R.I. 300 (R.I. 1905)   Cited 2 times

    Equitable life estates are given to the three children ( Sammis v. Sammis, 14 R.I. 123; Pierce v. Pierce, ib. 514; Taylor v. Lindsay, ib. 518), and equitable remainders in fee to their lineal descendants ( Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, 7 R.I. 383; Morris v. Potter, 10 R.I. 58; Read v. Power, 12 R.I. 16; Nightingale v. Nightingale, 13 R.I. 113; Angell, Petr. ib. 630; Sprague v. Sprague, ib. 701; Taylor v. Lindsay, supra); hence under the rule in Shelly's case, which, until the enactment of Gen. Laws cap. 201, § 6, was enforced as an imperative rule of law in Rhode Island, applicable to both legal and equitable estates ( Eaton v. Tillinghast, 4 R.I. 276; Manchester v. Durfee, 5 R.I. 549; Bullock v. Waterman St. Bap. Sy., ib. 273; Cooper v. Cooper, 6 R.I. 261; Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, supra; Jillson v. Wilcox, 7 R.I. 515; Brownell v. Brownell, 10 R.I. 509; Nightingale v. Nightingale, supra; Angell, Petr. supra; Sprague v. Sprague, supra; Pierce v. Pierce, supra; Taylor v. Lindsay, supra; Browning v. Browning, 16 R.I. 441; Andrews v. Lowthrop, 17 R.I. 60; Cowing v. Dodge, 19 R.I. 605; Manchester, Petr., 22 R.I. 636; McNeal v. Sherwood, 24 R.I. 315), the estates given to the testator's children were equitable estates tail. So far, upon the first question, we are constrained to assent to the argument of the counsel for Mrs. Paine; but upon the effect of the conveyance of the complainant's beneficial interest to her, the argument of the opposing counsel is equally conclusive.