In some cases, the word 'descend' in wills and deeds has been allowed a strongly persuasive influence, in the interpretation of ambiguous or doubtful provisions found in other parts of the instruments or to resolve a doubt as to the intent expressed by an entire instrument. Chipps v. Hall, 23 W. Va. 504; Browning's Petition, 16 R.I. 441; Eaton v. Tillinghast, 4 R.I. 276; Taney v. Fahnley, 126 Ind. 88." As may be observed from a study of the opinion, the court held that the presumptive or technical meaning of the word "descend" was controlled by the language of the deed giving to the first taker a life estate in express terms, thus overruling the dictum of JUDGE GREEN in the Chipps-Hall case.
estates are given to the three children ( Sammis v. Sammis, 14 R.I. 123; Pierce v. Pierce, ib. 514; Taylor v. Lindsay, ib. 518), and equitable remainders in fee to their lineal descendants ( Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, 7 R.I. 383; Morris v. Potter, 10 R.I. 58; Read v. Power, 12 R.I. 16; Nightingale v. Nightingale, 13 R.I. 113; Angell Petr. ib. 630; Sprague v. Sprague, ib. 701; Taylor v. Lindsay, supra) hence under the rule in Shelly's case, which, until the enactment of Gen. Laws, cap. 201, § 6, was enforced as an imperative rule of law in Rhode Island, applicable to both legal and equitable estates ( Eaton v. Tillinghast, 4 R.I. 276; Manchester v. Durfee, 55 R.I. 549; Bullock v. Waterman St. Bap. Sy., ib. 273; Cooper v. Cooper, 6 R.I. 261; Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, supra; Jillson v. Wilcox, 7 R.I. 515, Brownell v. Brownell, 10 R.I. 509; Nightingale v. Nightingale, supra; Angell, Petr. supra; Sprague v. Sprague, supra; Pierce v. Pierce, supra; Taylor v. Lindsay, supra; Browning, Petr. 16 R.I. 441; Andrews v. Lowthrop, 17 R.I. 60; Cowing v. Dodge, 19 R.I. 605; Manchester, Petr., 22 R.I. 636; McNeal v. Sherwood, 24 R.I. 314), the estates given to the testator's children were equitable estates tail."
Equitable life estates are given to the three children ( Sammis v. Sammis, 14 R.I. 123; Pierce v. Pierce, ib. 514; Taylor v. Lindsay, ib. 518), and equitable remainders in fee to their lineal descendants ( Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, 7 R.I. 383; Morris v. Potter, 10 R.I. 58; Read v. Power, 12 R.I. 16; Nightingale v. Nightingale, 13 R.I. 113; Angell, Petr. ib. 630; Sprague v. Sprague, ib. 701; Taylor v. Lindsay, supra); hence under the rule in Shelly's case, which, until the enactment of Gen. Laws cap. 201, § 6, was enforced as an imperative rule of law in Rhode Island, applicable to both legal and equitable estates ( Eaton v. Tillinghast, 4 R.I. 276; Manchester v. Durfee, 5 R.I. 549; Bullock v. Waterman St. Bap. Sy., ib. 273; Cooper v. Cooper, 6 R.I. 261; Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, supra; Jillson v. Wilcox, 7 R.I. 515; Brownell v. Brownell, 10 R.I. 509; Nightingale v. Nightingale, supra; Angell, Petr. supra; Sprague v. Sprague, supra; Pierce v. Pierce, supra; Taylor v. Lindsay, supra; Browning v. Browning, 16 R.I. 441; Andrews v. Lowthrop, 17 R.I. 60; Cowing v. Dodge, 19 R.I. 605; Manchester, Petr., 22 R.I. 636; McNeal v. Sherwood, 24 R.I. 315), the estates given to the testator's children were equitable estates tail. So far, upon the first question, we are constrained to assent to the argument of the counsel for Mrs. Paine; but upon the effect of the conveyance of the complainant's beneficial interest to her, the argument of the opposing counsel is equally conclusive.