Summary
holding that the allegation that the County was "responsible for approving the Sheriff's budget" was insufficient to establish that the former constituted an employer
Summary of this case from Hall v. Franklin Cnty.Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:00-CV-318-WS
December 19, 2000
MARIE A MATTOX, ESQ., MATTOX HOOD PA, TALLAHASSEE, FL, for Plaintiff.
LEONARD J DIETZEN, ESQ., POWERS QUASCHNICK TISCHLER ETC., TALLAHASSEE, FL for defendant.
ALFRED O'NEAL SHULER, ESQ., SHULER SHULER, APALACHICOLA, FL, JOHN FORTH DICKINSON, ESQ., CONSTANGY BROOKS SMITH LLC, JACKSONVILLE, FL., for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING FRANKLIN COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff, Sharon A. Brownell ("Plaintiff"), alleges that she has been employed in the Franklin County, Florida, Sheriff's dispatch section since 1995. She sues Bruce Varnes, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Franklin County, Florida, and Franklin County, Florida, for employment discrimination. She seeks relief under (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, Title 42, United States Code, Sections 2000e-2000e-17; and (2) the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes ("Chapter 760").
Before the court at this time is Franklin County's motion to dismiss (doc. 18). Franklin County contends that it is entitled to dismissal because Plaintiff has not alleged that Franklin County is an employer for purposes of Title VII or Chapter 760. Plaintiff has responded (doc. 25) in Opposition to the motion.
I. THE ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant, Franklin County, Florida, at all times pertinent hereto, has approved the budget of Defendant, Bruce Varnes, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Franklin County, Florida, and has otherwise exerted or exercised control over the Sheriff of Franklin County through its budget or otherwise." Compl. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff does not allege that Franklin County is now or ever was her employer.
II. FLORIDA LAW
In the State of Florida, the sheriff of any county is an elected constitutional officer whose duties are prescribed by the Florida Legislature. Fla. Const. art. VIII, § 1(d); Fla. Stat. § 30.15. In a section of the Florida Statutes entitled "Independence of constitutional officials," the Legislature pronounced that the "independence of the sheriffs shall be preserved concerning the . . . selection of personnel, and the hiring, firing, and setting of salaries of such personnel." Fla. Stat. § 30.53.
Sheriffs' operations are funded in Florida by the respective boards of county commissioners. For each fiscal year, Florida sheriffs are required to submit to their board of county commissioners a budget of proposed expenditures for of six statutory items: (1) salary of the sheriff; (2) salaries of deputies and assistants; (3) expenses, other than salaries; (4) equipment; (5) investigations; and (6) reserve for contingencies. Fla. Stat. § 30.49(2). Although the county commissioners are responsible for allocating monies to each of the six budget items, they may not determine utilization of the monies once allocated to the sheriff. In Weitzenfeld v. Dierks, 312 So.2d 194, 196 (Fla. 1975), the Florida Supreme Court held:
We find the internal operation of the sheriff's office and the allocation of appropriated monies within the six items of the budget is a function which belongs uniquely to the sheriff as the chief law enforcement officer of the county. To hold otherwise would do irreparable harm to the integrity of a constitutionally created office as well as violate the precept established by F.S. Section 30.53 [Independence of constitutional officials] and, in practical effect, gain nothing for the county.
III. FEDERAL LAW
Under Title VII, the term "employer" means "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). In Lves v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) ( en banc), the Eleventh Circuit considered what test to apply in determining whether separate state or local governmental entities should be counted as a single "employer" under Title VII's statutory definition. The court first noted that strong comity and federalism concerns require that great deference be given to a state's determination of whether two or more governmental entities are separate and distinct. The court then determined — after reviewing a number of tests used by various courts in assessing whether a defendant is an "employer" for Title VII purposes — that any such test should focus on who or which entity is in control of the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship. Useful "indicia of control" listed by the Eleventh Circuit included: "`the authority to hire, transfer, promote, discipline or discharge; the authority to establish work schedules or direct work assignments; [and] the obligation to pay or the duty to train the charging party.'" Lyes, 166 F.3d at 1345 (quoting Oaks v. City of Fairhope, Alabama, 515 F. Supp. 1004, 1035 (S.D. Ala. 1981)). The court rejected a test having "common ownership or financial control" as a factor because, the Eleventh Circuit wrote: "Governmental subdivisions such as counties or towns, or smaller subdivisions such as local agencies, may share sources of ultimate political control or funding, yet be wholly distinct with respect to their day-to-day operations or their control over relationships with employees." Lyes, 166 F.3d at 1343.IV.
In this case, Plaintiff does not allege that Franklin County was or is her employer. She does not allege that Franklin County had or has any control over her employment relationship with the Sheriff of Franklin County. Indeed, the Florida Legislature has made clear that sheriffs are constitutional officials whose "independence . . . shall be preserved concerning . . . selection of personnel, and the hiring, firing, and setting of salaries of such personnel." Fla. Stat. § 30.53. Plaintiff has alleged only that Franklin County is responsible for approving the Sheriff's budget. Such allegation is insufficient to establish that Franklin County meets the statutory definition of "employer."
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
Franklin County's motion to dismiss (doc. 18) and motion to drop party (doc. 8) are GRANTED, and Franklin County is hereby DISMISSED from this action.