losure. It may be that, under certain circumstances, a confidential communication with an authorized governmental agency does not constitute public disclosure, such that an employee's right to a name-clearing hearing is not invoked ( see Gentile v Wallen, 562 F2d 193, 197-198). Here, however, the applicable regulations do not address the issue of the confidentiality of a complaint submitted to SED and the subsequent investigation thereof by SED ( see 8 NYCRR part 83). Because a hearing officer or panel from SED may determine that, based on allegations in the complaint, there exists a substantial question concerning petitioner's moral character that ultimately could result in the revocation of petitioner's teaching certificate ( see 8 NYCRR 83.6) and because, as noted, the applicable regulations do not address the issue of confidentiality, we conclude herein that there is a sufficient potential for public disclosure to establish petitioner's entitlement to a name-clearing hearing ( see Matter of Browne v City of New York, 45 AD3d 590; cf. Matter of Lentlie v Egan, 61 NY2d 874, 876). Contrary to the contention of respondents, petitioner in fact "challenge[d] the substantial truth of the [allegations] in question" ( Codd v Velger, 429 US 624, 627-628).

See,Mullen v. County of Suffolk, 43 A.D.3d 934 (2nd Dept. 2007); Rivera v. Department of Educ., City of New York, 25 A.D.3d 559 (2nd Dept. 2006); Matter of Cardo v. Murphy, supra. See, also, Duncan v. Kelly, 9 N.Y.3d 1024 (2008)[in terminating petitioner, a probationary employee, the Commissioner relied upon his posthiring conduct of giving false and misleading statements to members of the Internal Affairs Bureau]; Browne v. City of New York, 45 A.D.3d 590 (2nd Dept. 2007)["in light of the factual dispute regarding whether there was public dissemination of the stigmatizing statement, the petitioner is entitled to a "name-clearing hearing" to afford her the opportunity to prove that the stigmatizing material purportedly in her personnel file is false"]. In any event, "the appropriate remedy [following a name clearing hearing] is only expungement, not reinstatement (see, Board of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, n. 12, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548)."Swinton v. Safir, 93 N.Y.2d 758 (1999).

Petitioner failed to demonstrate either. ( See Johnson v Katz, 68 NY2d 649, 650; Talamo v Murphy, 38 NY2d 637, 639; Browne v City of New York, 45 AD3d 590 [2nd Dept 2007];Johnson v City of New York, 34 AD3d 484, 485 [2nd Dept 2006]; Robinson v Health and Hospitals Corp., 29 AD3d 807, 809 [2nd Dept 2006]; Walsh v NewYork State Thruway Authority, 24 AD3d 755 [2nd Dept 2005]). The termination of a tenured employee placed on disciplinary probation is subject to the same judicial standard of review as the termination of a probationary employee.