Opinion
C. A. 6:19-cv-02856-JMC-KFM
01-31-2020
Doron H. Brown, Plaintiff, v. Chuck Wright, Allen Freeman, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on October 9, 2019 (doc. 1). By orders filed October 24, 2019, and December 3, 2019, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (docs. 10; 16). The plaintiff complied with the Court's Orders, bringing his case into proper form. By order filed January 14, 2020, the plaintiff was informed that his complaint was subject to summary dismissal because it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that he could attempt to cure the defects identified in his complaint by filing an amended complaint within 14 days (doc. 20). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his case be dismissed (id. at 9). On January 23, 2020, the plaintiff's amended complaint was entered on the docket (doc. 22). However, because the amended complaint likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the case.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Spartanburg County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”), brings this action alleging that the defendants are violating his constitutional rights (doc. 22). The plaintiff contends that he is being permanently housed with three other inmates and that he has to sleep on a mattress on the floor (id. at 6). He contends that he sleeps partially under the sink and hits his head sometimes (id. at 6-7). In his amended complaint, for the first time, the plaintiff also alleges that he has been exposed to mold because the sink leaks (id.).
The plaintiff's alleged injuries include humiliation, embarrassment, emotional stress, mental anguish, fear, shock, sore back, sore neck, and a sore leg (id. at 7). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This case is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Conditions of Confinement Claims
To the extent the plaintiff attempts to bring conditions of confinement claims against the defendants, even as amended, his allegations are insufficient to state a claim and are subject to summary dismissal. At all relevant times herein, the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee; thus, his claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment (which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement claims for individuals convicted of crimes). See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1983). In any event, “[the] due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). To state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury could have resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing and partially quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
Liberally construed, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional rights because his sink leaks and does not have a seal (and has caused mold), and by housing him with three other inmates in a cell (doc. 22 at 6-7). As an initial matter, the plaintiff's general allegations regarding the sink leaking in his cell do not rise to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. See Thompson v. Brown, C/A No. 3:11-cv-318-TMC-JRM, 2011 WL 6012592, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (rejecting conditions of confinement claim where the plaintiff claimed “his mattress and blanket were confiscated for six days, he was not allowed to have any toilet tissue for six days, his clothes were taken away from him for six days, his cell was cold, he had no running water in his cell, and he was forced to sleep on a steel cot for six days”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 6012550 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2011). Indeed, the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only deprivations which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to provide the basis of a § 1983 claim. Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to set forth plausible factual allegations that the defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (or that they were even aware of the sink leaking). As such, the plaintiff's assertions that his constitutional rights have been violated because he was placed in a cell with a leaky sink that caused mold provide no basis for relief and are subject to summary dismissal.
Moreover, the plaintiff's general allegations with respect to being housed in a cell with three other inmates also fail to provide a basis for relief pursuant to § 1983. See Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that “double or triple-celling of inmates is not per se unconstitutional” (emphasis omitted)) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981)); Hite v. Leek, 564 F.2d 670, 673-74 (4th Cir. 1977) (internal citation omitted) (finding no Constitutional violation when prisoners held with two other inmates in cell with one inmate sleeping on the floor); see also Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1380-81 (finding no cognizable Eighth Amendment deprivation for double bunking absent proof of unsanitary or dangerous conditions which cause deprivation of an identifiable human need). Moreover, although the plaintiff asserts that he has hit his head because he is sleeping under the sink, the plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations that his cell conditions are unsanitary and dangerous remain insufficient to state a claim for relief. A “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Moreover, the plaintiff's amended complaint contains no factual allegations establishing that the defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind in placing him in the cell with three other inmates. “[T]he fact that such detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into ‘punishment.'” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979). As such, the plaintiff's overcrowding claim is subject to summary dismissal.
Supervisory Claims
Additionally, the plaintiff appears to assert claims against the defendants in their supervisory capacities at the Detention Center (appearing to assert that they are responsible for the alleged unconstitutional policies); however, even as amended, the plaintiff's claims are subject to summary dismissal. Indeed, the plaintiff's amended complaint includes a formulaic recitation of the elements required for a supervisory liability claim-but the plaintiff's amended complaint contains no factual or personal allegations of wrongdoing. As such, the plaintiff's supervisory claims are subject to summary dismissal because the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable to § 1983 suits. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, to allege a plausible claim requires a showing that the supervisor (1) had actual or constructive knowledge that his/her subordinates engaged in conduct posing a pervasive or unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was “so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) an affirmative causal link between the inaction by the supervisor and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Green v. Beck, 539 Fed.Appx. 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff has not alleged how the defendants were responsible for or involved in the conditions complained of herein-beyond conclusorily asserting that they “created [a] policy or custom” and that they knew and disregarded an “excessive risk to inmate health” (see doc. 22 at 4-5). Even assuming, arguendo, that the defendants knew and/or could be held responsible for the alleged unconstitutional conditions, the plaintiff has not presented factual allegations of an affirmative causal link-and his formulaic recitation of the elements does not meet the plausibility standard. See Griffith v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., C/A No. 2:12-cv-00239-DCN, 2012 WL 2048200, at *1 (D.S.C. June 6, 2012) (noting that the plausibility standard requires more than “‘an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). As such, the claims against the defendants in their supervisory capacities are subject to summary dismissal. See Ford v. Stirling, C. A. No. 2:17-02390-MGL, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2017); London v. Maier, C. A. No. 0:10-00434-RBH, 2010 WL 1428832, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2010).
Abandoned Claims
It appears that the plaintiff has abandoned his conditions of confinement claim with respect to his out of cell recreation time, his First Amendment claim relating to the postcard-only policy at the Detention Center, and his denial of access to the courts claim. The plaintiff's amended complaint makes no mention of his denial of out-of-cell time or recreation (see doc. 22). Additionally, the only allegations with respect to the plaintiff's First Amendment and denial of access to the courts claims are in the request for relief and as a subject mentioned in grievances filed by the plaintiff (see doc. 22 at 7, 9). The plaintiff was warned that an amended complaint replaces the complaint and “should be complete in itself (doc. 20 at 9 (citing Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001)). As such, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the plaintiff's abandoned claims. To the extent the plaintiff did not intend to abandon these, for the reasons set forth in the court's prior order, the claims would still be subject to summary dismissal (see doc. 20 at 4-7).
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued January 14, 2020, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment. Despite filing an amended complaint, the plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies identified in the order dated January 14, 2020 (doc. 20). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 Fed.Appx. 280, 281 (4th Cir. 2018) (in a case where the district court had already afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, the district court was directed on remand to “in its discretion, either afford [the plaintiff] another opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order”) (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)). The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 300 East Washington Street, Room 239 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).