Opinion
Civil Action 2: 16-cv-01081
06-21-2021
ALTON D. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. TOM WOLF, et al., Defendants.
ALTON D. BROWN SCI Fayette All Counsel of Record (via ECF electronic notification)
ALTON D. BROWN SCI Fayette All Counsel of Record (via ECF electronic notification)
Marilyn J. Horan United States District Judge
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: ECF N. 603
Cynthia Reed Eddy United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff, Alton D. Brown, with brief in support. (ECF Nos. 603, 604). The motion has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the motion be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff Alton D. Brown is a Pennsylvania state inmate currently incarcerated at SCI-Fayette. He has been diagnosed with a number of serious medical issues, including metastatic prostate cancer. Mr. Brown filed the instant motion seeking an Order requiring Defendants to provide him with pain relief for his cancer and medical care for the adverse side-effects of the medication used for Hormone Therapy. All Defendants have responded to the motion (ECF Nos. 611, 612, and 613 614) and Mr. Brown has filed an untimely Reply to the Commonwealth Defendants' response. (ECF No. 619).The matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.
Plaintiff was ordered to file a Reply to the Defendants' responses by April 26, 2023. See Order, 3/27/2023 (ECF No. 615). On June 6, 2023, without seeking leave of court to file a Reply after the time had expired, see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the Court received Plaintiff's Reply to the Commonwealth Defendants' response, which is dated 5/31/2023. Because Plaintiff has not shown that he failed to act in a timely manner due to excusable neglect, the undersigned will not consider the Reply in making this recommendation.
B. Standard of Review
Inmate pro se pleadings, like those filed here, which seek extraordinary, or emergency relief, in the form of preliminary injunctions are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; and (2) that he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017). “If these gateway factors are met, a court then considers” “(3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest.” Id. at 176, 179. The Court must determine “in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the preliminary relief.” Id. at 179.
Preliminary injunctive relief is not granted as a matter of right. Kerschner v. Mazurkewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). The decision to grant or deny such relief is committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 1982). Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that places precise burdens on the moving party, and “[t]he preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). Further, when the requested preliminary injunctive relief “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). “[W]here the relief ordered by the preliminary injunction is mandatory and will alter the status quo, the party seeking the injunction must meet a higher standard of showing irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.” Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance, Grp., LLP, 528 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm't, Int., 60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Indeed, a request for mandatory proactive injunctive relief in the prison context “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration'.” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). In particular, courts have been reluctant to accept inmate invitations to use preliminary injunctions as a means to judicially prescribe specific medical courses of treatment for inmates. In such instances, courts have typically declined such requests citing the inmate's failure to either demonstrate irreparable harm; Rivera v. Pennsylvania Dep't Of Corrections, 346 Fed.Appx. 749 (3d Cir. 2009), Rush v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 287 Fed.Appx. 142 (3d Cir. 2008), or show a likelihood of success on the merits. Quinn v. Palakovich, 204 Fed.Appx. 116 (3d Cir. 2006).
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are further underscored by statute. Specifically, preliminary injunctive relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. See 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(2). Additionally, in considering a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the court must give substantial weight to any adverse impact such relief may have on public safety or on the operation of the criminal justice system. Id.
For a prisoner to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm if the requested relief if not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998). “As these elements suggest, there must be ‘a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint'.” Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010)).
C. Discussion
This is the third time Mr. Brown has filed a motion for injunctive relief in this case regarding the treatment, or the alleged lack thereof, for his prostate cancer. A full-day hearing was held before The Honorable Marilyn J. Horan on February 21, 2021. (ECF No. 379). Based on the testimony and evidence produced at that hearing, Mr. Brown's motion for injunctive relief was denied (ECF No. 447) and Mr. Brown's request for reconsideration of that decision was also denied. (ECF No. 547).
Then in April 2022, Mr. Brown again sought injunctive relief based upon an alleged failure to appropriately treat his prostate cancer. Specifically, Mr. Brown contended that he had learned that the medical treatment he was receiving for his cancer was meant only to prevent his cancer from worsening and that Defendants never intended to attempt to cure his cancer. In denying that motion, the Court found the available evidence related to Mr. Brown's request did not show that the Defendants have prevented or denied Mr. Brown from receiving appropriate medical treatment. (ECF No. 556). Mr. Brown's request for reconsideration of that decision was also denied. (ECF Nos. 565, 570).
Mr. Brown has now filed his third motion for injunctive relief seeking an Order requiring Defendants to provide him with pain relief and medical care to treat the adverse side-effects from the Hormone Therapy. According to Mr. Brown, beginning in April 2022, his pain medication has been reduced despite his increased levels of pain due to the side effects of his hormone therapy. He contends that “CCS and its staff are experimenting on the Plaintiff (and various others no doubt) with several types of medication, inter alia.” Statement of the Facts, P's Br. at p. 1 (ECF No. 604). He once again asserts that,
Defendants have refused to make any attempts to cure the cancer (see Motion for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. #530) because of the high cost and hate for this Plaintiff. The Plaintiff is pretty much forced to rely on Hormone Therapy for the possibility of extending his life. Knowing such, the Defendants [have] conspired to sabotage even this (Hormone Therapy) treatment since living with the idea that Plaintiff is having his life extended clearly leaves a bad taste in their collective mouths.P's Br. at p. 3. And he claims that he has been denied medical care “for retaliation purposes and for the purposes of preventing and/or hindering the prosecution of this and other matters.” Id. at 5.
As with Mr. Brown's prior requests for injunctive relief, the Court has considered the parties' profound disagreement as to Mr. Brown's medical treatment. As explained in the Court's August 12, 2021 Opinion denying Mr. Brown's first motion for a preliminary injunction,
the ‘deliberate indifference standard affords considerable latitude to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate patients, [and Courts] must disavow any attempt to second-guess the
propriety or adequacy of [their] particular course of treatment so long as it remains a question of sound professional judgment.'Op. and Order, Aug. 12, 2021, at p. 13 (quoting Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 538 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (ECF No. 447).
Mr. Brown's present request for injunctive relief again concerns a disagreement between Mr. Brown and the Defendants about how he should be medically treated. As with his prior requests for injunctive relief, the available evidence relating to Mr. Brown's current request shows that he is being provided with continuing and ongoing medical care for his cancer, including pain relief.
The medical records indicate that in February 2021, Mr. Brown was prescribed Methadone for pain relief relating to his cancer. However, after being caught diverting the Methadone, he is now prescribed Oxycodone, which is crushed and put in water for him to drink.
In June 2022, Mr. Brown saw Dr. Miceli and complained of total body ache and requested an increase of pain medication. Dr. Miceli advised Mr. Brown he would increase the pain medication a little at a time if the pain is cancer related. Dr. Miceli also said he would consider alternate hormone therapy if the cancer is active.
In August 2022, Mr. Brown's PSA levels had improved and Dr. Miceli began to gradually decrease the Oxycodone (crushed) prescription: from 120 mg, four times daily, to 90 mg three times daily, to 60 mg, three times daily, to 30 mg, two tablets three times daily as needed for pain. On December 17, 2022, Dr. Miceli reduced the Oxycodone prescription to 30 mg (crushed), one tablet three times daily as needed for pain. This prescription was to expire on March 16, 2023. The medical record of evidence reflects that Mr. Brown's recent lab reports indicate that Mr. Brown's PSA level is decreasing.Because of this, Dr. Miceli gradually has decreased Mr. Brown's pain medications to conform to the level of his illness. Despite the decrease given his improved PSA levels, Mr. Brown regularly receives other pain medications, including Gabapentin, Ibuprofen, and Excedrin.
The instant motion and Declaration were received by the Court on February 24, 2023, although the motion is signed and dated by Mr. Brown on 12/28/2022, the Declaration is signed and dated 1/9/2023. The Brief is signed and dated by Mr. Brown on 2/21/2023.
Plaintiff has provided a 9/23/2021, Form DC-135A, Inmate's Request to Staff Member, directed to Dr. Miceli in which Mr. Brown states, “I note that we had the PSA down to zero, . . .” (P's Br., Exh. H, emphasis in original) (ECF No. 604-1 at p. 34).
After closely reviewing the exhibits provided by the parties, which include over 200 pages of medical records, and 46 pages consisting of grievances, sick calls, and requests to staff members by Mr. Brown, and the arguments of the parties, the undersigned finds that Mr. Brown has not met his burden of proof that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. The current available medical evidence reflects that the medical providers are attentive to Mr. Brown's complaints of pain, and attempt to limit his pain from his metastatic prostate cancer as medically appropriate. The available evidence related to Mr. Brown's request does not show that the Defendants have prevented or denied Mr. Brown from receiving appropriate medical treatment. Thus, the undersigned recommends that Mr. Brown's request for injunctive relief be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, it is recommended that Mr. Brown's Motion for Preliminary Injunction be denied. Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file written objections to this Report and Recommendation by July 10, 2023, and Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, must file written objections, if any, by July 6, 2023. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely objections are filed as limited to review for plain error)