Opinion
No. 2019-09475 Index No. 619838/17
07-27-2022
Lorraine Brown, appellant, v. Jaiquell Williams, et al., respondents.
Kujawski & Kujawski, Deer Park, NY (Jennifer A. Spellman of counsel), for appellant. DeSena & Sweeney, LLP, Bohemia, NY (Shawn P. O'Shaughnessy of counsel), for respondent Celenia Ramos.
Kujawski & Kujawski, Deer Park, NY (Jennifer A. Spellman of counsel), for appellant.
DeSena & Sweeney, LLP, Bohemia, NY (Shawn P. O'Shaughnessy of counsel), for respondent Celenia Ramos.
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, J.P., SHERI S. ROMAN, PAUL WOOTEN, JOSEPH A. ZAYAS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Carmen Victoria St. George, J.), dated July 9, 2019. The order granted the motion of the defendant Celenia Ramos, joined by the defendant Jaiquell Williams, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident on January 14, 2017. The defendant Celenia Ramos (hereinafter the defendant) moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. The defendant Jaiquell Williams joined the motion. In an order dated July 9, 2019, the Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
The defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956-957). The defendant established, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the significant disfigurement category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Mnatcakanova v Elliot, 174 A.D.3d 798, 799; Forster v Novic, 127 A.D.3d 605). In addition, the defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine and the plaintiff's shoulders did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 A.D.3d 614). The defendant also demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see John v Linden, 124 A.D.3d 598, 599; Marin v Ieni, 108 A.D.3d 656, 657; Richards v Tyson, 64 A.D.3d 760, 761). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Maldonado v Piccirilli, 70 A.D.3d 785, 786; Lynch v Iqbal, 56 A.D.3d 621, 622).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
IANNACCI, J.P., ROMAN, WOOTEN and ZAYAS, JJ., concur.