Opinion
Civil Action 2: 16-cv-01680
06-21-2021
ALTON D. BROWN SCI Fayette All Counsel of Record (via ECF electronic notification)
ALTON D. BROWN SCI Fayette All Counsel of Record (via ECF electronic notification)
Marilyn J. Horan United States District Judge
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the Motion to Renew Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff, Alton D. Brown. (ECF No. 424). The motion has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the motion be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff Alton D. Brown is a state inmate currently incarcerated at SCI-Fayette. Mr. Brown's daily supplemental high protein snack bags were discontinued in July of 2022. Now, almost nine months after the discontinuation, Mr. Brown filed the instant motion seeking an order directing Defendants to reinstate his prescribed daily high protein snack bags. All Defendants have responded to the motion (ECF Nos. 426, 428, 429, and 430) and Mr. Brown has filed a Reply. (ECF No. 434). The matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.
B. Standard of Review
Inmate pro se pleadings, like those filed here, which seek extraordinary, or emergency relief, in the form of preliminary injunctions are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; and (2) that he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017). “If these gateway factors are met, a court then considers” “(3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest.” Id. at 176, 179. The Court must determine “in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the preliminary relief.” Id. at 179.
Preliminary injunctive relief is not granted as a matter of right. Kerschner v. Mazurkewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). The decision to grant or deny such relief is committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 1982). Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that places precise burdens on the moving party, and “[t]he preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). Further, when the requested preliminary injunctive relief “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980). “[W]here the relief ordered by the preliminary injunction is mandatory and will alter the status quo, the party seeking the injunction must meet a higher standard of showing irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.” Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix Renaissance, Grp., LLP, 528 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm't, Int., 60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1995)).
Indeed, a request for mandatory proactive injunctive relief in the prison context “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration'.” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). In particular, courts have been reluctant to accept inmate invitations to use preliminary injunctions as a means to judicially prescribe specific medical courses of treatment for inmates. In such instances, courts have typically declined such requests citing the inmate's failure to either demonstrate irreparable harm; Rivera v. Pennsylvania Dep't Of Corrections, 346 Fed.Appx. 749 (3d Cir. 2009), Rush v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 287 Fed.Appx. 142 (3d Cir. 2008), or show a likelihood of success on the merits. Quinn v. Palakovich, 204 Fed.Appx. 116 (3d Cir. 2006).
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are further underscored by statute. Specifically, preliminary injunctive relief in a civil action with respect to prison conditions must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. See 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(2). Additionally, in considering a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the court must give substantial weight to any adverse impact such relief may have on public safety or on the operation of the criminal justice system. Id.
For a prisoner to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm if the requested relief if not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998). “As these elements suggest, there must be ‘a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint'.” Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010)).
C. Discussion
This is not the first time Mr. Brown's daily supplemental high protein snack bags have been discontinued. In September 2021, the supplemental diet bags were discontinued after the DOC's clinical dietician did not approve the medical staff's request to renew the order for a daily supplemental high protein diet bag. Because these supplemental protein diet bags had been recommended by the medical staff, the Court granted Mr. Brown's request for injunctive relief and ordered Defendants to resume providing Mr. Brown with the daily supplemental high protein snack bag. (ECF Nos. 350, 362).
According to the updated medical records provided by Defendants, Mr. Brown was reassessed on July 6, 2022. At that time, the medical provider determined that additional nutritional supplementation of Mr. Brown's diet was not medically necessary. See ECF No. 4282 at p. 2; ECF No. 434-1 at 4 (the Progress Note Medical Provider of 7/6/2022 reflects that Mr. Brown's BMI was 35.26, he was considered obese, he is not malnourished, and “snack is NOT medically necessary or indicated ”).
On a subsequent Progress Note Medical Provider, dated 7/22/2022, it was reported that:
1. His weight/height puts him in the obese category, therefore it is not necessary to have an extra 500 kcal snack bag, not malnourished, rather obese per BMI chart.
2. Ordering snack bag would illustrate non-maleficence on my part as provider since pt is obese, receives 3 meals with recommended caloric intake per ADA, and I would be giving an already obese individual an extra 500 kcal snack bag.
Pt does not agree and does not verbalize understanding.(ECF No. 434-1 at p. 6).
According to the Declaration of James Bright, the CHCA at SCI Fayette, in the past when Mr. Brown's weight fluctuated in the 170s - 190s range, supplementary dietary items were deemed medically necessary in order to increase or maintain Mr. Brown's weight. (ECF No. 428-1 at ¶ 5). Since the supplement was discontinued in July of 2022, Mr. Brown's medical records do not contain any indication that additional supplementation to his diet has been deemed medically necessary. In a November 2022 assessment. Mr. Brown's vital signs were recorded as BMI 29.8 and weight 220 lbs. (ECF No. 429-1 at p. 1).
And although Mr. Brown contends that he requires additional protein, the DOC's clinical dietician has determined that the mainline meals, which are provided to Mr. Brown, adequately accommodate his protein needs.
A critical difference exists between the discontinuation of the high protein snack bags in September 2021 and the discontinuation of the high protein snack bags in July 2022. The July 2022 discontinuation was deemed by Mr. Brown's medical providers to not be medically necessary. Because the medical providers providing care for Mr. Brown are exercising sound discretion in their clinical decision-making, the Court should not second-guess the propriety of that course of treatment. Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979).
After closely reviewing the medical records which were provided by Defendants and Plaintiff, and the arguments of the parties, the undersigned finds that Mr. Brown has not met his burden of proof that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Thus, the undersigned recommends that Mr. Brown's request for injunctive relief be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, it is recommended that Mr. Brown's Motion for a Renewed Preliminary Injunction be denied. Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file written objections to this Report and Recommendation by July 10, 2023, and Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, must file written objections, if any, by July 6, 2023. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely objections are filed as limited to review for plain error)