Brown v. U.S.

9 Citing cases

  1. Young v. United States

    305 A.3d 402 (D.C. 2023)   Cited 3 times

    "It may therefore explain, avoid, or qualify the new substantive facts or impeachment matters elicited by the cross examiner." Rose v. United States, 879 A.2d 986, 993 n.3 (D.C. 2005) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Brownv.United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. 2000)). "The scope of redirect examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a showing of clear abuse."

  2. McFarland v. George Washington

    935 A.2d 337 (D.C. 2007)   Cited 62 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Applying McDonell Douglas to DCHRA claims

    Evidentiary rulings are within the trial court's sound discretion, and we will upset them "only upon a showing of grave abuse." Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 643 (D.C. 1995)). Here, Mr. McFarland was able to offer evidence of the facts surrounding the RIF within CEEP, from April 1999 through October 1999.

  3. Rose v. U.S.

    879 A.2d 986 (D.C. 2005)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that trial court's ruling as to relevance is discretionary decision that will be upset on appeal "only upon a showing of grave abuse."

    See id. A trial court's rulings as to relevance, as with other evidentiary rulings, are within the court's sound discretion and will be upset "only upon a showing of grave abuse." Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 643 (D.C. 1995)). The defendant in a criminal proceeding "is generally allowed to raise at trial character traits which are antithetical to the charged offense."

  4. Williams v. United States

    268 A.3d 1265 (D.C. 2022)

    Based on the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the extent of cross-examination when it permitted introduction of Mr. Brown's prior inconsistent statement — concerning the Hickson assault — to the grand jury. See (Latasha ) Brown v. United States , 763 A.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. 2000) ("This court will set aside an exercise of trial court discretion ‘only upon a showing of grave abuse.’ ") (quoting Taylor v. United States , 661 A.2d 636, 643 (D.C. 1995) ).

  5. Green v. United States

    209 A.3d 738 (D.C. 2019)   Cited 2 times

    At the conclusion of cross-examination, the government can request an opportunity for redirect examination, which is usually restricted by the scope of cross-examination; this generally concludes the witness's testimony. Singletary v. United States , 383 A.2d 1064, 1073 (D.C. 1978) (explaining there is "generally no constitutional right to recross-examine a witness, since the scope of the redirect examination is limited to matters which were first raised on cross-examination, to which the opposing party is merely responding"); see alsoBrown v. United States , 763 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. 2000) (explaining the proper scope of redirect examination); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVID. § 32 (7th ed.) ("[T]he consensus is that the party's examination [on redirect] is typically limited to answering any new matter drawn out in the adversary's immediately preceding examination."). If, however, "material new matters are brought out on redirect examination ... the [C]onfrontation [C]lause of the Sixth Amendment mandates that [the defendant] must be given the right of recross-examination on the new issues."

  6. Terry v. United States

    114 A.3d 608 (D.C. 2015)   Cited 8 times
    Determining that sufficient corroborating circumstances justified admission of the defendant's statements under the Laumer test because the statements were made to a neighbor, whom he had a close relationship with, the statements were made days after the shooting, and eyewitness testimony and DNA evidence clearly inculpated the defendant

    Redirect examination may be properly used “to deal with matters which first came up on cross-examination.” Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C.2000). Here, the issues involving the 1992 murder case were first raised on cross-examination by appellant and the impressions that appellant intended to leave with the jury were misleading and unfairly prejudicial.

  7. Terry v. United States

    No. 12-CF-802 (D.C. Apr. 30, 2015)

    Redirect examination may be properly used "to deal with matters which first came up on cross-examination." Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. 2000). Here, the issues involving the 1992 murder case were first raised on cross-examination by appellant and the impressions that appellant intended to leave with the jury were misleading and unfairly prejudicial.

  8. Pietrangelo v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP

    68 A.3d 697 (D.C. 2013)   Cited 38 times
    Finding no abuse of discretion in requiring question and answer format to allow other party to have opportunity to object

    In re D.S.A., 283 A.2d 829, 831 (D.C.1971). Traditionally, courts have limited the scope of redirect examination to subject matter brought out on cross-examination. Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C.2000). Here, there was nothing unusual about the mode and order of examining Delery employed by the trial court.

  9. Lopez v. U.S.

    801 A.2d 39 (D.C. 2002)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that where there is a factual dispute between appellant and his trial counsel that can only be resolved by weighing their credibility, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing

    In addition, an appellant must show that the alleged error is "`so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.'" Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1142 (D.C. 2000) (citations omitted). We have also said that "reversal is warranted only in exceptional circumstances where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result."