"It may therefore explain, avoid, or qualify the new substantive facts or impeachment matters elicited by the cross examiner." Rose v. United States, 879 A.2d 986, 993 n.3 (D.C. 2005) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Brownv.United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. 2000)). "The scope of redirect examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a showing of clear abuse."
Evidentiary rulings are within the trial court's sound discretion, and we will upset them "only upon a showing of grave abuse." Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 643 (D.C. 1995)). Here, Mr. McFarland was able to offer evidence of the facts surrounding the RIF within CEEP, from April 1999 through October 1999.
See id. A trial court's rulings as to relevance, as with other evidentiary rulings, are within the court's sound discretion and will be upset "only upon a showing of grave abuse." Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 643 (D.C. 1995)). The defendant in a criminal proceeding "is generally allowed to raise at trial character traits which are antithetical to the charged offense."
Based on the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the extent of cross-examination when it permitted introduction of Mr. Brown's prior inconsistent statement — concerning the Hickson assault — to the grand jury. See (Latasha ) Brown v. United States , 763 A.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. 2000) ("This court will set aside an exercise of trial court discretion ‘only upon a showing of grave abuse.’ ") (quoting Taylor v. United States , 661 A.2d 636, 643 (D.C. 1995) ).
At the conclusion of cross-examination, the government can request an opportunity for redirect examination, which is usually restricted by the scope of cross-examination; this generally concludes the witness's testimony. Singletary v. United States , 383 A.2d 1064, 1073 (D.C. 1978) (explaining there is "generally no constitutional right to recross-examine a witness, since the scope of the redirect examination is limited to matters which were first raised on cross-examination, to which the opposing party is merely responding"); see alsoBrown v. United States , 763 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. 2000) (explaining the proper scope of redirect examination); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVID. § 32 (7th ed.) ("[T]he consensus is that the party's examination [on redirect] is typically limited to answering any new matter drawn out in the adversary's immediately preceding examination."). If, however, "material new matters are brought out on redirect examination ... the [C]onfrontation [C]lause of the Sixth Amendment mandates that [the defendant] must be given the right of recross-examination on the new issues."
Redirect examination may be properly used “to deal with matters which first came up on cross-examination.” Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C.2000). Here, the issues involving the 1992 murder case were first raised on cross-examination by appellant and the impressions that appellant intended to leave with the jury were misleading and unfairly prejudicial.
Redirect examination may be properly used "to deal with matters which first came up on cross-examination." Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. 2000). Here, the issues involving the 1992 murder case were first raised on cross-examination by appellant and the impressions that appellant intended to leave with the jury were misleading and unfairly prejudicial.
In re D.S.A., 283 A.2d 829, 831 (D.C.1971). Traditionally, courts have limited the scope of redirect examination to subject matter brought out on cross-examination. Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C.2000). Here, there was nothing unusual about the mode and order of examining Delery employed by the trial court.
In addition, an appellant must show that the alleged error is "`so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.'" Brown v. United States, 763 A.2d 1137, 1142 (D.C. 2000) (citations omitted). We have also said that "reversal is warranted only in exceptional circumstances where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result."