But § 4A1.2 has no bearing on the application of the ACCA. See Brown v. United States, 636 F.3d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 2011). "Section 4A1.2 speaks only to the calculation of criminal history points and does not bear on the calculation of [a defendant's] ACCA sentence."

Upon careful review of the record and the arguments in the briefs, we conclude that the district court did not err in sentencing Miller as an armed career criminal. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (if § 922(g) offender has three prior convictions for violent felony or serious drug offense committed on occasions different from one another, term of imprisonment shall be not less than fifteen years); United States v. Dunning, 666 F.3d 1158, 1166 (8th Cir. 2012) (de novo review of district court's determination that convictions for resisting arrest were violent felonies; Missouri felony resisting-arrest conviction qualifies as violent felony for purposes of sentencing defendant as armed career criminal); see also Brown v. United States, 636 F.3d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (Guidelines provision governing computation of criminal history does not bear on calculation of defendant's sentence as armed career criminal). In addition, having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues.

United States v. Hobbs, 136 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Brownv. United States, 636 F.3d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding reliance on § 4A1.2 in the ACCA context is misplaced); United States v. Medina-Gutierrez, 980 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating whether offenses are considered "related" under § 4A1.2 is irrelevant in the ACCA context); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 307 (9th Cir.1993) (declining to apply § 4A1.2 case law to an ACCA enhancement because the two provisions do not relate); cf. United States v. Harris, 369 F.3d 1157, 1168 (10th Cir.2004) (rejecting the application of § 4A1.2 in determining whether convictions are separate pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A));United States v. De Jesus Mateo, 373 F.3d 70, 74 (1st Cir.2004)

The defendant's argument and analysis are wide of the mark for § 924(e) prior convictions. See Brown v. United States, 636 F.3d 674, 675-76 (2nd Cir. 2011) (case law interpreting prior convictions "committed on occasions different from one another" for purposes of § 924(e) is controlling and reliance on U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 "is misplaced."). The government furnished as an exhibit the complaint from the state case showing the defendant was charged with burglary of a building (Topeka West High School) in violation of K.S.A. 21-3715(b).

That Rodriguez received concurrent sentences for the two convictions is irrelevant. See Brown v. United States, 636 F.3d 674, 675-76 (2d Cir. 2011).