Second, the construction and maintenance of the Butner softball field under the institutional policies in effect at that time "is precisely the type of discretion or choice that falls within the discretionary-function exception." Rodriguez v. United States, 415 F. App'x 143, 146 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see, e.g., McCoy v. United States, No. C-12-3821 THE (PR), 2014 WL 261833, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2014); Alvarado-David v. United States, 972 F. Supp. 2d 210, 214-15 (D.P.R. 2013); Brown v. United States, No. CV 00-0529 (RR), 2001 WL 477250, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2001). Because both prongs of the two-part test are satisfied, the discretionary function exception bars plaintiff's FTCA claim for the injury he suffered on the softball field.
measures are discretionary.); Reynolds v. United States, No. 4:04-cv-95/RV/EMT, 2006 WL 5400338, *5 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2006) (Unpublished) (decision not to provide seat belts in vehicle used to transport prisoners protected by the discretionary function exception because it involved balancing "security concerns posed by the use of safety belts, including the risk of prisoners escaping and the danger to Deputy Marshals by being in close proximity to prisoners during the securing and unlatching of safety belts, against the risk of injury to prisoners by not using the belts."); Lopez v. Brady, No. 4:CV-07-1126, 2008 WL 4415585, *15 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2008) (Unpublished) (decision not to pad basketball hoop poles in recreation yard susceptible to policy analysis, to wit: concerns that "weapons and contraband could be hidden within the padding and the pads themselves could be used as weapons, as an aid to escape, or as body armor or a shield in the event of an institution disturbance"); Brown v. United States, No. CV 00-0529(RR), 2001 WL 477250, *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2001) (Unpublished) ("[D]ecision about how best to anchor a basketball hoop to allow prisoners to play the sport with minimal risk to prison security implicates a discretionary policy choice. . . ."); Fanoele v. United States, 975 F.Supp. 1394 (D. Kan. 1997) (discretionary function exception applied to bystander wounded in courthouse shooting alleging negligence by USMS and private contractor in providing security.)
The court allows that the decision to install the UNICOR sign in this case could arguably qualify as protected conduct under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. Mr. Jackson, however, is concerned with the manner in which the sign was installed, not the location or its general appearance. Ms. Suates delegated the UNICOR sign's installation to another federal employee, and Mr. Jackson is alleging that this employee was negligent in the execution of his job. Defendant maintains that Ms. Suates' delegation of the task impliedly accorded discretion to the employee and cites Brown v. United States, No. CV 00-0529, 2001 WL 477250 (E.D.N.Y. March 19, 2001), in support. In Brown, a prison inmate cut his hand on an exposed bolt on a basketball hoop and brought a negligence claim.