Opinion
No. CV04-4004645-S
December 6, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS OF THE DEFENDANT UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION ( #124)
The movant's reliance on Hunter v. Olschelski, 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 585 (2002) is misplaced as that case does not address the scope of declaratory judgment relief. The standing issue in Hunter was the narrow one of whether or not the plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary to a contract and not the much broader predicate for standing set forth in P.B. §§ 17-54 and 17-55. A declaratory judgment action is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 627 (1977).
The movant contended at oral argument that declaratory relief was limited to either contractual parties or insurance carriers. Such a narrow construction would eviscerate declaratory relief which is broad enough to allow a resolution of coverage in the particular circumstances of this case. See e.g., Wynn v. Commercial Union Insurance Company, 12 Conn. L. Rptr. 51 (1994). While factually different the conclusions reached by this court in Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Patnat General Ins. Co., 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 73 (1996), inform the court's decision here. Coverage issues are the proper subject of a declaratory judgment action. The identity of the party seeking relief does not control. The issue raised here is no less substantial in the context at hand because it is raised by a tort plaintiff and not an insurance carrier.
Nor has the movant shown that this court could not or should not in the exercise of its sound discretion permit this action to proceed. Where as here the coverage issue is separable from the underlying tort action, its resolution first may well be dispositive of all three pending cases. See e.g., Christian v. Sizemore, 383 S.E.2d 810 (W.Va. 1989). In line with this conventional wisdom the plaintiff plausibly suggests a number of ways in which the resolution of coverage will expedite or eliminate litigation.
Motion denied.